




































FROM THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY TO 0% FINANCING:  



















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communication 
in the Graduate College of the  










 Professor Robert W. McChesney, Chair 
 Professor Inger L. Stole  
 Associate Professor Kathryn J. Oberdeck  






 This dissertation is a study of the commercial media system situated within the political 
economy of communication. Through a case study of General Motor’s promotional 
communication, this dissertation investigates how commercial propaganda, such as public 
relations (PR) and advertising, influence the commercial media. From 1990 to 2009, GM became 
a financial powerhouse through General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), its financial 
subsidiary. At the same time, GM increased production of SUVs. This dissertation examines how 
GM’s promotional communication supported these two trends. Through ads, GM sold SUVs 
using lucrative financial promotions. GM’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) complemented 
this approach by safetywashing GM’s SUVs through community programs. Thus, despite widely 
reported safety problems, many Americans believed SUVs to be safe. Likewise, GM used 
greenwashing PR and CSR to portray the corporation as environmentally conscious while 
lobbying against Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations. Through these PR and 
advertising campaigns, GM successfully countered criticism and shifted public opinion around 
auto safety and environmental regulations. When GM faced bankruptcy in 2009, the corporation 
used promotional communication to influence the debate over the auto bailout. In the years since 
the bailout, the auto industry remains surprisingly similar to the 1990s and 2000s. Despite their 
impact on consumer safety and the environment, SUVs are popular worldwide. The promotional 
communication tactics advanced by GM in the 1990s and 2000s continue to influence public 
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CHAPTER 1: “WHAT’S GOOD FOR GENERAL MOTORS” 1 
Introduction  
 In the mid-twentieth century, it was commonly said, “As General Motors goes, so goes 
the nation.”2 During the course of the twentieth century, this sentiment might have been 
rephrased to “As the auto industry goes, so goes the nation.” The auto industry provided jobs to 
millions of Americans in manufacturing, auto repair, and other industries. Consumers went from 
having virtually no automobiles in 1900 to two cars per household after World War II. The auto-
industrial complex not only brought prosperity but also shaped the public policies around auto 
safety, auto finance, and the environment. The auto industry used promotional communication to 
shape commercial media coverage and, ultimately, to shift public policies. This study is situated 
within the political economy of communication, a subfield that examines how the structure of the 
media system influences its content. Biases toward capitalism and power are naturally built into 
the structure of the commercial media system. Promotional communication, such as public 
relations (PR) and advertising, serve as commercial propaganda that influences the content of the 
commercial media system. This dissertation is a case study of GM’s promotional 
communication. In this dissertation, I analyze how GM used promotional communication to sell 
SUVs and auto loans from 1990 to 2009. The corporation used a combination of advertising, PR, 
and lobbying to make these products profitable. GM used financial promotions to sell dangerous, 
environmentally unsound SUVs without much criticism from the news media. Yet, in 2008 and 
2009, executives at GM distanced themselves from GM’s history of selling loans and SUVs, so 
                                                          
1 The title of this chapter is based on a quote that is commonly attributed to President Eisenhower’s Defense 
Secretary, Charles E. Wilson.  
2 TomDispatch, “As GM Goes, So Goes…,” The Nation, February 23, 2009, https://www.thenation.com/article/gm-
goes-so-goes/. This quote did not originate in this article but is referred to there.  
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that the corporation could receive a federal bailout with few strings attached. I argue that this 
demonstrates how promotional communication influences the commercial media system and the 
policymaking process with consequences for the public.  
In the following pages, I present my approach to the study of promotional communication 
at GM. I first discuss the nature of the promotional industries, establishing what they are and 
how I approach them in this study. I then provide an overview of the political economy of 
communication and the relationship between advertising, public relations, and journalism. This 
provides the background and context for my historical approach to studying GM’s promotional 
communication. I then discuss my case study of GM.  Finally, I give an overview of my research 
objectives, approach, and dissertation chapters.  
The Auto Industry and the Promotional Industries  
The automobile was an “epoch-making invention” that reshaped U.S. society around its 
use and maintenance. For example, the rise in importance of the oil industry is due to “in large 
part” to the auto industry.3 Automobiles required a variety of materials for production from glass 
to rubber to fabric, sustaining subsidiary industries. Beyond the numerous Americans employed 
directly and indirectly by the industry, the auto industry was also as a force of social change that 
reshaped social life. Automobile ownership enabled suburbanization. This new geography 
ushered in a world dominated by highways dotted with billboards and shopping malls that 
replaced public spaces in city centers.4 This cultural shift was a product of the immense 
communicative power of the auto industry. The auto industry has produced PR and 
                                                          
3 Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), 219. 
4 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2003).  
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advertisements aimed at encouraging the public to buy vehicles, shun investments in public 
transportation, and favor the auto industry as a creator of jobs, despite its impact on safety and 
the environment.5 
PR, advertising, lobbying, marketing, and related fields have been termed the 
promotional industries or promotional professions.6 These professions typically work to sell a 
product for their employers. A key facet the promotional industries is that they “serve primarily 
those who employ them.”7 Many companies employ both “in-house” communication employees 
and hire external firms, but typically there is an overarching communication strategy. These 
employees produce “promotional texts,” such as advertisements, press releases, and news 
influenced or entirely fabricated by PR. Scholars have analyzed these texts using both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches.8 Promotional texts are shaped by the firm that produces 
them and the firm that orders their production. With its army of internal and external employees 
in advertising and public relations, GM is in the business of communication. The auto industry’s 
array of promotional texts warrant analysis.  
Lizabeth Cohen observed, “Increasingly over this century, the economic behavior of 
consumptions has become entwined with the rights and obligations of citizenship.”9 Consumer-
citizens are expected to consume to ward off depressions and recessions, even if that means 
filling up landfills with iPhones, cars, and other goods filled with toxic chemicals. In this 
political economic atmosphere, the promotional industries serve as “commercial propaganda,” a 
form of “privileged communication conducted primarily by a small number of corporations to 
                                                          
5 Peter Freund and George Martin, The Ecology of the Automobile (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993) 
6 Term “promotional industries” from Aeron Davis, Promotional Cultures: The Rise and Spread of Advertising, 
Public Relations, Marketing and Branding (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013), 2. 
7 Davis, Promotional Cultures, 24.  
8 Davis, Promotional Cultures.  
9 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic, 408. 
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change the behavior of the vast majority of the population.”10 Commercial propaganda is not 
simply on behalf of a corporation. It has wide-reaching effects that reshape society. Ads and PR 
have played a role in the rising consumer debt, the increased rate of childhood obesity, the 
environmental crisis, and anxieties related to appearance.11 The auto industry’s promotional 
communication not only influences consumers’ purchasing decisions but also advocates on 
behalf of the political and economic interests of the U.S. auto industry. The auto industry’s 
commercial propaganda has influenced auto safety, auto loan regulation, and global warming. 
This section will describe two types of promotional communication that serve as commercial 
propaganda, advertising and PR, and their relationship to commercial journalism in the U.S.  
Although all promotional communication acts as commercial propaganda and behalf of 
corporations, the functions and methods of promotional communication differ. For the most part, 
it is easy to identify product advertising, although native advertising may be harder for 
consumers to identify. Product advertising became an important and necessary business expense 
under oligopolistic, national markets in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.12 In the 
nineteenth century, ads resembled classified ads and focused on product differences. Advertising 
has since evolved into a mature industry defined by data-driven practices that prey on 
consumers’ emotions. As Inger Stole discusses in Advertising on Trial, the use of advertising 
accomplished two things for firms: made their products more desirable by associating products 
                                                          
10 Robert W. McChesney et al., “Advertising and the Genius of Commercial Propaganda,” in The Propaganda 
Society: Promotional Culture and Politics in Global Context, ed. Gerald Sussman (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 
40; see also Inger L. Stole, “Cause Marketing as Commercial Propaganda: Neoliberal Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?,” 
in The Propaganda Society: Promotional Culture and Politics in Global Context, ed. Gerald Sussman (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2011). 
11 McChesney et al., “Advertising and the Genius of Commercial Propaganda.”  
12 Inger L. Stole, Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism and Corporate Public Relations in the 1930s (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2006), 4-5. 
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with emotions and increased profit margins by competing intangible product characteristics, like 
the feeling of driving a Cadillac, instead of price.13  
After World War I, advertising practitioners began to see the public as irrational and in 
need of guidance from advertisers. Because of sexist industry biases, ads often exploited 
women’s anxieties about appearance and other issues.14 Although the advertising industry was 
challenged by consumer advocates in the 1930s, it survived the challenge.15 During World War 
II, the industry cemented its role in the U.S. economy, as will be described in more detail later. 16 
After World War II, advertising further developed its use of data to target advertisements. With 
today’s digital advertising, ads are targeted at individuals directly based on their demographic 
characteristics, location, and detailed information about purchasing habits.17  
Most of the advertisements available at the GM Heritage Center were product 
advertisements for Chevrolet and Cadillac, two of GM’s most popular and iconic brands. These 
advertisements give a sense of the national campaigns during the period from 1990 to 2009. 
Many of the advertisements were made to be adapted by local dealers with whom GM shares 
advertising costs. By the 1990s, GM heavily emphasized financial promotions to draw in 
consumers, even though most consumers were not eligible for the best promotions. These 
promotions were particularly useful when paired with SUVs and trucks. Even with annual 
percentage rates as low as 0% on SUVs and trucks, GM made thousands of dollars on the sales 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Inger L. Stole, Advertising at War: Business, Consumers, and Government in the 1940s (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2012).  
17 Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
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of those vehicles because of their high prices. I explore how GM co-promoted GMAC financial 
products and SUVs in Chapter 3.  
In addition to product advertising, institutional advertising emerged in the early twentieth 
century to build public trust in the corporation and prevent muckraking investigations and 
regulation.18 Rather than featuring a product, such as a Cadillac, institutional ads advertised the 
corporation. For example, AT&T used institutional ads to cement in the public minds its vision 
of a monopoly with the public at heart.19 AT&T used institutional advertising that emphasized 
service and its role as a community member for over three decades. Along with AT&T’s public 
relations campaign, the institutional advertising campaign cemented in the public mind that 
AT&T had the public’s interest at heart through service. Because of this successful campaign, a 
1935 FCC investigation had little impact on AT&T’s operations.20 Although General Motors 
used institutional advertising early in its history, most archived advertisements are product 
advertisements. Thus, this dissertation does not analyze GM’s institutional advertisements.  
In addition to advertising, the second major type of promotional communication is PR. 
PR is the practice of corporations attempting to influence the public to change attitudes and 
behavior. It is a form of corporate propaganda that aims to prevent government intervention and 
support capitalism.21 Describing the role of PR in the political process, Alex Carey wrote, “The 
twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the 
growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as 
                                                          
18 Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in 
American Big Business (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 166. 
19 Ibid., 80. 
20 Ibid., 86.  
21 Alex Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty, ed. Andrew 
Lohrey (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997). See also Inger Stole’s discussion of PR in Advertising on Trial.  
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a means of protecting corporate power against democracy.”22 The overall goal is not merely to 
shape the image of the corporation but to shape public perceptions of the truth.23 Unlike 
advertising, “the best PR is never noticed.”24 Historically, PR practitioners have sought to 
publish press releases in legitimate news outlets to enhance the perception that PR is truthful.25 
Some scholars and practitioners of PR describe it as a “two-way” practice because of its 
incorporation of public opinion data.26 However, polls are not neutral but are created by 
practitioners, who often have a particular agenda. While PR tactics may take on an appearance of 
being two-way, corporate interests, not the public interest, will always be at the heart of 
corporate PR. 
PR evolved in response to muckraking journalism in the early twentieth century. At that 
time, PR was a defensive activity on behalf of corporations, so corporations primarily used it to 
excuse something that had already happened.27 PR has primarily been used by corporations. In 
addition to defensive practices to ward off criticism, corporations now practice PR proactively as 
a means of maintaining long-term relationships with the public and reinforcing advertising 
messages. Corporations engage in a variety of PR activities, including publishing public service 
publications and paternalistic programs, such as employee housing.28 These programs attempt to 
                                                          
22 Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy, 18. 
23 Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 6. 
24 Mark Dowie, introduction to Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Public Relations Industry, 
by John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995).  
25 Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy; Stole, Advertising on Trial; Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin 
(New York: Basic Books, 1996); Aeron Davis, “Public Relations and News Sources,” in News, Public Relations, 
and Power, ed. Simon Cottle (London: SAGE Publications, 2003).  
26 James E. Grunig, “Two-Way Symmetrical Public Relations: Past, Present, and Future,” in Handbook of Public 
Relations, ed. Robert L. Heath and Gabriel Vasquez (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2001); Larissa A. 
Grunig and James E. Grunig, “Public Relations in the United States: A Generation of Maturation,” in The Global 
Public Relations Handbook: Theory Research and Practice, ed. Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verčič (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
27 Ewen, PR! 
28 Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul. 
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build relationships with local communities to attain advantages for the corporation, such as 
preventing unfavorable regulations or avoiding public scrutiny.  
While PR is different from advertising, both practices function to strengthen the 
commercial appeal of the corporation and expand its political and economic power through 
favorable public opinion. Charitable donations have long been used to uplift corporations, such 
as by associating corporations with the arts. Donations also establish that corporations are active 
members of the community.29 With the advent of neoliberal policies that led to cuts in social 
services beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, corporations began to fill the gap in social services 
through corporate charitable activities.30 Some of these activities fall under the umbrella of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Because of the importance of CSR to the modern 
corporation, chapters 4 and 5 address how GM and GMAC used CSR as “window dressing” to 
cover for corporate lobbying against safety and environmental regulations. 
Commercial journalism in the U.S. has been heavily influenced by the promotional 
industries and commercial propaganda. One goal of industry PR is to shape the terms of debate. 
The “auto-industrial complex,” a term provided by Peter Freund and George Martin, includes 
auto manufacturers, the oil industry, public sector highway and transportation departments, and 
private sector entities whose interests align with the auto industry.31 Through their influence, 
“the effect of the auto-industrial complex is not one of mechanically determining outcomes but 
one of constraining the range of available options and of influencing discourses about them.”32 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Stole, “Cause Marketing as Commercial Propaganda”; Inger L. Stole, “Philanthropy as Public Relations: A 
Critical Perspective on Cause Marketing,” International Journal of Communication 2 (2008): 20–40; Samantha 
King, Pink Ribbons Inc.: Breast Cancer and the Politics of Philanthropy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2006). 
31 Freund and Martin, The Ecology of the Automobile, 134. 
32 Ibid., 136.  
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For example, by continually associating the automobile with freedom and individuality, as well 
as lobbying against public transportation infrastructure, the auto-industrial complex has 
discouraged the development of public transportation in the U.S. on multiple fronts. Although 
the auto-industrial complex shapes the realm of debate, it is not all-powerful. Ralph Nader’s 
stand for automotive safety is one example of a consumer victory, as is discussed in this 
dissertation. 
In addition to the economic power of the auto industry in terms of employment, the auto 
industry also provides much-needed advertising dollars to local news media, such as newspapers. 
Local newspapers are still the primary source of original reporting, even the digital era.33 Detroit 
has been linked to the auto industry since the early twentieth century. Thus, this dissertation 
focuses on how the Detroit Free Press covered the auto bailout in 2008.When the bailout was 
being debated in 2008, writers at the Free Press could have considered what alternative futures 
for the U.S. automobile industry might have looked like for the struggling metropolis. Instead, 
the paper’s coverage followed the logic and argument of auto industry lobbying and PR. 
Reporters did not examine how the auto industry had placed their city in jeopardy. Coverage 
focused on maintaining the auto industry as it was. This narrative largely closed off criticism of 
the U.S. auto industry’s promotion of gas guzzling SUVs and trucks. This argument will be 
explored in chapter 7.  
From 1990 to 2009, GM experienced acute financial problems. GM attempted to use 
financial products and SUVs to solve its financial problems. Financialization, the process 
through which GM built its financial empire,34 is the context for understanding GM’s 
                                                          
33 Robert W. McChesney, Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning The Internet Against Democracy (New 
York: The New Press, 2013), 173.  
34 John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces 
Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012); Greta R. Krippner, 
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promotional communication during this period. Financial products and SUVs could not undo 
years of problems. In 2008, GM appealed to the federal government to save the corporation. The 
corporation argued that it should be saved because it was a traditional manufacturer that 
employed thousands of Americans directly and indirectly influenced the employment of millions 
more. GM promised a new, green future and attempted to distance itself from its history of SUV 
sales and dependence on auto finance. In 2009, GM was forced into government ownership, 
bankruptcy, and then emerged as the “New GM.” The “New GM” was surprisingly similar to the 
“Old GM,” without its financial subsidiary GMAC. This dissertation examines how GM 
developed into a company that focused on financial products and SUVs and how this influenced 
its promotional communications. Eventually, it turned its back on two decades of promoting 
SUVs and finance to argue for the auto bailout in 2008. 
The Political Economy of Communication 
This section describes the field of the political economy of communication, which has 
strongly influenced my thinking on the relationship between communication and capitalism. The 
origins of the political economy of communication can be traced to both classical political 
economy35 and critical/cultural studies.36 In North America, the development of the political 
economy of communication can be traced to the growth of communication technologies, such as 
the telephone, telegraph, and radio. Prior to and during World War II, communication scholars 
                                                          
Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); 
Sunanda Sen, Dominant Finance and Stagnant Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
35 Graham Murdock, “Political Economies as Moral Economies: Commodities, Gifts, and Public Goods,” in The 
Handbook of Political Economy of Communications, ed. Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014), 13–40; Vincent Mosco, Political Economy of Communication, 2nd Edition 
(Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2009). 
36 Ramón Zallo, “Current Challenges for the Critical Economy of Culture and Communication,” in Power, Media, 
Culture: A Critical View from the Political Economy of Communication, ed. Luis A. Albornoz, trans. Ian Barnett 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3–34; 
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primarily focused on media effects research, such as how mass messages influenced the 
audience.37 For example, Paul F. Lazarsfeld developed early methods of communication research 
to test mass media effects and realized that opinion leaders, not just messages, influenced the 
audience.38 After World War II, Wilbur Schramm founded the Institute for Communications 
Research (ICR) at the University of Illinois, which became one of the leading communication 
programs in the country. During this period, the ICR supported both qualitative and quantitative 
research. It provided a place for critical scholars, such as Dallas W. Smythe and Herbert Schiller, 
to teach and talk about their work. 39 These critical political economists reacted against the 
effect-based paradigm.40 While they did not oppose empirical research, political economists 
wanted to do research that reflected democratic ideals.41  
Scholars within the political economy of communication subfield principally address why 
media systems are structured the way they are and how that influences social, economic, and 
political outcomes.42 Many studies within the subfield are concerned with how the media are 
structured by government policies and the democratic potential of media systems.43 Essentially, 
the political economy of communication asks questions about who owns the media, what that 
means for the democratic process, and how public policy influences the structure and function 
media system.   
                                                          
37 Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication 
38 He was also influential in sociology.  
39 Schiller was only employed briefly at UIUC.  
40 Garnham, “The Political Economy of Communication Revisited.”  
41 Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication; see also Jonathan Hardy, Critical Political Economy of the 
Media: An Introduction (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014). 




One of the key methods and approaches within the political economy of communication 
is historical research.44 Both Herbert I. Schiller and Dallas W. Smythe incorporated historical 
perspectives in their work.45  Historical perspectives on the development of technology and 
policy are crucial to understanding the structure of the media system and how that influences 
content. Unlike other perspectives within communication that privilege individual inventors and 
actors, the historical approach within political economy of communication presents a contested 
history of policymaking.46 For example, Robert W. McChesney addresses how community 
groups and industry lobbyists in the 1930s battled over whether the radio system would be 
primarily public or private. Victor Pickard addressed how public interest standards briefly saw a 
resurgence in the 1940s and have continued to influence media activists today.47 Amanda 
Ciafone discussed Coca-Cola’s attempts to “glocalize” advertising by promoting Coke in India 
with ads in “Hinglish,” only to face criticism from local communities because of its use of 
ground water. Resistance to Coca-Cola’s presence in India took the form of local protests that 
were infused with a global resistance to corporate capitalism.48 Reflecting this emphasis on 
contested histories, I explore the possibilities presented by citizens’ groups during the debate 
around the bailout in chapter 7. In chapters 5 and 6, I address the criticisms against SUVs from 
safety and environmental advocates.  
                                                          
44 Mosco, Political Economy of Communication; Robert W. McChesney, Communication Revolution: Critical 
Junctures and the Future of Media (New York: The New Press, 2007). 
45 Herbert I. Schiller, Mass Communication and American Empire, Second Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); 
Dallas Walker Smythe, The Structure and Policy of Electronic Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1957). 
46 Mosco, Political Economy of Communication.  
47 Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, & Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. 
Broadcasting, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Victor Pickard, America’s Battle for Media 
Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate Libertarianism and the Future of Media Reform (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
48 Amanda Ciafone, “If ‘Thanda Matlab Coca-Cola’ Then ‘Cold Drink Means Toilet Cleaner’: Environmentalism of 
the Dispossessed in Liberalizing India,” International Labor and Working-Class History 81 (Spring 2012), 131. 
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In addition to historical approaches, scholars within the political economy of 
communication also address media industries. Media conglomerates are vertically and 
horizontally integrated. Horizontal integration means that conglomerates own companies in 
different areas of media production, such as television and film. In contrast, vertical integration 
means that conglomerates own subsidiaries at different levels of production, such as production 
and distribution of television shows.49 Media conglomerates often include news outlets, such as 
broadcast stations or newspapers. Unfortunately, conglomerates may negatively impact news 
production. For example, ABC news declined to cover a story about labor issues at Disney’s 
amusement parks. Disney, as ABC’s corporate owner, may have exerted pressure on ABC.50 
This example sheds light on one way that media conglomerates use horizontal and vertical 
integration to their advantage.  
The political economy of communication traditionally asks questions about the 
communication industries. In that tradition, this dissertation follows the inquiry concerning 
power and commercial influence over the media, particularly in chapter 7 which examines how 
the Detroit Free Press covered the auto bailout debate. Yet, this project challenges the traditional 
scope of political economy of communication by suggesting that large industrial firms can be 
subject to historical inquiry following the critical, political economy of communication tradition 
because their dependence on professional communication makes them influential 
communicators.  
The North American school of political economy has also emphasized communication 
policy as a research subject.51 Political economists are concerned with how those with power, 
                                                          
49 Ben H. Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004). 
50 Janet Wasko, Understanding Disney: The Manufacture of Fantasy (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
51 McChensey, Communication Revolution; Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication. 
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especially economic power, influence policymaking. One way to explain this relationship is by 
using some of the “truths” identified by Robert W. McChesney in Communication Revolution. 
The first “truth” is “Media systems…are not ‘natural’ in any society.”52 Rather than accepting 
the structure of the media industries at face value, McChesney encourages scholars to ask why 
those systems are the way that they are. Communication scholars should work under the 
assumption that the media system is the result of government policies. Taking this assumption 
means acknowledging that a commercial media system is not the only possible media system 
within a democracy. By investigating promotional communication practices and their 
relationship to commercial journalism, this dissertation prompts questions about how the media 
system might be reshaped in the public interest.  
Relationship between Communication and Capitalism  
This section explicates the relationship between the media and communication industries 
and capitalism. Media industries are an essential component of American capitalism for three 
reasons. First, media industries offer an investment opportunity for capitalists. Investors and 
business owners seek out media firms and projects as investment opportunities because of the 
prestige and power of the media industries. Second, media industries are crucial to encouraging 
growth and dynamism within capitalism. Capitalism tends to be stagnant, but advertising, public 
relations, and other communicative processes can encourage consumers to buy goods or soothe 
consumer concerns. Finally, media industries are an entrenched part of American capitalism and 
their economic influence is a powerful force in the United States. 
                                                          
52 McChesney, Communication Revolution, 118. 
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The first function of the media and communication industries within capitalism is as an 
investment opportunity for capitalists, particularly those outside the industry. Although the risk 
of investing in a media production is high, the potential for profit is also high. In addition, some 
media industries are prestigious. For instance, the film industry has long been of interest to 
investors.53 Since the 1930s, banks have been involved in financing film productions. By the 
1970s, most of the largest American banks engaged in film financing; it was even a specialty of 
some bankers.54 Because banks want to minimize their risk, they insist that films be profitable 
and spend wisely. Film producers and creators know that the bank may ask for records to justify 
how much they are spending and expect a return on their investment. As Janet Wasko observes:   
Restrictive covenants provide a legal basis for banks to guide and enforce general policy 
objectives and strategies of a corporation, leaving the actual implementation of these 
objectives to the corporation’s management. In this respect, the bankers are the captains 
of industry, and their broad strategies are executive by lieutenants in film companies.55 
This leads to film production policies that emphasize predictable levels of income over 
creativity. Production companies want a product that sells reliably. Thus, production companies 
emphasize formula films and merchandisable films. 
 Banking and finance also influence journalism. As Núria Almiron chronicled in 
Journalism in Crisis, many media corporations have been financialized. Instead of profiting from 
the media content that they produce, financialized media corporations profit from financial 
investments. News outlets within financialized corporations may find it difficult to challenge, 
question, or cover financial capitalism in a critical way. In addition, the boards of directors for 
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media corporations often include representatives from financial firms who subject the media 
industries to the concerns of Wall Street. The emphasis on profitability can be detrimental to  
independent, critical journalism that relies on costly investigative research.56 In 2013, Jeff Bezos, 
the owner of Amazon, purchased the Washington Post for $250 million.57 The purchase 
immediately launched questions about whether Bezos’ involvement in the paper would 
permanently alter the Post’s editorial practices; Bezos could potentially prevent the Post from 
covering his company negatively.58 As media companies are absorbed into other industries, there 
are inherent risks. The cultural and artistic value of media content comes second to their status as 
a commodity to investors. This is particularly concerning when these corporations could 
influence journalism.  
 The second function of the media and communication industries within capitalism is to 
use advertising and PR to promote consumer spending. In advanced capitalist societies, 
developed markets are characterized by monopoly and stagnation. In Monopoly Capital, Paul A. 
Baran and Paul M. Sweezy chronicle how capitalism is not driven by individual entrepreneurs or 
business executives but by corporations.59 Within monopoly capitalism corporations are part of 
oligopolies, a market with competition among a few large corporations. Within oligopolies, 
corporations act in “corespective” ways, meaning they may collude or cooperate with other 
corporations.60 Because all firms are large and would be able to lower prices, corporations within 
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oligopolies typically avoid price competition. Price competition would likely result in reduced 
profits for all companies in the oligopoly, and consumers would just accept lower prices.61 
Instead of competing over price, corporations compete through sales effort, or promotional 
industries.62 As will be described in chapter 4, GM and GMAC utilized sales effort heavily 
through discounts and promotions, even one tied to recession after September 11th. GM spent 
millions on print and television advertisements, which provided crucial funds to news outlets.  
 The need for companies to use promotional communication has also impacted the 
structure of the media system, which has grown to rely on promotional communication. In the 
U.S., most media networks are commercial and depend on advertising revenue to survive. 
Scholars have criticized the media for decades, arguing they may be biased by their advertisers. 
For example, in 1919, Upton Sinclair wrote The Brass Check, which described how newspapers 
overlooked advertisers’ misconduct or provide favorable comment.63 Critical scholars, 
particularly those within the political economy tradition, frequently pursue this line of inquiry.64 
Robert W. McChesney argues the bias toward capital is built into how stories are covered.65 
Commercial news organizations are likely to reduce spending on journalism to raise profits; 
coverage may not be investigative, might lack sufficient context, and will rely on official 
sources, particularly public relations.66 In addition, advertisers may actively censor stories or 
journalists may feel compelled to self-censor.67 GM’s role as an advertiser gave them significant 
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influence over news coverage of manufacturing defect in their trucks in the 1990s, as discussed 
in chapter 7. Their long-term relationship with the Detroit press is the subject of the primary 
analysis in the same chapter.  
The third function of the media and communication industries within capitalism is the 
formation interconnected media oligopolies that wield massive economic power. The media and 
entertainment industries have grown faster than many other sectors in the U.S. economy, earning 
$1.9 trillion globally in revenue in 2016. 68 The largest market in the world is the U.S. where 
media companies earned $712 billion in revenue.69 In recent years, this growth has concentrated 
in a handful of companies that dominate the U.S. and global media markets.70 In his study of the 
top five media firms in the U.S., Ben Bagdikian found that “the Big Five have similar boards of 
directors, they jointly invest in the same ventures, and they even go through motions that, in 
effect, lend each other money and swap properties when its mutually advantageous.”71 While 
media companies claim the market is competitive, large, transnational media conglomerates 
often engage in anti-competitive practices or in “corespective” ways.72 In addition to further 
cementing economic dominance over the global media and entertainment industries, these 
conglomerates also use their economic power to create favorable policies. 
Advertising, PR, and Journalism 
Thus far, I have described the political economy of communication and the relationship 
of the media industries, including the promotional industries, to capitalism. This section expands 
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on the relationship between advertising, PR, and journalism. The relationship between these 
practices is central to the structure and inquiry of this dissertation. Ideally, journalism should 
serve as the “Fourth Estate” within a democracy by holding those in power accountable.73 This 
requires journalism that makes complex political issues understandable to the public, so that 
citizens can make informed decisions.74 Unfortunately, during the twentieth century, U.S. 
journalism became increasingly commercial and more reliant on advertising and public relations. 
This section briefly outlines how these industries developed during the twentieth century.  
U.S. journalism developed into a primarily commercial media system during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The newspaper industry transformed from one defined by 
independent, local, party-affiliated newspapers to national chains from between 1890 and the 
1910s. Chains relied more heavily on advertising, and the desire for ad dollars drove some 
outlets to rely on “yellow journalism” to sell papers.75 Criticism launched against corrupt 
newspapers led to the creation of professional journalism standards that emphasized editorial 
independence and neutrality. Unfortunately, this independence led to an emphasis “on achieving 
factual accuracy and on not… questioning the basic infrastructure of an often corrupt and 
dysfunctional status quo.”76  Professional standards increased the reliance on official sources 
limiting the range of debate and coverage of issues on which official sources agree.77 
Professional journalism became defined by a propensity to question within the bounds of elite 
debate and neutrality between two sides, regardless of factual accuracy. The problems of 
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professional journalism intensified as journalism became more dependent on advertising and as 
media conglomerates grew.  
News outlets are often part of conglomerates that put pressure on their journalism 
divisions to be profitable. As described earlier, the goals of journalism do not fare well when 
subjected to corporate logic. For example, vertically and horizontally integrated media 
conglomerates strive for synergy. Disney released the Hercules books, CDs, and film at the same 
time. To maximize synergy, Disney might also want its ABC news outlet to cover Hercules. 
Thus, synergy does not help journalism criticize power structures, but, instead, encourages 
positive coverage of parent company or its interests.78 Corporatization of the press “removes the 
press as a buffer between corporations and the public sphere.”79 Journalism should advocate on 
behalf of the public by holding those in power to accountable to public concerns, but it has 
become disconnected from the public. 
At the same time, advertising developed from simple descriptions to data-driven 
campaigns that target ads to desirable demographics.80 In the 19th century, ads were print-based 
and primarily descriptive. With the advent of national brands, ads became tied to identification, 
packaging, and slogans. Buying a product meant the consumer was buying into a lifestyle.81 In 
the 1930s, consumers began fighting the advertising industry and called for regulations on ads. 
The 1930s remains the one time when the role of advertising in society was up for debate.82 
During World War II, advertisers banded together to form the War Advertising Council. The 
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Council provided advertising for government bonds in support of the war effort. After World 
War II, the War Advertising Council became the Ad Council and continued the advertising 
industry’s productive relationship with the government. By working pro bono with the 
government, advertisers have avoided unfavorable regulation and protected advertising’s status 
as a tax-free business expense. Advertising’s tax-free status is one reason that corporations keep 
putting more money into advertising.83 In 2014, advertising accounted for 19% of the U.S. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and in 2015, U.S. advertisers spent over $140 billion. 84   
Parallel to both advertising and journalism, PR has also increased in importance during 
the twentieth century.  PR has its roots in the railroad industry in the nineteenth century. As 
railroads grew and advanced across the United States, opposition to railroad companies also 
grew. To promote positive views of the railroad industry, railroad companies used extensive 
publicity, such as offering rides to members of the press.85 Beginning in 1900, the first PR 
agencies were founded in Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C.86 Professional PR began 
primarily as a defensive practice against accusations of impropriety. For example, during a 1914 
miners’ strike in Ludlow, Colorado, about two dozen people, mostly women and children, were 
killed by the Colorado National Guard. In the wake of this tragic incident, known as the Ludlow 
Massacre, John D. Rockefeller employed Ivy L. Lee to persuade the public that the miners’ 
union was at fault for the deaths.87 Lee’s work on behalf of Rockefeller is one of the earliest 
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examples of professional public relations on behalf of a corporation. His tactics would go on to 
influence PR practices in the years following, as described in the next chapter.  
Although corporations are the preeminent users of PR and commercial propaganda, 
modern propaganda and PR also has its roots in World War I-era government propaganda that 
spawned social scientific research aimed at controlling public opinion.88 The U.S. government 
recruited PR professionals and journalists to generate support for American involvement in the 
war.89 This represented a sea change. World War I showed that PR could be used preemptively 
rather than defensively. In the 1920s, corporations tried to build positive reputations through 
large-scale campaigns that defined businesses as “public trustees.”90 These campaigns often 
included donations to charities. Today, such practices are often termed corporate social 
responsibility, which is the focus of chapters 5 and 6.91  
In response to the New Deal during the 1930s, businesses increased their use of public 
relations to counteract the consumer movement and respond to President Roosevelt’s reforms.92 
The advertising industry also used PR when it was under attack from consumer groups in the 
1930s.93 Because of quantitative media effects research during World War II, the PR and 
advertising industries modernized their techniques in the post-war period.94 For example, both 
industries began to use quantitative methods, such as polling and statistical analyses. These 
practices remain important in both industries today.  
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Today, PR professionals cultivate relationships with journalists to get press releases 
published. Although online publishing has lowered expenses, revenue from online ads is much 
lower than revenue from print ads. Despite increases in the number of online ads, total 
advertising revenue for newspapers has continued to fall.95 This has affected the overall quality 
of journalism. As revenue declines, newspapers are forced to cut reporters and staff. In 2017, the 
New York Times announced plans to reduce the number of copy editors significantly.96 
Newspapers rely more on press releases and PR materials as article sources to reduce costs. In 
the past, about 40% of newspaper articles were derived from press releases; today, the number is 
around 86% for some papers.97 Journalism’s increasing reliance on PR is also a boon to PR 
professionals who want to publicize their narrative.  
 The relationship between the promotional industries and journalism is where 
communication’s role in capitalism meets and challenges communication’s role in democracy. 
The shift toward “promotional culture” is not only an economic problem, but a political 
problem.98 Companies design media content to appeal to advertisers. The conflicting goals of 
advertising and hard-hitting journalism make it difficult to provide viewers and readers with the 
information necessary to participate in a democracy. “Soft” news, coverage of entertainment and 
lifestyle news, is popular. Other news coverage must emulate popular television in format and 
content, so important points may be glossed over in favor of shorter, easier to read articles. At 
the same time, advertisers influence news coverage and press releases are more and more likely 
                                                          
95 McChesney, Digital Disconnect. 
96 Sydney Ember, “Times Staff Members Protest Cuts and Changes to News Operation,” New York Times, June 29, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/business/media/new-york-times-staff-members-protest-cuts.html. 
97 Cutlip, The Unseen Power; McChesney, Digital Disconnect.  
98 Davis, Promotional Cultures, 1.  
24 
 
to be published as news with little oversight. During times of critical, democratic debate, like the 
auto bailout, this means that citizens may be short on information needed to make decisions.  
GM and GMAC 
 General Motors was founded as the General Motors Company by William C. Durant in 
1908.99 Durant expanded GM by purchasing stock in a variety of car, truck, and motor 
companies. This made GM’s manufacturing process easier. However, Durant’s flurry of 
expansions had also increased the company’s debt, and its board of directors began to doubt him. 
The board removed Durant from the presidency. In 1911, Durant established the Chevrolet 
Motor Company. Using Chevrolet, he purchased a majority stake in GM and merged the two 
companies together to form the General Motors Corporation in 1918.100 A year later, GM 
established the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). GMAC would become a key 
element of GM’s advertising strategies in the twentieth century. Importantly, GMAC offered 
financing to dealers and customers through installment plans or auto loans. Despite initial public 
reservations about installment plans, the use of installment plans would drastically increase in the 
1920s.101 GM recognized established GMAC “to gain control of the credit necessary for the 
distribution of its products.”102 This gave GM a new area of profitability and increased its 
manufacturing profits. 
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 GMAC served two functions: it helped dealers purchase their inventory and gave 
customers access to auto loans.103 With the volume of sales GMAC could support through GM 
dealers, GMAC was able to offer cheaper financing than an independent company. The 
arrangement also meant that more cars would be sold. GM wholly-owned GMAC for most of its 
history, so the corporation also earned income from GMAC stock dividends.104 Alongside 
GMAC, GM established the General Exchange Insurance Corporation in 1925.105 With the 
addition of insurance, GM further insured that dealers would use their financing system to buy 
and repair vehicles. Insurance also became necessary for customers to get financing through 
GMAC, increasing the likelihood that they would finish paying if their car was damaged in an 
accident.106  
GMAC’s Expansion in the 1990s and 2000s 
 In the mid-twentieth century, American auto manufacturers dominated their industry. A 
few decades later, their hold over the automotive industry collapsed. As GM responded to 
globalization and competition from foreign auto manufactures, GMAC’s importance within the 
company increased. In 1984, GM purchased Electronic Data Systems, an information and 
communication technology (ICT) company.107 EDS served a vital role in supporting GMAC’s 
loan origination through network technology. GM’s used EDS in the same way that many 
companies use ICT to support financial operations, as described by Dan Schiller.108 Investments 
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in GMAC, EDS, and other subsidiaries allowed GM to expand and boost profitability outside of 
the auto industry:  
The new pattern was set for the remainder of the model year. Roger would keep 
repeating, ‘We are now in a position for maximum profitability,’ and GM stock would 
rise. GM sales, meanwhile, continued to slump, down 33.94 percent in May and a full 22 
percent for the first full half of the ’87 calendar year. GM’s market share was down to 
36%. Yet, in perfect orchestration, the profits from the GM subsidiaries were announced 
as rising some 24.5 percent in the second quarter. GMAC led the pack with a 37.9 
percent rise in profits. In every case of gains, business outside of the auto industry was 
the deciding factor.109 
Under CEO Roger Smith, diversification played a role in making GM appealing as stock to Wall 
Street investors and maintaining profitability. In the 1990s and 2000s, GM relied on GMAC 
promotions to increase auto sales. Yet, despite its massive spending on advertising, GM lost 
market share from 1990 through 2009; the manufacturer, which had nearly 50% of the U.S. 
market at its peak in the mid-twentieth century, now has less than 20%.110   
 By the 1990s, GM was struggling to sell many of its models, except for SUVs and trucks. 
By focusing on SUVs and trucks, GM profited from both financial promotions and auto 
manufacturing.111 Thus, GM and the other U.S. auto manufacturers largely gave up on the small 
car market. Aside from selling SUVs, GM also expanded into other financial products, such as 
mortgages. GM hoped to use financial products and SUVs to keep itself afloat, but its financial 
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problems were too pervasive. In 2006, GM’s credit rating was devalued. GM needed money and 
needed a functional GMAC that could still make loans. That year, GM sold 51% of GMAC to 
Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm.112 The sale gave GM immediate cash and 
improved GMAC’s credit rating by tying it to Cerberus, instead of the now-toxic GM.113 
Unfortunately, when the mortgage market floundered in 2007 and 2008, GMAC suffered 
because of its mortgage holdings. It could not make loans for GM because GMAC faced its own 
solvency problems.114 Because of this, GM appealed to Congress for bailout funds shortly after 
the bank bailout in 2008, also known was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  
 GMAC needed to become a bank holding company to qualify for TARP funds.115 This 
required changing its legal classification and ownership structure. GM sold its remaining 49% 
ownership stake in GMAC to Cerberus.116 The Federal Reserve swiftly approved GMAC’s 
transition to a bank holding company in December 2008. In December 2008, GMAC received its 
first payment from the government--$5 billion from the Treasury.117 By bailing out GMAC, the 
government hoped that more credit would be available for auto lending to help stave off a crisis 
in the auto industry.118 The infusion of $5 billion was not enough to save GMAC or prevent 
crisis in the auto industry. However, due to the risk, the FDIC did not want to provide loans to 
U.S. auto manufacturers.119 Therefore, the federal government used TARP funds to bailout GM 
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and GMAC. By December 2009, the month of the third TARP investment in GMAC, an industry 
commenter noted: “The TARP program was originally intended for the banks, but most of the 
banks have found a way to escape out of that. At this point, most of the government’s risk is 
concentrated in automotive.”120 In 2008 and 2009, about $50 billion in TARP funds had been 
invested in GM, and $17 billion had been invested in GMAC.121 In 2010, nearly 100 years after 
the original formation of the company, GM had an initial public offering (IPO) and became the 
“New GM.”122  
Research Objectives 
 In 2008, as President Bush announced the bailouts of GM and Chrysler, The New York 
Times remarked, “In the end, it was clear, however, that Bush did not want GM or Chrysler, both 
American icons, to go down on his watch.”123 The American auto industry is a large part of the 
American economy but also lives in the American psyche as a quintessential American industry. 
From the Ford Mustang used in Bullitt to the Chevy Camaro that starred in Transformers, 
American cars, especially sports cars, are highly visible in movies and TV. A Pontiac Firebird 
Trans Am, a GM car, was even the star of the TV show Knight Rider. From the highway system 
to the growth of suburbs, the auto industry and automobiles have shaped the geography of the 
U.S.124 GM’s use of promotional communication has upheld their political and economic power 
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by functioning as commercial propaganda and political propaganda on behalf of industry goals. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, GM’s corporate structure expanded beyond auto manufacturing to 
incorporate finance and ICT. Ultimately, GM was forced to give up ownership of GMAC so that 
both companies could receive government funds. This context factored into its changing 
promotional communications.  
I use a critical communication approach that is strongly influenced by the political 
economy of communication. However, in a manner somewhat different from traditional political 
economy of communication studies, I focus on an industrial giant, instead of a firm traditionally 
within the bounds of the communication industries. GM and its contemporaries are crucial to the 
communication industries. GM has historically been one of the top U.S. advertisers. Despite its 
diminished market share in automobile sales, GM ranked third nationally in advertising spending 
in 2015.125 Its role as an advertiser, along with its network of dealers, makes GM important to 
news agencies that depend on ad revenue to fund their operations. GM and other auto 
manufacturers possess immense power to get favorable news coverage and press releases into the 
news. On the day that GM CEO Rick Wagoner testified in Washington asking Congress to 
bailout the auto industry, he also had an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal.  
 My dissertation is a case study of GM demonstrates the flaws of the commercial media 
system by examining how the auto-industrial complex has used PR and advertising to influence 
auto safety, financing, and environmental regulations. I seek to address the following questions. 
How did GM expand in the 1990s and 2000s beyond the auto industry? What is the history of 
GM’s use of promotional communication? How did GM integrate GMAC into its traditional auto 
advertising? How did this complement GM’s focus on SUVs and trucks? How did GM and 
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GMAC use PR and corporate social responsibility that focused on auto safety and the 
environment? How were these efforts related to GM’s lobbying campaigns against auto safety 
and environmental regulations? How was news coverage of the bailout in Detroit influenced by 
GM? What other possibilities for reform after the bailout existed? How does GM’s use of 
promotional communication reflect the biases of the commercial media system?  
 To address these questions, I rely primarily on document research using primary source 
materials from the GM Heritage Center, the official GM archive located in Warren, Michigan.126 
I primarily use advertisements, press releases, and annual reports to track the content of GM 
campaigns. This results in a top-down approach; my approach is similar to Min Tang’s approach 
in her case study of Tencent in China.127 By carefully tracking the advertisements and press 
releases produced, I can see the scope of GM’s campaigns and the narrative that those campaigns 
tried to advance. To supplement the primary source materials, I also used secondary sources, 
such as books about the U.S. auto industry, trade press materials, polling data, and news. I 
incorporate some criticism from consumer groups to demonstrate the missing narratives around 
auto safety, environmental regulations, and financial regulations. This provides a larger political 
economic context to GM’s advertising and PR. This is crucial to addressing these texts from a 
critical perspective.128 Putting these texts in context shows the ways in which they were 
misleading and how they shaped consumption and public policy debates.129  
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 Chapter 2 describes how GM became the dominant auto manufacturer during the 
twentieth century because of its use of planned obsolescence and financing. I utilize annual 
reports and secondary sources in chapter 2 to show how GMAC and other holdings became 
important beginning in the 1980s. Chapter 3 discusses GM’s use of promotional communication 
before 1990. In that chapter, I describe how GM played a key role in developing modern 
advertising techniques. I also describe how GM’s PR responded to concerns about auto safety 
and the environment beginning in the 1960s. I rely primarily on secondary sources to describe 
GM’s promotional communication before 1990. Chapter 4 addresses how GM used ads to co-
promote GMAC financial products and SUVs. I discuss the use of promotional financing and its 
ties to patriotism. I use both print and television advertisements from GM and coverage from 
Advertising Age to demonstrate the lasting impact of GM’s shift toward financial promotions.  
 Chapter 5 describes how GM used corporate social responsibility as “safetywashing,” 
while lobbying against auto safety regulations. I use press releases to describe GM’s corporate 
social responsibility programs related to safety. I incorporate consumer safety critiques in this 
chapter to demonstrate how the media and GM’s primary regulator, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) failed to address consumer concerns. Chapter 6 
describes how GM used greenwashing PR while lobbying against Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) regulations. I use press releases that focus on GM’s involvement in higher 
education and green technology. I further show how Congress and the NHTSA capitulated to 
industry PR, instead of pressing for environmental regulations. Chapter 7 addresses the 
relationship between PR, advertising, and journalism focusing on the Detroit Free Press and its 
coverage of the auto bailout. I then offer my concluding thoughts and future areas of inquiry. I 
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deviate from the GM materials to use the Detroit Free Press and government hearings on TARP 
to cover the debate over the auto bailout. 
Conclusion 
 The auto bailout was a missed opportunity. Nearly 100 years after its founding, GM 
became the “New GM,” but, as the auto industry enters another potential crisis, one might ask 
what is new about the “New GM.” SUVs are still the most popular vehicles in America, and their 
popularity is growing worldwide. Unfortunately, this has dire consequences for safety and the 
environment. Through advertising and PR, GM has sold consumers are vehicles that have higher 
greenhouse gas emissions, while delaying the adoption of electric vehicles. In the 1990s and 
2000s, GM was defined by its financial products and SUVs, but these trends have not ceased. 
With auto loan failures rising, the power of the auto industry to influence public debate over 
safety, the environment, and finance continues to put the public at risk. Addressing global 
warming requires addressing transportation, but that the auto-industrial complex has continued to 
delay progress. Changing the terms of debate requires considering how the auto-industrial 
complex rose to power and how the commercial media system has helped maintain its influence. 
This dissertation seeks to address those questions. The next chapter will show how GM became 
the largest auto manufacturer in the U.S. and why it turned to SUVs and finance in the 1990s.  




CHAPTER 2: THE RISE OF AUTO FINANCE AND THE SUV OBSESSION  
Introduction  
The introduction to this dissertation addressed the field of the political economy of 
communication and framed this dissertation’s study of GM’s promotional communication from 
1990 to 2009. This chapter provides a history of GM and GMAC in preparation for a discussion 
of GM’s promotional communication before 1990 in the next chapter. Understanding GM’s 
history is necessary to analyzing the advertising, PR, and news coverage of the industry after 
1990. Unlike Ford, Oldsmobile, or Dodge, GM was not founded by an inventor but a financier. 
GM was always a collection of parts, and those parts did not always work well together.  
Histories of GM often focus on management strategies aimed at making the companies within 
GM work in unison. This chapter describes the history of GM and GMAC from the early 
twentieth century through GMAC’s growth in importance from the 1980s onward, ending with 
an analysis of the two dominant trends in the auto industry in the 1990s and 2000s: the use of 
financial promotions and the sale of SUVs. Understanding these two trends is necessary to 
understand GM’s promotional communication from1990 to 2009.  
First, I address the early history of the auto industry and the creation of GMAC. This 
provides background information for GM’s shift toward broader financial offerings and SUVs in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Second, I describe the growth of GMAC from the 1980s onward, 
explaining how GM shifted into financial products outside of the auto industry. Third, I discuss 
how the U.S. auto industry shifted toward selling SUVs in the 1990s because of profitability and 
low oil prices. SUVs have become a key part of profitability for all auto manufacturers but have 
created safety and environmental problems, two subjects that are covered later in this 
dissertation. Despite its financial problems, GM was still the largest auto manufacturer in the 
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world and had the largest market share in the U.S. during the 1990s and most of the 2000s. Other 
auto manufacturers have followed GM’s lead in promoting financial products and SUVs. GM’s 
strategies continue to shape the contemporary auto industry.   
The latter parts of this chapter rely on GM’s annual reports from the GM Heritage Center. 
Annual reports are a fusion of public relations documents and important financial disclosures to 
investors. Thus, this chapter treats them as reliable sources of raw data and carefully supplements 
them with secondary sources, such as trade publications and news coverage, that confirm or 
challenge GM’s self-reports. I analyze them primarily as documents that present GM’s narrative 
about what kind of corporation it was.130 I do not address whether GM’s use of financialization 
was ultimately harmful to the corporation; that has been the subject of numerous works and is 
outside the scope of this dissertation.131 Instead, I use primary and secondary materials to chart 
the growth of GM’s financial empire and the sale of SUVs as trends that affected GM’s 
promotional communication in the 1990s and 2000s.  
The Auto Industry before World War II  
Economists Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy describe the automobile as an “epoch 
making” innovation because the U.S. economy was reshaped around the production and use of 
the automobile. The automobile industry employed millions of people directly; millions more 
worked in industries that depended on the auto industry for prosperity, such as petroleum and 
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rubber.132 Outside of auto manufacturing, automobile dealers, gas stations, and repair shops all 
benefit from the auto industry. One could even argue that roadside motels and resorts are 
beneficiaries of the auto industry because highways have made travel easier and more frequent. 
The auto industry has transformed how America uses natural resources, does business, and 
travels. Yet, it was not clear from the birth of the automobile that automobiles would transform 
America and the world.  
 The early auto industry was intensely competitive. Beginning in the nineteenth century, 
numerous inventors worked on projects that would eventually lead to the modern automobile.133 
In the 1860s, spurred by the discovery of petroleum, inventors in Germany and France began 
developing combustion engines that used gas.134 At this time, automobiles were viewed as a 
replacement for carriages for the wealthy. Most automobile manufacturers were assemblers who 
bought existing parts, such as carriage bodies and engine parts, and put them together. Because 
anyone could be a manufacturer, the number of manufacturers rapidly increased. These small-
scale operations bear little similarity to the vertically integrated manufacturing operations of 
today’s automobile industry.135 Early automobiles also ran on variety of fuels, including steam, 
kerosene, electric, and gas.136 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the speed and 
power of gas combustion engines began to outpace other engines. In 1895, a gas-powered 
automobile won a major Chicago race.137 After this, gas-powered vehicles were viewed as 
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technologically superior to other alternatives, such as electric vehicles. The dominance of gas-
powered vehicles would go unchallenged for decades.  
 The shift toward gas-powdered automobiles also marked a shift in automobile 
production. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, inventors and financiers with 
dreams of large-scale automobile production sought to change the industry. The auto industry 
made its home in Michigan because the state was home to many of the materials that the auto 
and carriage industries needed, including iron, copper, and lumber. Furthermore, banks in Detroit 
were less skeptical of the auto industry than their New York counterparts.138 In 1899, R.E. Olds 
created the first U.S. automobile factory in Detroit, Michigan.139 His factory inspired Henry 
Ford.140 In 1903, Ford established the Ford Motor Company. Ford is best remembered for his 
manufacturing system that tasked workers with small, repetitive tasks that were supplemented by 
automation. This meant that workers produced nearly identical vehicles quickly.141 By 1907, 
Ford had decided to focus on one model that would become a staple for many Americans: the 
Model T.142 Ford further refined his manufacturing process over the next decade. In 1915, his 
production method enabled him to reduce the price of the Model T to less than its 1908 price.143 
Over the two decades, Ford manufactured about 15 million Model Ts.144 The Model T was 
known for its unparalleled dependability, but fashion would soon become more important.  
 While Ford undoubtedly holds a place in automobile history for his innovations in 
production, General Motors developed another key innovation: automotive finance. When Ford 
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and Olds began selling their automobiles, Americans only purchased automobiles with cash. 
Thus, the automobile market consisted of those who could afford to spend hundreds of dollars at 
once. GM changed that. In 1908, GM began as a different kind of automotive company from 
Ford and Oldsmobile. W. C. Durant, GM’s founder, owned a horse-drawn carriage business and 
purchased his way into auto manufacturing. Over two years, he bought stakes in car, truck, and 
engine companies and brought them together as part of the General Motors Company.145 
Eventually, Durant’s financial backers grew concerned that the sizable company would not turn a 
profit, and Durant lost control of GM.146 Not content with failure, Durant established the 
Chevrolet Motor Company in 1911. He grew the company over the next few years and used it to 
purchase a controlling share in GM in 1918. Durant was once again president of the General 
Motors Corporation.147  
 Durant’s return to GM demonstrated a key problem that the early automobile industry 
faced. Automobiles were relatively new products with untested market potential, and no one 
really knew how many could be sold. Many banks, like those in New York, were skeptical of 
financing automobile companies and their customers. Due to lack of financing, Ford had even 
been forced to delay the founding of his company. Further, skepticism from banks had forced 
Durant out of GM. In 1918, Durant pursued a new strategy that would ensure GM would have 
adequate financing in the future. In 1919, the GM incorporated its subsidiary, the General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), under New York banking laws.148 Through GMAC, 
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GM could provide millions of dollars of internal financing for dealer inventories and customer 
purchases.149 Furthermore, because GM wholly-owned GMAC, GMAC’s revenue would go 
back into GM, keeping its profit margins healthy. With the help of GMAC, Americans began 
buying their vehicles on installment, an early form of auto loan. By 1925, 75% of customers used 
installment plans to purchase their vehicles.150 Between 1920 and 1930, millions more vehicles 
were put on the roads; the automobile had been transformed from a luxury good into an 
affordable commodity. 
 Auto manufacturers successfully sold their product to the American people, but for the 
industry to survive, they needed to sell even more cars. By the late 1920s, the market was 
saturated, and Americans were no longer buying vehicles.151 Installment plans had expanded the 
market beyond those who could pay for the car in cash, but auto manufacturers needed car 
owners to buy newer, better cars more frequently. Henry Ford insisted on making and selling his 
dependable Model T, but dependability would soon be outweighed by fashion. In 1923, GM 
began offering annual models.152 Annual models offered three advantages for GM. First, GM 
could appeal to different kinds of customers by offering a “car for every purse.”153 To support 
the variety of vehicles offered, GM used market research to tailor their ads to different 
customers.154 Second, instead of rolling out engineering advantages when they happened, the 
annual model policy meant that new models would be released at the same time every year. GM 
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offered customers improved technology, different styling, and increased prices all at once.155 
Third, customers could trade their old vehicles for new ones.156 GM’s fusion of GMAC 
installment plans and annual models became the norm in post-World War II America.157 While 
Ford sold Americans on dependability, GM sold them on “planned obsolescence,” the term used 
to describe producing new products rapidly so that consumers buy products more often. The 
advertising tactics that supported planned obsolescence will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 Using installment plans, advertising, annual models, and even paint colors, GM began to 
eclipse Ford as the dominant automaker. GM emphasized change, while Ford seemed stuck in 
the past. Feeling installment plans were irresponsible, Ford offered a Weekly Purchase Plan 
through which customers could save for a car with the dealer. His plan proved unpopular, and 
customers flocked to GM dealers to use GMAC installment plans. 158  Ford was reluctant to 
change or cease production of his Model T, but GM offered different models and brands for 
different customers. GM’s most affordable brand was the Chevrolet. By 1927, Chevrolet models 
outsold the best-selling Model T. The Model T had modernized production and affordability, but 
GM had sold Americans on annual models. By the 1930s, GM had more than 40% of customer 
sales and was the dominant U.S. auto manufacturer. In contrast, Ford had dropped from over 
50% of the market in 1922 to less than 10% in 1927.159 GM set the stage for modern automobile 
production, sales, and advertising through planned obsolescence, emphasis on style, and use of 
installment plans.  
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Yet, GM could not avoid the Great Depression. About half of the autoworkers in Detroit 
were laid off between 1929 and 1931.160 To offset losses in vehicle sales, auto manufacturers 
sold accessories and parts to keep profits high.161 The decline in auto sales hastened the 
consolidation of the auto market. At the start of the twentieth century, there had been hundreds of 
small manufacturers of automobiles. The shift toward mass production caused many small 
manufacturers to fail, but there were still independent manufacturers in 1929. The decline in 
sales finally put an end to most of the remaining independent manufacturers.162 Ford was forced 
to adapt to GM’s tactics. In 1932, Ford began producing multiple models; in 1933, the company 
introduced an annual style change policy. Ford’s acceptance of planned obsolescence meant that 
GM had finally won its marketing war.163 It also demonstrated that GMAC and captive finance 
companies led to greater profitability.164 
Beginning in the 1930s and 40s, the auto industry flexed its political muscle. In 1932, 
GM established the National Highway Users Conference to lobby for the construction of 
highways. Government interest in creating and maintaining roads not only led to consumer car 
sales but also expanded the market for buses that were also produced by the auto 
manufacturers.165 Because of these public policies, the Victorian era trolley system was replaced 
by buses and automobiles. The end of the trolley system was only the beginning of the policy 
changes initiated by the auto industry. After World War II, the industry would push for more 
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policies that changed the geography of the U.S. and made Americans dependent on vehicles for 
work and leisure.  
While the auto industry began flexing its political muscle, workers began asking for 
more. During the 1930s, unionization in the auto industry increased. Strikes and the threat of 
unionization had plagued the auto industry since early twentieth century.166 Ford’s famous 
commitment to pay his workers enough to buy the cars that they built was necessary to keep 
people from walking off the production line because of working conditions. In 1917, the Auto 
Workers Union (AWU) formed as an off-shoot of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). At 
its peak in 1919, the AWU represented only 45,000 workers out of nearly 350,000 thousand. The 
AWU failed to organize the industry and folded due to internal problems.167 In 1926, the AFL 
attempted to organize in the auto industry. Many auto workers wanted a union that represented 
all auto workers who worked on the assembly line. However, the AFL was organized by craft 
unions and wanted auto workers to be represented by craft unions based on their specialties.168 
The AFL’s craft unions failed to gain traction in the industry.  
The 1933 the passage of National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) permitted the 
formation of unions. Companies that followed NIRA guidelines often marketed their products 
with the NIRA “Blue Eagle.” Although GM used the “Blue Eagle” in advertising, it also 
contributed to the American Liberty League, which opposed NIRA.169 Although NIRA was ruled 
unconstitutional a few years later, workers had already begun to organize again in the auto 
industry.170 The passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 again permitted unionization, so the AFL 
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organized the United Automobile Workers (UAW) for “those workers who actually operated the 
assembly line.”171 The UAW fulfilled auto workers’ desire for a collective union. Locals 
affiliated with the other automobile unions quickly joined the UAW. In 1936, beginning with 
GM, the UAW began organizing workers at GM, Ford, and Chrysler, a group known as the “Big 
3.” The UAW targeted GM’s plant in Flint, Michigan, where all but 20% of the population was 
employed by the auto manufacturer.172 GM opposed unionization and fought the AFL. However, 
in 1937, GM was forced to the negotiation table when a series of sit-down strikes spread from 
Flint to other plants in the Midwest.173 Following their success at GM, the UAW organized at 
Ford in 1937.174 The UAW’s tactic of starting with GM and playing the Big 3 off of each other 
continued after World War II.  
During World War II, GM shifted its production from consumer vehicles to tanks, 
military vehicles, and other equipment so that the corporation could survive and wait for the 
boom of the postwar years. Even during this period, GM did not stop its ads and public relations. 
Instead, it leveraged them to remind people that the corporation supported the war effort. GM 
remained a major defense contractor in the 1950s, boosting its profits and its importance to the 
U.S. economy.175 The next chapter describes how GM’s shift to war production during World 
War II helped the industry survive and became an important advertising tool during and after 
World War II. 
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By 1946, there were only nine auto manufacturers.176 During the next few decades, the 
industry would further consolidate as the Big 3 came to dominate the U.S. auto industry, while 
the fourth major U.S. auto manufacturer, American Motors, struggled until the 1980s.177 The Big 
3 dominated because they were vertically integrated. Vertical integration refers to companies 
controlling production at different stages of the production process. U.S. auto manufacturers 
design vehicles, produce parts, and assemble those parts into vehicles. GM and Ford owned 
mines and lumber mills that produced some of the raw materials necessary for their products. 
Vertical integration helped large manufacturers control the price of production and ensure 
adequate supply of products.178 Of the Big 3, GM was the most vertically integrated.179 GM’s 
vertically integrated structure made it the leader of the auto industry in the post-war period; the 
auto giant set the standard that other manufacturers had to follow. 
In the post-war period, companies raced to sell consumer products. Consumers were 
ready to purchase but feared rapid price increases if war-time price controls were removed.180 
Consequently, unions fought for increased wages and federal price controls after the war ended. 
Prior to World War II, union membership had risen to over 28% of the population; after the war, 
membership remained high. In 1945, the UAW began a strike at GM for higher wages and price 
controls.181 In 1946, strikes spread around the country as workers demanded a higher quality of 
life.182 Despite a long strike at GM, the UAW was unable to achieve all of its goals; the union 
won a higher wage, but the federal government removed price controls.183 Auto prices rose in the 
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1950s and continued to rise in the following decades because GM’s annual style change policy 
required an annual increase in prices.184 Despite price increases, American cars were enormously 
popular. Unions and manufacturers both benefited from immense economic and political power.  
Auto manufacturers needed to catch up on years of lost sales during the war, so they had 
to produce new vehicles quickly. This gave unions more leverage. In 1950, the UAW negotiated 
a historic contract with GM, known as the “Treaty of Detroit.” The inclusion of pension benefits 
and a health plan set the contract apart from those that preceded it.185 The “Treaty of Detroit” 
was a win for workers. However, it also set in motion the post-war paradigm. Under this 
paradigm, health care, pensions, and other benefits that might be provided by the government 
were instead provided by private enterprise.186 In 2008, the UAW pension fund would become 
the subject of scrutiny. Opponents of the labor movement argued that UAW workers had too 
many benefits and that costly benefits had pushed auto industry to bankruptcy. Between the 
“Treaty of Detroit” and the 2008 bailout, the UAW’s power and prestige fell alongside the U.S. 
auto industry.  
The 1950s led to power and profitability for auto manufacturers. After returning from the 
war, veterans moved to the suburbs and needed cars to get there. Young suburban families 
bought millions of cars, so that “three-quarters of American households owned at least one car 
by the end of the 1950s.”187 Yet, the cars they were buying were not all American. Import sales 
grew gradually in the 1950s until they were about 10% of all U.S. consumer sales in 1959.188 
Before 1959, U.S. auto manufacturers focused on large vehicles because they were more 
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profitable than small ones; the same logic that led the industry to focus on SUVs in the 1990s.189  
However, the growth of the import market convinced U.S. manufacturers that they could 
challenge foreign manufacturers on small cars. In 1959, the Big 3 entered the compact car 
market by importing cars from their European subsidiaries because it was less expensive than 
building new facilities to produce compact cars.190 At first, American compacts effectively 
competed with imports because most imports did not have dealers and servicers.191 Americans 
chose to buy American because they were easier to buy and service.  
Despite initially offering competitive vehicles, GM’s annual style change policy 
mandated that the price and size of the vehicle should always be increased. Long-time GM 
President Alfred P. Sloan emphasized vehicle size in design because he felt that Americans liked 
large vehicles. Thus, American “compact” cars continued to grow in length and price during the 
1960s. With American “compact” cars no longer compact, customers again turned to imports in 
the 1960s. By 1968, the import market was even larger than a decade earlier. That year, the Big 3 
announced new compact and subcompact models.192 Unlike their previous foray into compact 
and subcompact cars, these models were produced domestically, not overseas.  
During this era, the Big 3 also began offering sports cars, such as the Ford Mustang. In 
addition, they added a variety of accessories, such as stereos, cigarette lighters, and chrome 
plating.193 These additions drove up vehicle prices even more. The Big 3’s prices were 
particularly high when compared to imported models that were equipped with few accessories. 
Confusion over vehicle pricing led to the passage of price labeling laws in the 1950s that 
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required dealers to show the list price and other charges that raised the price, such as accessories. 
However, despite some transparency in dealer pricing, prices still varied between customers 
because of financing charges.194 Despite continued price increases, vehicles did not advance 
technologically between 1945 and 1965.195 Prices also rose due to increased advertising costs. 
All U.S. auto manufacturers increased their spending on ads, but GM spent the most. However, 
because GM sold the most vehicles, the advertising cost per vehicle was lower than other 
manufacturers.196 
During the 1950s and 1960s, auto manufacturers needed to sell more vehicles to stay 
afloat. This meant selling vehicles more frequently and encouraging families to buy multiple 
vehicles. Manufacturers advertised vehicles to both parents and teens. In ads, the ideal suburban 
family was portrayed as hyper-mobile. These tactics succeeded. Only 7% of families had more 
than one car in 1950. By 1970, 29% of families had more than one car.197 As I discuss in the next 
chapter, GM attempted to sell families on multiple vehicles beginning in the 1930s, but the 
development of the suburbs helped to spur families to purchase multiple vehicles.  
In addition to increased advertising and GM’s focus on suburban families, GMAC and 
captive finance companies helped increase automobile sales, and consequently, increase 
consumer debt.198 Increasing personal debt fueled consumers’ desires to purchase cars and move 
to the suburbs. GMAC inspired Ford and Chrysler to create their own credit subsidiaries. These 
credit subsidiaries drew customers in with offers of available credit for most customers.199 With 
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easier access to credit, customers took on loans for more consumer purchases. Originally, 
GMAC was a “limited captive” because it financed GM’s auto customers and dealers.200 
However, GMAC expanded into a “mixed captive” in the late twentieth century when it began to 
make corporate loans and loans to consumers in other industries, such as housing.  
Public policy also played a role in encouraging the growth of the suburban population. In 
1956, the federal government began building the Interstate Highway System. Between 1956 and 
1970, the government spent over $69 billion more on highways than on rail transit.201 This aided 
suburban sprawl because suburbanites could more easily commute into city centers. Shopping 
centers cropped up in suburban areas to relieve the traffic congestion caused by suburbanites 
commuting to urban shopping districts.202 Federal policies encouraged Americans to buy 
automobiles instead of railway passes because of the proliferation of highways and the ease of 
credit access. American lives and livelihoods were reformulated around the automobile, giving 
the Big 3 tremendous political and economic power. In addition to the building and maintenance 
of highways, other public policies, such as gas subsidies and tax deductions, help to keep 
Americans’ interest in automobiles high. 
Despite the American love of automobiles, some citizens became skeptical of the safety 
and environmental impact of automobiles. Beginning in the 1950s, some members of the public 
expressed concerned about air pollution. The auto industry offered a solution through “blow-by” 
devices that reduced the harmful fumes from vehicle exhaust. The industry hoped that the 
installation of “blow-by” devices would prevent national legislation.203 However, after the 
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publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, the environmental movement continued to grow, 
and public concern increased. In 1965, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Act to 
ease public concerns. The same year, Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed was published and 
prompted widespread concern about auto safety. The auto industry continued to fight safety and 
environmental regulations in the following decades. These policy issues will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter and chapters 5 and 6.  
Nader’s attacks in the 1960s began a period of intense scrutiny for the auto industry. In 
1970, Congress passed the Clean Air Act, inaugurating the first emissions standards over much 
consternation from Detroit.204 Simultaneously, oil crises led to increased imports sales. Auto 
manufacturers responded by selling compact cars and attacking foreign manufacturers in ads.205 
Yet, many American compact cars had design problems. These flawed vehicles damaged the 
U.S. auto industry’s reputation and sales. Consequently, the Carter administration had to bailout 
Chrysler in 1979.206 With their dominance threatened, the U.S. auto industry turned to the federal 
government for support. In the 1980s, the federal government rolled back auto safety and 
emissions regulations.207 These deregulatory moves propped up the industry, but the industry’s 
struggles were signs of tumultuous years yet to come. To remain profitable, GM relied on 
GMAC.  
The Growth and Sale of GMAC 
 As described in the introduction, financialization is the context for this dissertation. 
Financialization is “the shift of the center of gravity of economic activity increasingly from 
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production (and production-related services) to speculative finance.”208 Finance has long 
supported the production of goods and services, such as loans for building factories. However, 
since the 1970s, finance and related industries, such as real estate and insurance, have expanded 
to become a greater portion of the economy.209 One reason for this is that both financial and non-
financial companies profit from financial activities. John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. 
McChesney describe this as the “financial-industrial complex.”210 The shift toward finance 
occurred in traditional industrial firms, like GM, as well as the communication industries. For 
example, General Electric (GE), which owned NBC-Universal for decades, was heavily 
financialized; by 2008, it derived about 36% of its profits from finance.211 Similarly, in the auto 
industry, GM created GMAC in 1919 to help finance dealer and consumer purchases. GMAC’s 
financial activities expanded to commercial and mortgage lending in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Eventually, the survival of GM could not be achieved without GMAC, so GMAC had to be 
bailed out under TARP.212  
Financialization means that companies rely more on financial income for profitability. 
Manufacturing companies want to minimize their risk from and exposure to manufacturing 
expenses, such as research and development (R&D) spending. In the last few decades, 
companies have decreased R&D spending because of the high return on investment from 
financial activities. In the automotive industry, there has been a 40% drop in R&D spending.213 
In Makers and Takers, Rana Foroohar argues that GM’s reduced spending on R&D was part of 
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the reason for the GM ignition switch scandal. In the early 2000s, GM discovered a problem in 
production where the ignition on some vehicles turned off while the vehicle was on and caused 
the vehicle to stop. Although the problem was discovered before any vehicles left the assembly 
line, it was not fixed. Foroohar argues that GM was not focused on design but on efficiency. This 
meant that GM did not take safety concerns seriously because of the cost of potential fixes.214 In 
addition, emphasis on efficiency meant creating designs that used already existing materials, 
such as the badly designed Pontiac Aztek.  
Financialization is not confined to the auto industry. GE mirrored GM’s shift toward 
finances and away from R&D. In 1932, thirteen years after GM established GMAC, GE 
established GE Capital. Like GMAC, GE Capital was meant to help customers finance 
purchases, but “[o]ver time, GE eventually came to act like a bank itself, borrowing money to 
conduct daily operations, and focusing more on the manipulation of its capital than on the 
creation of truly innovative products and services.”215 Jack Welch, CEO of GE from 1981 to 
2001, de-emphasized manufacturing and focused on financial services. Once an industrial giant, 
GE essentially became a bank. Its emphasis on financialization backfired during the financial 
crisis when GE lost billions of dollars. An investment by Warren Buffet and FDIC loans saved 
GE.216 Thus, the practices at GM are representative of larger industrial trends during this period. 
GM had its own Jack Welch: GM CEO Roger Smith. Smith was what some 
commentators on the auto industry call a “bean counter.” 217 He began in the finance side, not the 
engineering side, of GM. Smith became chairman at a time when the auto industry was in the 
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midst of a crisis. In 1980, the year the Smith became chairman, GM lost money for the first time 
since 1921.218 Yet, even as GM lost money, it still controlled 49% of auto sales; GM and the 
Japanese manufacturers together accounted for 70% of the market.219 By 1980, Japanese auto 
manufacturers firmly dominated the compact car market because of the oil crises in 1973 and 
1979. Further, industry observers frequently criticized U.S. auto manufacturers when comparing 
them to their Japanese counterparts. While U.S. auto manufacturers were described as slow and 
error-prone, Japanese manufacturers were efficient and produced cars with fewer problems.220 
During the 1980s and 1990s, American manufacturers fixated on implementing Japanese 
management style in the U.S.  
Although Smith may have been inspired by the productivity of Japanese manufacturing 
plants, his methods differed. While Japanese auto manufacturers emphasized teamwork among 
human workers, Smith saw an opportunity to eliminate human workers and create “‘the world’s 
first 21st-century corporation’ – the first all-electronic manufacturing corporation with a high-
tech elite, paperless processes, and peopleless [sic] plants.”221 Smith opposed unions and sought 
to end them by populating his factories with robots that could build vehicles. GM spent more 
than its competitors on heavily automating its plants, but quality decreased. GM entered the 
1980s with a surplus, which Smith invested in new subsidiaries and updated facilities. Between 
1983 and 1985, Smith spent about $20 billion on various investments, such as automating 
factories, buying Hughes Aircraft, and creating the Saturn brand.222  With his purchasing frenzy, 
Smith made GM into a behemoth that was more than an auto manufacturer.  
                                                          
218 Lee, Call Me Roger. 
219 Ibid., 95. 
220 Ibid. 




GM also faced issues with management during Smith’s tenure. When he tried to 
reorganize the corporate management structure, Smith sowed frustration and chaos. At the same 
time, his corporate policies favored management over unionized workers. Worker productivity 
rose at GM, but unionized workers’ wages did not.223 While GM’s executives received bonuses, 
unionized workers received less from profit-sharing than their peers at other auto manufacturers. 
Continued sales losses meant that plants had to be closed for GM to remain profitable. GM even 
moved plants to Mexico to lower costs. Unionized assembly line workers felt threatened by job 
losses due to plant closures and downsizing.224 In 1990, documentarian Michael Moore released 
Roger and Me in which Moore described how GM had abandoned his hometown of Flint, 
Michigan. Roger and Me fueled public criticism toward GM’s practice of shutting down plants 
and devastating company towns for profitability.225  
Smith’s drive for efficiency alienated his union workforce, and his automated workforce 
failed. Yet, because of plant closures, the UAW was cornered. The union negotiated an 
agreement which required auto manufacturers to rehire one person for every two that were fired 
or retired. However, the UAW also consented to allowing auto manufacturers to make plants 
compete for jobs, a practice known as “whipsawing.”226 The UAW thought its concessions 
would stop plant closures, but the closures continued. Despite U.S. auto manufacturers’ betrayal 
of UAW workers and their communities, the UAW worked with GM on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in the 1990s and 2000s as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6.   
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GM’s lackluster designs and production problems caused its market share to drop from 
almost 50% to about 36% during Smith’s tenure.227 Yet, even with its lower market share, GM 
was still the market leader. GM needed to move cars off lots – fast. Smith decided that financial 
incentives would help drive consumers to purchase cars that were otherwise not selling well. 
These national programs offered consumers auto loans with low annual percentage rates.228 
Because GM led the market, Ford and Chrysler were forced to offer their own financial 
promotions. Financial promotions changed the appeal of American vehicles and reshaped 
consumer buying habits. Customers wanted low rates and would wait for another low rate to 
purchase a vehicle.229 GM seemed to be permanently stuck offering financial promotions. 
Smith also initiated another acquisition that would change GM’s strategy. In 1984, Smith 
purchased Electronic Data Systems (EDS), a company founded and run by Ross Perot.230 Yet, 
EDS was a fraught purchase. First, Smith did not notify employees who were being transferred 
from GM that they were being transferred to EDS; some found out from the newspaper instead 
of their employer. Second, some transferred employees complained about the loss of pay and 
benefits. EDS paid less, offered fewer benefits, and was not unionized. Third, industry observers 
were concerned with the purchase because EDS did not deal in computer-aided 
manufacturing.231 Smith’s purchase of EDS harmed his relationship with employees and 
exemplified his management style. However, EDS also exemplified the type of business that 
Smith was interested in.  
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Smith was not only interested in EDS because it could support manufacturing by 
improving his automated systems. He was also interested in how it could support GMAC’s 
financial offerings. In the mid-1990s, GM leveraged EDS to improve GMAC’s services by using 
information technology to increase the speed with which GMAC could process an application. 
By 1997, GMAC could review a loan application in “just 10 minutes.”232 Smith recognized that 
networking technologies were an important component of profiting from financialization. With 
EDS’ technology, GMAC approved customers quickly and made them more likely take a GMAC 
loan.  
By the end of the 1980s, “diversification efforts were growing…combined GMAC, EDS, 
and GM Hughes Electronics income was up by 55 percent during the first quarter for ’87, but 
vehicle making was down an estimated 72 percent.”233 Smith had created an auto manufacturer 
that did not manufacture vehicles, just as Jack Welch created a consumer goods manufacturer 
that was really a bank. By turning GM into a financial behemoth, he set the auto manufacturer on 
its trajectory for the next two decades. In the 1990s, GM emphasized financial income through 
GMAC and focused on sport utility vehicles (SUVs) to reap the most benefit from financial 
contracts. These two trends would dominate GM’s corporate activities and promotional 
communication from 1990 to 2009.  
By 1990, GMAC had become an important part of GM. At the start of the decade, it was 
a wholly owned subsidiary that contributed to GM’s profits through earnings on GMAC stock 
and auto loan contracts. During this period, GMAC expanded beyond auto finance to other areas 
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of financial operations, making it “the largest consumer finance operation in the nation.”234 This 
operation subsidized GM’s vehicle sales, even though GM was supposed to be an auto 
manufacturer.235 Yet, this advantage also came with disadvantages. GMAC’s credit rating was 
regularly tainted by GM’s poor credit rating in the 1990s.  
In 1990, GM’s Board of Directors voted to replace Smith with Robert Stempel.236 As 
would be the theme in later works analyzing GM’s activities in this period, Stempel was greeted 
as a “car guy” rather than a “bean counter.”237 Some observers hoped that a “car guy” might be 
more successful “because it became painfully obvious even to the accountants that better bean 
counting will no longer ensure the company’s prosperity.”238 GM continued to close plants in the 
early 1990s, partially due to misleading financial information that had been released under 
Smith’s tenure. In many cases, these plants and their communities had made concessions to GM 
to keep the plants, such as tax abatements.239 GM used corporate social responsibility to reach 
out to communities where it operated. Yet, donations could not make up for the lost jobs or 
millions of dollars in lost tax revenue from abatements. As I discuss in chapters 5 and 6, this is 
the logic of corporate social responsibility. 
In these years, GM focused on becoming “leaner,” which meant laying off more North 
American workers. By 1991, the corporation had fired about half of its salaried workforce from a 
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few years earlier.240 GM’s healthcare and pension plan obligations were part of the reason for 
their heavy losses. In addition to cutting jobs, GM was forced to make cuts to its ad budget. In 
1990, the corporation announced that 25% of its ad spending would be “cut or delay[ed].”241 
Even so, in the first quarter of 1990, GM only fell to second place behind Proctor & Gamble, 
Co., in advertising spending.242 Chevrolet, GM’s most popular brand, fell from the number one 
spot in TV ad spending to number five.243 However, instead of cutting as much as anticipated, 
GM decided to spend additional money on a corporate campaign about quality later in the year. 
In 1991, GM reported plans to cut $200 million, or 14.3%, of its advertising budget.244 Even with 
these cuts, GM’s divisions combined spent over $1 billion on advertising.245 GM was a 
powerhouse in advertising, but it was still suffering from budget problems.  
GM was in freefall and needed something to save it. In his first annual review as CEO in 
1990, Stempel described how GM was losing money, but its non-automotive subsidiaries, such 
as EDS, Hughes, and GMAC, were profitable.246 Not only were GM’s subsidiaries profitable, but 
GM was still a behemoth in the market even in dire financial straits. GM had suffered 
tremendous losses, but it was still the sales leader and would remain the leader for most of the 
next two decades. A particularly important element of GM’s profitability and market dominance 
was GMAC, which earned over $1 billion annually. GM described its subsidiary as “America’s 
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largest finance company.”247 Yet, the connection between GM and GMAC was not always 
positive.  
GM’s losses meant that both GM and GMAC’s credit rating could be downgraded by the 
credit rating agencies. In December 1991, the credit rating agencies were reportedly planning to 
downgrade GMAC’s commercial paper, a term that refers to short-term loans issued by GMAC 
to finance its operations. GM’s losses and profitability issues were bleeding over into the 
subsidiary that it needed to finance its operations and maintain profitability.248 Without a good 
rating, GMAC would have struggle to find investors for its commercial paper. GMAC would 
have trouble borrowing money, so its financial promotions for automobiles would be more 
costly. As the New York Times put it, “In a sense, G.M.A.C., which has been steadily profitable, 
is suffering for the reputation of its money-losing parent.”249 Indeed, GM’s losses largely 
continued in 1992; the corporation only made $92 million, while GMAC made $1.2 billion.250 
GM’s continuing problems meant that GMAC’s credit would be downgraded in 1993, which led 
to losses in GMAC’s activities outside of auto lending.251 The ties between GM and GMAC 
grew tenser as GM’s financial position became increasingly precarious.  
Stempel improved profitability, but not fast enough for Wall Street. When he resigned in 
1992, he was quickly replaced by John F. Smith.252 Smith took the reins of a company that had 
posted huge losses for the three years running and was facing a tense UAW contract negotiation. 
With GM employing more UAW workers than Ford and Chrysler, Smith faced the difficult 
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challenge of reconciling the union’s concerns with Wall Street’s concerns.253 He needed to turn 
around profitability in North America where GM had been struggling with balancing the costs of 
production, costly employee benefits, and lackluster sales. To make ends meet, Smith had to 
continue his predecessors’ cuts, closing an estimated 21 factories.254 To improve profitability, 
Smith emphasized Roger Smith’s tactic of diversification and finance, so GMAC played an 
important role in marketing and profitability.  
In 1993, GM was finally profitable again, earning about $2.5 billion. The North 
American market was barely profitable, with $427 million net profit. In contrast, GMAC earned 
about $1 billion profit.255 GMAC’s profitability was not only tied to auto finance but also to the 
mortgage and insurance industries. GMAC broadened its offerings, so customers could get 
virtually any financial product from the lender. GMAC owned and serviced nearly $100 billion 
in total assets. GM’s auto business was making money again, but its subsidiaries were booming. 
The 1996 Annual Report put the situation bluntly: “To many people, GM is a car and truck 
company. Yet a General Motors with GM-NAO [GM North American Operations] and GMIO 
[GM International Operations] would still generate sales sufficient to rank among the top 30 in 
the Fortune 500.”256 GM not only had GMAC but also Hughes Electronics, EDS, and Delphi 
Automotive, its parts subsidiary. These subsidiaries kept GM afloat even as its primary business 
struggled.  
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One of the key assets of GMAC in the 1990s and 2000s was GMAC Mortgage Group. 
GMAC Mortgage had both residential and commercial divisions. Through its subsidiaries, the 
lender made loans, serviced loans, and packaged loans into securities that could be sold to 
investors. In the 1995 Annual Report, GM claimed, “GMAC Residential Funding Corporation is 
the number-one issuer of private mortgage-backed securities.”257 While GMAC certainly ranked 
in the top originators and servicers of mortgages, it is unclear whether this ranking is accurate. In 
1995, there were fewer mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued, so it is possible that GMAC 
issued securities at a higher rate than other companies.258 Regardless, GMAC was likely at or 
near the top of the issuers of MBS, which would continue to be an important product in the 
2000s.  
With access to the mortgage market, GMAC could offer a variety of products to 
consumers. The first customers were the “GM Family.”259 GM tailored its early marketing to the 
hundreds of thousands of GM employees around the world. As members of the “GM Family,” 
they were asked not only to buy their cars from GM but also their homes, their insurance, and 
other financial products. Even as GMAC grew, marketing products continued to emphasize the 
“GM Family.”260 This approach synergized with GM’s emphasis on using its workers for 
political and economic gain, a theme explored in Chapter 5. Thus, the corporation’s profitability 
was not only dependent on financialization but also on employees showing company loyalty by 
turning some of their paycheck back over to their employer for their mortgage, car loan, or both. 
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GMAC eventually expanded beyond the “GM Family,” but the “family” remained an important 
base of GMAC’s operations and profitability.  
GMAC continued to prioritize the mortgage sector through acquisitions in the mid-1990s 
when it acquired some mortgage servicers and originators.261 When GMAC purchased Wells 
Fargo’s mortgage servicing portfolio in 1998, it gained assets worth about $28 billion.262 That 
same year, GMAC bought another portfolio worth $38 billion.263 With these acquisitions, GM 
became one of the top five mortgage servicers. The company serviced nearly $126 billion worth 
of mortgages, which amounted to about 1.5 million mortgages.264 In 1998, GMAC’s servicing 
profile grew by about 58%.265 Their mortgages gave them clout in the market, which kept GM 
afloat. Beyond buying its way into market power, GMAC also became vertically integrated in 
the real estate and mortgage businesses. GMAC also purchased a relocation services company, 
which synergized with its ownership of a real estate company. The corporation’s goal was “to 
become a comprehensive service for homebuyers.”266 GMAC’s acquisitions gave it considerable 
holdings outside of the automotive industry.  
In 1998, GM underwent another change of leadership. Rick Wagoner was chosen to lead 
GM as chairman. He became CEO in 2000. With Wagoner as CEO, a financier was again 
leading the auto manufacturer.267 Wagoner led GM until he was forced to resign after the auto 
bailout. Under his leadership, GM further emphasized GMAC as a source of profits and shifted 
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toward producing and marketing SUVs. In 2000, GMAC became a thrift institution, also called a 
savings and loan bank. Although the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 prohibited nonbanks 
from owning thrifts, GMAC had applied before the bill passed.268 This enabled GMAC to 
continue growing its financial empire.  
In the early 2000s, GMAC increased the number of securitizations it issued. GMAC 
could raise money for loans by turning its loans into securities that investors could buy. These 
securities included a variety of loan types, such as subprime loans and negative equity loans, 
which are also known as underwater loans.269 With over $5 billion in securities issued in one 
quarter, GMAC dominated securitizations.270 By 2001, GMAC had become the top commercial 
lender and the number three online retail lender in the U.S.271 However, GMAC still relied on the 
auto industry for nearly three-quarters of its profits. Despite this margin, the loan provider was 
interested in continuing to expand outside of automotive financing because “nonautomotive 
business is growing faster than automotive business.”272 GMAC’s goal was to be a one-stop-shop 
for all its customers’ financial needs. Their marketing plan even included targeting children and 
teenagers with ads and educational materials about finance.273 
GMAC dominated commercial lending with large loans, securitizations, and a variety of 
products offered in the U.S. and abroad.274 GMAC serviced over $200 billion loans and was 
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firmly entrenched in the market alongside banks later deemed “too big to fail,” such as Wells 
Fargo.275 Like its parent company, GMAC also offered different brands to target different kinds 
of customers, such as ditech.com, a site that targeted retail customers in need of home equity 
loans.276 By 2003, GMAC’s mortgage holdings had caused a massive increase in profits. That 
year, the company’s earnings were $2.8 billion, a $1 billion increase over a year earlier.277   
GMAC’s growing size made it an integral to GM. In first quarter of 2004, GMAC earned 
more than GM’s global auto operations, making it “‘a critical contributor’ to GM 
profitability.”278 GMAC’s contributions came from both their mortgage interests and auto 
industry financing interest.279  GMAC continued its practice of acquiring other mortgage 
servicers and originators to grow its size in the market.280 GMAC’s performance for GM even 
inspired other auto manufacturers to expand their financing operations. Inspired by GMAC’s 
success, Toyota Financial Services announced plans to expand into mortgages and other products 
in 2004. Like GMAC, Toyota wanted to offer customers a variety of financial products that 
would increase their loyalty to Toyota and Toyota’s profits from finance.281 Despite GM’s 
failings, the auto manufacturer still led the market in auto sales and was a leader in the mortgage 
industry. U.S. auto manufacturers not only followed GM’s lead in financial promotions, but they 
also observed GM’s other business strategies to better emulate the firm that had dominated the 
auto industry for over six decades.  
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GM’s problems still plagued their captive lender. GMAC was tied to GM and its credit 
rating. Despite increasing sales from SUVs and massive downsizing, GM still struggled with 
profitability. GMAC’s profits from auto loans also decreased toward the end of 2004, so the 
lender shifted to offering rebates to compensate.282 However, the corporation’s normal tactics 
were insufficient. In 2005, due to health costs and accounting errors, GM lost over $10 billion.283 
GM decided to sell half of GMAC’s commercial lending business to provide the parent company 
with cash. The move also deprived GM of part of its “strongest asset.”284 The commercial 
mortgage unit alone contributed 6% of GM’s 2004 profits. In 2005, GM would sell 78% of its 
commercial mortgage unit to investors for $9 billion.285 The same year, GM and GMAC’s credit 
was downgraded to junk status, making it increasingly difficult to make loans to keep the 
corporation afloat.286  
Observers in 2005 and 2006 noted the irony that GM was forced to sell one its most 
profitable parts. The trade journal Mortgage Strategy described the conundrum that faced GM: 
“General Motors was once the poster child of US industrial might. Today, it’s a struggling auto 
maker trying to retool while owing billions to its retirees…The sad thing is that GM really likes 
the financial services business, especially the residential unit. In 2005 GM lost a whopping 
$10.6bn while all of GMAC earned $2.5bn. What’s there not to like?”287 In the face of GM’s 
mounting losses, GMAC could not sustain the corporation. GM sold 51% of GMAC to Cerberus 
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Capital Management, a private equity firm.288 The sale allowed GM to gain some income from 
GMAC’s stock dividends, while retaining GMAC as a source of vehicle financing. GM would 
have earned “$13 billion over three years” from the deal.289 Yet, just two years later, GMAC’s 
fortunes would come crashing down with the rest of the mortgage market, leading both GM and 
GMAC to seek government bailouts.  
GM’s Brands and the Rise of the SUV 
The second trend that defined GM’s behavior in the 1990s and 2000s was the rise of the 
Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV). An SUV is a vehicle that combines the body of a car with the 
chassis or underbody of a truck. SUVs were first produced in 1935, with the production of the 
Chevrolet Suburban. However, in part due to the gas crises of the 1970s, SUVs were not popular 
until the 1980s. By the 1980s, there was a tariff for light trucks. Because of the tariff, U.S. 
manufacturers could easily dominate the light truck market.290 For U.S. manufacturers, SUVs 
were a source of profitability in the 1990s and 2000s when they were otherwise struggling. 
Although SUVs seem outdoorsy, they are mostly driven by urban and suburban consumers who 
like feel of a vehicle that could be driven off-road.291 SUV drivers want to cultivate the image of 
what it means to buy and drive an SUV. The vehicle offers families an escape from alternatives, 
like a boring minivan or a large family sedan. SUVs appealed to U.S. auto manufacturers 
because they had higher profit margins than other vehicles. As I discuss in Chapters 4 and 5, 
these vehicles had huge implications for customers’ safety and the environment. 
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 SUVs were also part of GM’s emphasis on “badge engineering.” GM’s divisions were a 
key part of GM’s marketing success in the mid-twentieth century. However, by the 1990s, GM’s 
multitude of brands was viewed with concern. GM’s finance staff supported “badge 
engineering,” which meant selling nearly identical vehicles under different names. The goal was 
to reduce the cost of designing and manufacturing vehicles, but the effect was to reduce the 
differences between brands and make them less distinct.292 To save money, designers focused on 
designs that took advantage of existing materials, but this resulted in bad designs, like the failed 
Pontiac Aztek.293  Because of “badge engineering,” GM’s brands competed against each other, 
instead of eroding the market share of their competitors.  
In the 1990s, GM had eight brands: Chevrolet, Buick, GMC, Cadillac, Pontiac, Saturn, 
Hummer, and Oldsmobile. GM purchased Hummer in 1998 after ending its Geo brand that 
marketed compact cars in the 1980s and 1990s to compete with imports. Saturn, the newest 
member of the “GM Family,” was started by Roger Smith in 1983 to compete with Japanese auto 
manufacturers.  In 1990, the first Saturn ads aimed to build the new brand’s reputation, rather 
than advertising its new vehicles. The trade publication Advertising Age posed the question, “Are 
they selling cars or running for Congress?”  The ads capitalized on “Main Street” values of 
working-class white Americans building new, better American cars. However, GM struggled to 
define the brand’s other values. The corporation attempted to use Saturn to brand itself as 
technologically innovative and capable of competing directly with Japanese cars, but the brand 
failed to appeal to consumers. Even Saturn, which had been created to manufacture compact 
cars, entered the SUV market.  
                                                          
292 Michelle Krebs, “Vehicles So Much Alike They’re Actually the Same,” The New York Times, October 20, 1999, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/20/automobiles/vehicles-so-much-alike-they-re-actually-the-same.html. 
293 Foroohar, Makers and Takers.  
66 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, GM further abandoned the compact car market that it had long 
struggled in. The corporation focused on light trucks and sport utility vehicles.  Even with losses 
in overall market share in North America, GM gained in light truck sales. Due to low gas prices 
in the early 1990s, light trucks grew in popularity. GM sold more trucks in 1992 than any other 
auto manufacturer.294 Capitalizing on the popularity and profitability of trucks, auto 
manufacturers moved to design SUVs that were functionally trucks but combined the appeal of a 
car and a truck. By the mid-1990s, SUVs made up one third of the auto market in the U.S.295  
Even Cadillac, GM’s “flagship brand,” produced an SUV.296 The luxury SUV market 
offered even higher profit margins than other full-size SUVs. These SUVs were still dangerous 
and inefficient but were enormously popular. In 1995, GM announced that it would develop a 
luxury SUV for Cadillac that would eventually become the Cadillac Escalade. The Escalade 
attracted luxury buyers who would otherwise opt for a Range Rover or a similar vehicle.297 The 
Escalade, perhaps unknown to luxury buyers, also used the “badge engineering” strategy; it was 
essentially an upgraded GMC Yukon, which was virtually identical to the Chevrolet Tahoe. In 
the end, “Cadillac was essentially taking a $20,000 work truck, tricking it up with lots of chrome, 
leather seats, and a fancy stereo, and selling it for close to $50,000.”298 The Escalade entered the 
market behind Ford’s and Chrysler’s offerings in 1999, but it improved Cadillac’s languishing 
image and boosted sales.299 
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The popularity of the Escalade was also enhanced by the availability of a new financing 
product: the auto lease. Auto leases made luxury cars like the Cadillac Escalade more affordable 
because customers could lease them for a few years at a lower cost than they would buy them. 
Leases also allowed high income individuals to lease luxury vehicles without having to worry 
about maintenance costs. Thus, leases appealed both to customers with the aspiration of owning 
a luxury vehicle and to those who desired to avoid the costs of ownership. By the mid-1990s, 
24% of new vehicles were leased.300 Leasing also opened the door to auto manufacturers selling 
used vehicles. Leased vehicles were usually returned in good condition. Once returned, the 
vehicle could be marketed and sold to a customer who aspired to own a luxury vehicle but could 
not purchase a new one. I discuss leased and used vehicle advertising in Chapter 3.  
By 1999, thanks to a “red hot” market, GM produced 2.7 million trucks, sport utility 
vehicles, and minivans.301 Each of GM’s brands offered an SUV, but many of them were 
functionally similar in design.302 In 2001, GM sold more than 1 million SUVs and over 2.6 
million trucks, a major milestone. GM further increased its market share through a special 0% 
annual percentage rate (APR) financing promotion launched after September 11. Profit margins 
were so high on SUVs that they were even profitable with the 0% financing offer.303 The 
financing program merged GMAC’s use of promotions with SUVs’ profitability. Most customers 
did not qualify for 0% rates, but the gimmick brought customers in. In 2001, because of the 
popularity of the 0% financing promotion, about 50% of GM’s customers used GMAC, a sharp 
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increase over the 40% that did in 1999.304 Any loans with 0% rates could still be packaged into 
asset-backed securities that used auto loans, similar to the MBS that GMAC used in the 
mortgage industry. The advertising of this program will be discussed more in Chapter 3.  
By the mid-2000s, low oil prices and high profit margins meant that auto manufacturers 
produced even more SUVs. GM continued to be a leader in SUV and truck sales.305 Yet, even 
while dominating the SUV market and using finance promotions, GM’s market share in the 
industry continued to fall. It decreased from nearly 34% in 1992 to about 26% in 2006.306 In 
2005, oil prices began to rise, which signaled trouble for the SUV market. Sales of full-size 
SUVs declined, while “crossover SUVs” that fused the body style of an SUV with a car chassis 
increased in popularity because of their higher fuel efficiency.307 Thus, even with the rise in oil 
prices, SUVs still made up about 55% of the market in 2005.308 Even with high fuel prices, 
SUVs have not disappeared. Their profitability has ensured that auto manufacturers continue to 
produce them. SUVs are still a huge portion of the U.S. auto manufacturers’ sales; they are so 
important that Ford may stop producing cars.309 Even Toyota, which has been known for its fuel 
efficient and small cars, began manufacturing SUVs in the 2000s.310 As I discuss in Chapter 5, 
the continuing popularity of SUVs has contributed to the myth that auto manufacturers are 
powerless to produce and sell more fuel efficient vehicles. 
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 By the 1990s and 2000s, GM put into place practices that would continue even after the 
auto bailout. In this chapter, I described GM’s history during the twentieth century, focusing on 
how the automaker came to rely SUV sales and GMAC to increase its profitability. SUVs 
contributed up to 70% of the GM’s profits during the 1990s and early 2000s.311 Yet, its market 
share continued to drop because GM dropped out of the car market and struggled to distinguish 
brands due to “badge engineering.” The SUV trend has continued since the auto bailout. Despite 
concerns about safety and the environment, SUVs are more popular than ever. Sales of trucks 
and SUVs were over 60% of U.S. auto sales in 2018.312 Through safetywashing and 
greenwashing, which I explore in detail later, GM quelled fears about the SUV and turned the 
choice to drive an SUV into an issue of personal freedom. Yet, this personal freedom continues 
to threaten consumers’ safety and the environment. The promotional communication strategies 
that I discuss continue to have an impact on consumers’ lives and the planet.   
GMAC’s auto finance promotions also synergized with the profitability of SUVs and 
enabled GM to make money, even on loans with a 0% APR rate. Further, the financial 
promotions encouraged more customers to make loans with GMAC. Auto manufacturers have 
continued to use financial promotions, including an employee financing promotion that GM first 
used in 2005.313 At the same time, GMAC offered new products, including mortgages and 
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insurance. These products increased GMAC’s profitability, but ultimately put both companies at 
risk when the market crashed in 2007 and 2008.  
This chapter has described how GM grew into the biggest auto manufacturer in the world 
using auto finance as a key advertising tool. In the 1980s and 90s, facing immense financial 
problems, GM acquired mortgage companies and other finance companies to expand GMAC 
beyond the auto industry. In the 1990s, GMAC’s auto loan promotions tied into the sale of 
SUVs. These two trends will be the focus of Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Before discussing how GM’s 
promotional communication approached the sale of SUVs and financial products, the next 
chapter addresses the history of GM’s promotional communication from 1908 to 1990. The 
narrative provided in Chapter 3 parallels this one by explaining how advertising, PR, and news 





CHAPTER 3: GM’S PROMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION BEFORE 1990  
Introduction 
 During the twentieth century, GM grew into the biggest auto manufacturer in the world 
through its innovative advertising strategies, such as annual models and financial contracts. This 
chapter is paired the previous chapter to present a complementary history of GM’s promotional 
communication before 1990 and provides important background information for the chapters that 
follow. I address GM’s advertising, public relations, and influence over the news media. GM’s 
advertisements changed in the decades preceding the rise of financial promotions in the 1980s. 
The automaker tied institutional advertising to public relations and relied on the “family” theme 
in product advertising. GM’s long history of corporate philanthropy evolved into corporate social 
responsibility. In addition, GM faced two distinct PR challenges in the post-war period: safety 
and the environment. These issues influenced GM’s PR and product advertising for decades. 
Simultaneous, GM used its influence as an advertiser and manufacture to influence news 
coverage. The corporation made threats to withholding ad dollars to alter coverage of labor 
conflicts and other important issues.   
 I first discuss GM’s advertising strategies from the early twentieth century through the 
1980s. I focus on two types of advertising: institutional advertising and product advertising. 
Second, I discuss GM’s public relations. I describe GM’s history of corporate philanthropy and 
corporate social responsibility. I then describe GM’s PR in response to new regulatory 
challenges from Ralph Nader and the environmental movement. Finally, I finish with a 
discussion of how GM has influenced the news, focusing my discussion on news related to the 




Auto industry advertising has been the most studied aspect of auto industry promotional 
communication. There are three types of auto advertisements: corporate or institutional, such as 
ads for GM the corporation; subsidiary or brand advertising, such as an ad for multiple Chevrolet 
styles; and model advertising for a particular model, such as a Chevrolet truck.314 For the 
purposes of my dissertation, brand and model advertising will be treated as variations on product 
advertising, so I describe their development jointly. In the following pages, I first examine 
institutional advertising, which was an important factor in GM’s growth during the 1920s and 
1930s. I then describe the development of GM’s product advertising from the early twentieth 
century through the 1980s.  
Institutional advertising promotes an image of a corporation, particularly when that 
corporation under threat from outside political forces.315 Institutional advertisements usually 
focus on the virtues of the corporation and its philanthropic activities, rather than its products or 
services.316 This chapter considers institutional advertisements those that focus primarily on 
corporate reputation in a traditional advertising format, such as a print ad. In contrast, other 
activities for the benefit of reputation, such as sponsoring radio shows, will be considered public 
relations, as they are not traditional advertisements. My choice is consistent with Roland 
Marchand’s delineation between institutional ads and PR programs.317 GM began running 
institutional advertisements in 1922, when President Alfred P. Sloan discovered that the public 
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was not familiar with the company he ran. The public knew Buicks, Chevrolets, and Cadillacs 
but did not realize that they were all part of the same company. Sloan set out to change this 
perception through an institutional advertising campaign that operated internally and 
externally.318  
Sloan gathered the divisional heads to form an interdivisional committee on institutional 
advertisements that worked with infamous advertiser Bruce Barton. Barton suggested that GM 
present itself and its brands as a “famous family” in which the five automotive divisions were 
members.319  The ads introduced each member of the family, beginning with its most famous 
member, Cadillac.320 GM, like AT&T, used its size as a virtue; this boosted public confidence in 
GM and carried the corporation through the Depression. Furthermore, other ads lauded not only 
GM, but automobiles themselves. GM showed how prestigious individuals, like preachers and 
doctors, were able to serve their community more effectively with an automobile. For example, 
one ad showed a doctor arriving in time to save a patient.321 GM’s institutional campaign 
promoted the auto manufacturer as a virtuous corporation that represented dependability through 
its size, history, and technological prowess.  
Beyond public perception, GM faced another problem: divisions operated too 
independently. In addition to implementing a re-organization strategy that emphasized 
centralization, Sloan sought to unify GM’s divisions by deploying the institutional campaign 
internally.322 Ads were displayed in factories, labs, and dealerships. The ads not only improved 
public perception and internal unity but also paved the way for future product advertising. As 
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Roland Marchand writes, “the ‘family of cars’ theme of GM institutional advertising and the 
emphasis of the campaigns on GM research had paved the way for the marketing of new 
products from the ‘GM Family.’”323 Indeed, the initial success of the new Pontiac division in 
1925 was attributed to GM’s strong institutional campaign. The campaign was so successful that 
General Electric emulated GM’s institutional campaign by deploying their institutional campaign 
internally and externally.324 
With the return of consumer criticism in the 1960s, particularly from Ralph Nader, 
institutional advertising became an important tool to counter public skepticism across all 
industries. Yet, GM’s institutional advertising was not always consistent. Despite not ranking in 
the top 10 institutional advertisers in 1975, GM was number three in 1976.325 GM has continued 
to strategically deploy institutional campaigns at other times. In response to its floundering 
reputation for quality in the 1990s, this campaign centered GM’s quality on its people. One ad in 
the campaign that was aired during the 1992 Super Bowl opined, “The people at General Motors. 
Putting quality on the road.” 326 Although institutional advertisements are similar in format to 
traditional ads, they are now handled by PR departments.327  
Product Advertising  
In the Ecology of the Automobile, Peter Freund and George Martin state that the diffusion 
of the automobile in the twentieth century is the result of two things: mass production and 
marketing. Freund and Martin argue that annual style changes and market segmentation continue 
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to “remain major stimulants of consumer demand.”328  Alfred P. Sloan, longtime president and 
CEO of GM, created marketing and styling innovations in the 1920s, as described in the previous 
chapter.329 For this reason, GM holds a significant place in the history of auto industry 
advertising. Its developments in advertising sparked changes throughout the industry and 
inspired the use of similar tactics in other industries. Thus, this section primarily focuses on 
model advertising as it developed through the twentieth century.  
Companies first began using advertising in the nineteenth century. At the time, most ads 
were similar in format and style to classified ads. In the early twentieth century, ads began using 
national brand names and strived for brand recognition with jingles and other techniques. In the 
1910s, ads shifted toward a “’reason-why’ approach” that emphasized why a consumer should 
purchase a product. By the 1920s, advertisers began to focus more on the consumer’s 
perspective.330 Some advertisers tried new approaches, including “negative appeals,” such as 
imagined negative comments about bad breath.331 By the 1930s, advertisers recognized that 
appeals directed toward consumer experience were the most effective. Auto advertising followed 
a similar trajectory to advertising writ large. As the auto manufacturing market matured in the 
1920s, ads shifted from announcement-style ads comparing vehicles and horses to more 
sophisticated ads that offered vehicles suited to different consumer lifestyles. 
The automobile’s origins date from the late nineteenth century, but the modern 
incarnation of mass-produced automobiles started in 1908. Automobile ads began in the 1900s 
and 1910s. These ads focused on technical capabilities and the benefits of ownership to convince 
consumers to purchase automobiles. Early ads often attempted to persuade buyers that an 
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automobile was better than a horse. One ad reasoned that a vehicle would be cheaper to own than 
a horse because gas was less expensive than feeding a horse.332 Because of their cost, early 
automobiles were primarily purchased by wealthy individuals. Interestingly, many people did not 
consider them a suitable replacement for a horse.333 During the 1910s, the auto industry 
underwent dramatic changes. The Ford Model T became more affordable. However, Ford dealers 
still only accepted cash, so the market was limited to those who had enough cash to buy the 
Model T outright.  
 As the Ford Model T grew in popularity, GM devised a plan to challenge Ford for market 
dominance. While the Model T remained unchanged, Harley Earl at General Motors instituted 
styles and models in 1921, a shift that forever changed the auto industry. Earl emphasized annual 
design changes, also called “planned obsolescence.”334 “Planned obsolescence” encouraged sales 
because consumers were more likely to trade in their old vehicle for a new model, even if it was 
working properly.335 Advertising cultivated this desire by encouraging consumers to purchase 
new and stylish vehicles. As described in the previous chapter, within a few years, GM’s annual 
model and styling changes helped Chevy become the most popular brand in the US.336 In 1955, 
Harley Earl remarked, “Our big job is to hasten obsolescence. In 1934 the average car ownership 
span was 5 years: now [1955] it is 2 years. When it is 1 year, we will have a perfect score.”337 
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Annual model changes revolutionized the auto industry and auto ads. The industry’s success 
inspired a host of other industries to follow suit.338  
 The advent of annual model changes brought auto advertising into its modern 
arrangement. Auto manufacturers divided the auto market “into many price sectors, and … 
product[s] with a measure of individuality … conspicuously more modern than its 
predecessors.”339 With annual models, auto manufacturers targeted designs and advertisements at 
consumer segments. GM’s use of models and styling was one of the earliest examples of market 
segmentation prior to the 1950s.340 Manufacturers not only competed on technical excellence, 
but on styling. For example, when auto manufacturers first developed paint color for vehicles, 
the target audience was women. The addition of paint color “creat[ed] a sense of style.”341 When 
paint colors were finally perfected in 1924, advertisements focused on women’s preference for 
stylishly colored vehicles rather than the customary black car.342  
 Models are designed with consumers in mind, and the advertising and marketing plans 
are tailored to those customers. Key to the promotion of models is the consideration of brands. 
With its variety of brands, GM could target automobiles to a variety of consumers. In the GM 
archive, as well as studies of GM ads, Chevrolet and Cadillac often predominate because they 
are iconic brands. GM positioned Chevrolets as affordable and reliable, while Cadillacs were 
luxury vehicles. Indeed, any number of songs and films still perpetuate this image of Cadillac, 
while Chevy’s wholesome American image is perhaps best epitomized by the Dinah Shore song, 
“See the USA in your Chevrolet.” The ads described in the following section are from 
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compilations of auto advertisements. Some of the collections are geared toward collectors or 
enthusiasts. While they do not paint a comprehensive picture of auto ads, they do shed light on 
the trends in auto advertising.343   
Until the 1920s, auto ads emphasized “practicality and economy” and “durability and 
reliability.”344 These ads typically featured a drawing or painting of a vehicle, often in a realistic 
setting. With the advent of styles and annual model changes, advertisers began to focus more on 
feeling, emotion, and psychological obsolescence. For example, a 1925 Cadillac ad showed a 
woman in a fashionable coat and hat in front of a Cadillac, while the copy stated, “your Custom-
Built Cadillac will faithfully reflect your own good taste. In this way, it will represent your 
personal ideal of beauty.”345 The Custom-Built Cadillac was clearly meant to be a luxury item, 
for well-dressed people with the money to order a car exactly as they wanted it. The ad did not 
even list a price, stating “at prices consistent with wise investment.”346 Other high-end General 
Motors makes, like Buick, similarly emphasized style and “smartness.”347 These ads promoted 
Cadillacs and Buicks as high-end vehicles.  
In contrast, Chevrolet was marketed as an affordable, reliable car.348 For example, a 1919 
Chevy described Chevy automobile as “dependable and economical transportation” and pitched 
the price as part of the appeal, “The first cost is low. The upkeep is never a burden.”349 Likewise, 
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a 1931 Chevrolet ad featured an empty Chevrolet in front of an abstract background. The ad 
copy praised the reliability of the Fisher Body Works car: “Fisher is proud to have had a part in 
this achievement and to join with Chevrolet in offering for the first time at modest cost a car of 
such pronounced charm, all-season utility, and high value.”350 Thus, while Cadillac and Buick 
aimed for wealthier, more stylish customers, Chevrolet ads targeted consumers with more 
modest incomes.  
 While GM drew distinctions between members of the GM family with its ads in the 
1920s and 1930s, it also expanded the market for automobiles. In 1920, one out every thirteen 
Americans had an automobile, but by 1930, nearly one in five did.351 Annual models and 
installment plans helped open the market for automobiles beyond consumers who could pay in 
cash. GM also incorporated other advertising efforts. In 1928, GM began advertising the second 
vehicles to families in Chevrolet ads, although the purchase of second cars would not radically 
increase until after World War II.352 GM and other auto manufacturers also began to reach out to 
women as a target demographic.  
 The “flapper” of the 1920s depicted a “modern” woman who used consumption as a road 
to empowerment and independence. Auto manufacturers took advantage of this imagery in their 
ads. A qualitative study of Vogue from 1920 to 1929 found that “advertisers catered to women’s 
new sense of freedom while promoting their own agenda of consumption.”353 For example, a 
1923 Cadillac ad described the Type 61 “as the ultimate accessory for the modern woman.”354 
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Despite the chic image of the “flapper” woman in Cadillac ads, she was often pictured driving 
herself, rather than having a chauffeur, as a measure of her independence and self-reliance. 
These advertisements provided an image of women as independent, consuming citizens with an 
implied degree of sexual liberation.355 Despite this early foray into advertising to women, 
American manufacturers largely lost interest in women after World War II because they did not 
consider women to be the primary purchasers of cars.356 Dealers also played a role in pitching 
ads toward men because “[dealership] owners were ‘all men,’ powerful figures who made their 
views known to Detroit and who did not believe women were important customers.”357 Dealers’ 
regressive views meant that Detroit struggled with marketing to women for decades.  
Despite massive growth in the 1920s, the Depression still affected the auto industry. 
Between 1929 and 1931, almost half of all workers in Detroit were laid off. Detroit’s 
employment level finally recovered with wartime production in 1942. Despite the struggles of 
the industry as a whole, the 1930s were good to GM. GM passed Ford to become the dominant 
auto manufacturer, a position it would hold for decades.358 During the 1930s, advertisers utilized 
grittier images, such as working-class Americans, rather than the high-income individuals 
usually depicted in advertisements. Advertisers were also concerned that thrifty behaviors 
learned during the Depression would forever weaken advertising and lessen the appeal of a 
lifestyle based on consumption.359 Advertisers adapted and began using appeals based on 
technological improvements. For example, without explaining how engines actually functioned, 
GM described its motors as “Knee Action” to entice consumers with technical-sounding 
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jargon.360 The Great Depression also spawned critiques of capitalism and consumption, such as 
those made by Consumers’ Union.361 GM responded through patriotic campaigns to counter the 
New Deal philosophy. With the start of World War II, GM’s patriotism took on a new life.  
As part of the Arsenal of Democracy during World War II, General Motors produced 
tanks, ammunition, and other supplies. Like other contemporary advertisements, World War II 
era ads emphasized GM’s contribution to the war effort while advocating for the purchase of war 
bonds.362 For example, a 1943 Cadillac ad showed a large black and white drawing of American 
soldiers in front of a tank with surrendering Nazis in the background. Above the tank, Cadillac 
was written in large white letters along with the Cadillac logo. Below the ad, the copy stated, 
“Making its mark… on a Nazi Mark IV” in large black letters with a description of the M-5 tanks 
produced by Cadillac.363 A textbox in the bottom corner of the ad reminded consumers to buy 
war bonds and stamps. The ever-present call to buy war bonds was present in many ads, such as 
a 1945 Buick that simultaneously reminded consumers to buy war bonds while stating that 
victory “will mean such pleasures as an open road, a glorious day – and a bright and lively 
Buick.”364 Aside from patriotic ads, GM used sponsored programming to promote its patriotic 
image.365 After World War II, GM continued to use patriotic themes, such as its “Keep America 
Rolling” campaign, and reinforced the notion that consumption was the duty of good citizens.  
The 1950s brought a surge of car sales and iconic design changes. The “Forward Look” 
included tail fins, chrome accessories, wrap-around windshields, and hood ornaments. Invoking 
the space age, these vehicles sported names like the “Pontiac Strato Star” and the “Oldsmobile 
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Rocket.” Ads further emphasized space-age themes through copy like “True, this Buick won’t 
Fly – but it does have variable pitch propellers in its Dynaflow Drive.”366 The technical language 
of “Dyanflow Drive” did not mean much in reality but made consumers think of the 
technological advances made by GM. GM’s ads created an association between spatial mobility 
and social mobility. For example, a 1955 Cadillac ad featured a picture of seven men sitting a 
board room table, having what looks like a business meeting. Below the picture, the ad copy 
states, “Meeting of … Cadillac Owners!” Underneath that line, smaller print describes how 
Cadillacs are owned by men in the upper echelons of the business world, but “you don’t have to 
be a member of a Board of Directors in order to enjoy a new Cadillac car.”367 The ad implies that 
buying a Cadillac can help one climb the social ladder. These aspirations are still visible in auto 
ads today. 
 The 1950s and 1960s were crucial for another reason. Increasing suburban populations 
led to a boost in auto sales.368 GM focused its energy on selling second and third cars to growing 
suburban families. Auto ads incorporated photos, instead of drawings, and became more realistic. 
Because of the emphasis on selling a second vehicle to growing families, ads in the 1950s 
emphasized family relationships and how family members could use the vehicle.369 In 1950, only 
7% of families had more than one car but by 1970, 29% did.370 People began to change cars 
more quickly with about a two-year ownership window in the mid-1950s. This flurry of sales led 
to a production peak in the U.S. auto industry.371  
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The era of elongated cars with tail fins swiftly ended in the 1960s. The most famous car 
ads of the 1960s were not for Chevys, Cadillacs, or Fords but for Volkswagens. Taking 
advantage of the cultural upheaval of the 1960s, Volkswagen hired Doyle Dane Bernbach (DDB) 
to do their advertising in the U.S. DDB began creating “anti-obsolescence ads” beginning in 
1959.372 These “anti-obsolescence” ads poked fun at the obvious “planned obsolescence” of 
styling changes by stating that the outward style of the Volkswagen Beetle changed very little 
from year to year because the only changes were technological ones. Volkswagen took 
advantage of the moment and “cleverly made the values of the counterculture accessible and 
acceptable to middle America, and then pressed them in the service of consumerism.”373 
American manufacturers began to rely more on surveys and consumer information that told them 
why some consumers preferred foreign vehicles.374 They took advantage of youthful 
individualism and social reactions against consumerism, using appeals to youth and the freedom 
associated with owning an automobile.375 For example, a 1966 Corvair ad showed a photograph 
of a woman lounging on a red Corvair. The copy reads, “A most unusual car for people who 
enjoy the unusual.” The ad further describes how a man defied market research by trading in “the 
same black sedan” for a red Corvair and taking a new job.376  
 The oil crisis of the 1970s prompted a flurry of interest in small, imported cars.377 While 
American auto manufacturers primarily made large, gas-guzzling vehicles, oil crises made 
consumers more interested in small, fuel efficient cars. Not to be outdone, U.S. auto 
manufactures responded with their own cars, designed using market research. In ads, U.S. auto 
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manufacturers attacked foreign manufacturers directly by claiming that foreign manufacturers 
could not produce cars that were ideal for Americans. These ads frequently relied on racist 
stereotypes, such as Americans being larger and unsuited for small, foreign cars.378 
Simultaneously, the U.S. auto industry’s marketing strategies undermined their attempts at 
selling smaller cars. The “economical” Chevrolet Vega was priced higher than its counterparts 
because of GM’s strategy of promoting their brand value by making their vehicles more 
expensive. At the same time, GM’s long-time strategy of increasing the size of its cars meant that 
cars like the Chevrolet Corvair started small but grew annually or had lots of features added; 
both of which drove up the price.379  
 The industry was in trouble in the 1980s. Small American cars did not sell well. Some, 
like the Corvair, had safety issues. With help from the Carter and Reagan administrations, the 
U.S. auto industry attempted to save money through more lax regulatory standards and policies 
aimed at limiting the availability of imports. Yet, GM’s market share dropped from 49% in 1980 
to 36.5% in 1987.380 To combat this decline, CEO Roger Smith heavily automated plants and 
used financial promotions. Low annual percentage rates brought in customers who were 
interested in buying vehicles that were otherwise unappealing. These national programs forced 
others to use the same gimmicks. However, these rates also made customers more skeptical of 
the value of American cars.381 As I discuss in the next chapter, financial promotions became an 
important strategy in the 1990s and 2000s. They not only helped move cars off lots, but they also 
provided an influx of loans that could be pooled as part of GM’s larger financial strategy. Yet, 
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these ads also posed a problem for consumers because the financial contracts were confusing, 
and the offers were not always available to consumers.  
Public Relations  
In the twentieth century, GM was a behemoth and used PR to influence public opinion 
and public policy. In the following pages, I explore how they did so. First, I describe the 
development of GM’s PR from the early twentieth century through World War II. GM focused 
on communities where the corporation operated. GM also emphasized how capitalism made 
technological and scientific progress possible. Furthermore, because of GM’s role as a military 
industrial contractor during World War II, GM’s PR also emphasized the connection between 
capitalism and democracy. Second, I explore how GM addressed public concerns about safety 
and the environment, two important issues in the post-war period. Although it faced initial 
setbacks, GM was able to rollback safety and environmental regulations in the late twentieth 
century. 
After the Civil War, monopolies arose across American industries. These monopolies 
were born on the backs of low wages paid to thousands of workers, which led to massive 
resentment and discontent between labor and management.382 The Civil War era was defined not 
only by conflict between North and South but also by strikes and labor uprisings that continued 
after the war. Farmers and workers demanded equality as populist movements swept the 
nation.383 Reform politicians capitalized on these feelings and emphasized the need for wide-
scale social change, including regulating corporations. However, the populist uprisings of late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century also made some social scientists and political leaders 
                                                          




concerned about how much power the uneducated masses had. Scientists and others began 
discussing how to use scientific measures to control the public.384  
 In the early twentieth century, muckraking journalism exposed the inequalities in 
American society. These journalists threatened to expose unsavory corporate practices. The fear 
of exposure led corporations to turn to the first PR practitioners.385 The first PR agency, the 
Publicity Bureau, was founded in 1900. PR professionals often had backgrounds in journalism, 
which gave them the writing skills and connections necessary to furnish press releases and other 
materials that journalists could use in their articles. Ivy L. Lee, one of the founders of modern 
PR, worked as a journalist prior to founding Parker and Lee.386 Lee’s innovative approach to 
business PR and shaped tactics that are still used today.387 The origins of what would later be 
called corporate social responsibility can be traced to early corporate philanthropy in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.388  
 Lee strengthened the reputation of PR, depicting his chosen profession as “a candid 
dispenser of facts.”389 Yet, this description differed from what Lee was hired to do. At the time, 
corporations used PR to protect themselves after catastrophes. In 1914, the Colorado National 
Guard killed more than two dozen people during a miners’ strike at the Colorado Iron and Fuel 
Company. Known as the Ludlow Massacre, the disaster sparked public outrage against Colorado 
Fuel and Iron and its owner, John D. Rockefeller. Working on behalf of Rockefeller, Lee 
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successfully covered up that Colorado Fuel and Iron was responsible for the deaths.390 He 
alleged through numerous “credible” sources that the massacre was the union’s fault. He also 
framed the strike as a business fight through pamphlets titled, “Facts Concerning the Strike in 
Colorado for Industrial Freedom.” Instead of making excuses for the conflict, the pamphlets used 
the term “Industrial Freedom” to position the strike as part of a struggle for capitalism. While 
Lee portrayed himself as a “dispenser of facts,” he carefully crafted “facts” to suit his clients’ 
needs from sources, like newspapers owned by clients, that seemed credible.391  
In addition to shaping the “facts” through publicity, companies often engaged in “welfare 
capitalism” prior to World War I.392 These programs demonstrated that a company cared for its 
employees and treated the corporation as a “family,” a theme echoed in GM’s ads. Through these 
paternalistic practices, corporations provided housing, transportation, and other services to their 
employees. The National Cash Register Company even offered classes for their employees. Of 
course, these programs were not benevolent. These programs were intended to keep employees 
from unionizing and complaining about working conditions.393 Through “welfare capitalism” 
corporations could promote a good face to the public and their employees.  
World War I presented an opportunity for the government to use carefully crafted “facts” 
to propel the U.S. into an international conflict. Advertising and PR practitioners showed their 
patriotism by contributing to the government effort. Those contributions served as PR for the 
growing advertising and PR industries, as well as for their clients.394 The National War Advisory 
Board marshalled advertisers to produce ad campaigns for government bonds, recruitment, and 
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other issues that utilized donated space. This served as boon for both the ad industry and 
industries that co-promoted their products and brands alongside government messages.395 The 
Board worked with the Committee on Public Information, often referred to as the Creel 
Commission. Some PR practitioners also served as government consultants for the 
Commission.396 The Creel Commission demonstrated that PR could be used to cultivate public 
opinion outside of defending against a corporate crisis. After World War I, corporations 
increased their spending on advertising and PR.397  
The Great Depression sparked the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt who sought to alter 
American society through his New Deal. To American corporations in the 1930s, the New Deal 
was a threat to their livelihood.398 The advertising industry frequently used PR to prevent 
regulation. As Inger Stole observes, “public relations would become an essential component of 
the advertising industry’s campaigns to protect itself from public criticism throughout the 
twentieth century.”399 Likewise, corporations used PR, along with advertising, to protect 
themselves from New Deal regulations. For example, Ford Motor Company employed a former 
reporter to discuss Edsel Ford’s work-ethic and attack the New Deal on the radio.400 In the 1920s 
and 30s, GM had presented the GM “family” to the public through its institutional advertising. In 
the 1930s and 40s, the GM “family” sought to defend itself from the threats of New Deal 
legislation through PR that enhanced the appeal of the free market and presented GM as a good 
corporate citizen.401  
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As GM factories spread beyond the Midwest to other areas of the country, the automaker 
heavily localized its PR efforts. GM placed ads in church bulletins and local papers while 
supporting community activities. Thirty-nine factories had PR committees that created a local 
“Plant City Bulletin.”402 GM also published GM Folks, an internal magazine, to build 
camaraderie among their workers. In addition, GM financed the very popular “Parade of the 
States” radio program. The brainchild of Bruce Barton, the “Parade of the States” featured a 
“tribute” to each state written by Barton and orchestral music. These efforts helped make the 
giant GM “family” into a local family with ties to the community. GM also sought to protect its 
“family” by countering the threat the corporation felt the New Deal posed to capitalism.  
GM set out to defend capitalism from the New Deal by associating it with scientific and 
technological progress. In 1935, GM sponsored the General Motors Symphony Orchestra 
Concerts that featured messages about traffic safety and technological developments at GM. This 
radio program emphasized that capitalism enabled GM’s technological developments.403 
Similarly, GM’s “Parade of Progress” was a traveling PR campaign that ran from 1936 to 1938. 
The campaign praised individual initiative as the reason for scientific and technological 
development, as well as emphasizing how “free enterprise” enabled GM to make advancements 
in science and engineering.404 GM’s emphasis continued with the “Futurama” exhibit at the 
1939-1940 New York World’s Fair. The exhibit emphasized a “brighter, technological future.”405 
The background to that future was a free market that allowed GM to create new technologies to 
make life easier.  
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GM’s PR efforts were complemented by its membership in the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) trade association. In 1933, NAM launched a campaign that described the 
“American way” as the only alternative to socialism. As a result, any opposition to business 
interests was un-American.406 As a member of NAM, GM participated in cross-industry efforts 
to promote the “freedom of enterprise” as a business-friendly addition to the Four Freedoms 
outlined by President Roosevelt. GM also sought for schools to incorporate a business-friendly 
perspective in the classroom. GM produced two textbooks: Transportation Progress and 
Chemistry and Wheels. Although billed as educational materials, the goal was to influence 
students’ “buying habits” and make corporations seem like trustworthy sources of information.407 
GM’s emphasis on science and technology in education would continue in the decades 
following.  
World War II was an important time for GM and the auto industry. GM was a defense 
contractor, a role that featured prominently in its advertising.408 It was also a sponsor of war-
related radio programming, including Cheers from the Camp and Victory is Our Business. 
Cheers from the Camp featured soldiers speaking to their families over the radio but also allowed 
GM to use soldiers as an advertising tool. In Victory is Our Business, meanwhile, GM workers 
spoke to their communities about GM’s role in the war effort.409 Beginning in 1943, GM 
sponsored the NBC Orchestra, which featured speeches on the war from Charles “Boss” 
Kettering, a famous GM engineer. GM also sponsored local programs in its factory towns 
featuring performances by celebrities and workers. This programming was an extension of 
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earlier efforts to connect with factory towns.410 GM’s workers were an asset both as community 
members who advocated on the company’s behalf and as political tools who persuaded 
politicians to align with GM’s political goals.  
The post-war period brought both turbulence and profit to the auto industry. Consumers 
were unable to purchase cars from 1942 to 1945, so there was a backlog of demand. When the 
war concluded in August 1945, automobile companies were permitted to return to normal rates 
of production. They had to reconvert their factories and build new factories in anticipation of 
more demand.411 During the post-war period, quality of life and purchasing power rose for the 
middle class; social status was determined by consumption.412 Consumer spending drove the 
economy and led to post-war prosperity. GM and the other U.S. auto manufacturers advertised 
their bigger and better cars hoping that consumers would tire of their unfashionable old cars and 
purchase new ones. Unfortunately, trouble was brewing for GM. While auto sales increased, 
consumers grew concerned about auto safety and the environment, two issues that would define 
GM’s post-war PR, advertising, and lobbying. 
Ralph Nader, Safety, and the Environment 
 In the mid-twentieth century, U.S. auto manufacturers felt confident in their position 
because of American demand for big, flashy cars. In 1960, GM controlled about 50% of the U.S. 
market. During the 1960s, U.S. manufacturers began to lose market share as they battled safety 
critiques, the environmental movement, and the growing import market. Safety arose as a 
national issue in 1966 when President Johnson stated that we needed “to arrest the destruction of 
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life and property on our highways” in his State of the Union address.413 Congress passed the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act that same year. Simultaneously, the 
environmental movement fomented public concern about emissions. In 1961, California passed a 
law authorizing smog control devices, which came installed on 1963 models. This eventually led 
to federal environmental regulations, including the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Act of 1965.414 
Despite increased scrutiny, American manufacturers made no major technical changes to U.S. 
vehicles from 1949 through the mid-1970s largely thanks to lobbying efforts.415 This section 
documents how safety and the environment became major areas of PR and lobbying for the auto 
industry.  
Prior to the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, auto safety 
was primarily regulated by police who enforced state and local driving laws. By the mid-1960s, 
mounting auto deaths demonstrated the inadequacy of local prevention measures. Highway 
engineers began to design safer highways, but automobile deaths reached epidemic levels.416 
Most laws operated at the state and local level. Typically, these laws focused on traffic flow or 
insignificant technological requirements. According to conventional wisdom at the time, driver 
negligence was the primary cause of accidents.417 Ralph Nader and the “third wave” consumer 
movement sought to position auto safety as a social problem that could be addressed by 
regulation and technological changes.  
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In the 1930s, Consumers’ Union, an activist organization, called for regulation of the 
advertising industry. Unfortunately, Consumers’ Union became the target of red-baiting 
beginning in 1941; a decade of sustained attacks transformed Consumers Union into an 
organization more concerned with product testing and publishing the Consumer Reports 
magazine than activism.418 In the absence of sustained activism by Consumers’ Union, other 
consumer organizations emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Ralph Nader, trained as a lawyer, was 
at the center of these changes.419 Nader’s activism ultimately influenced Congress to pass “more 
than twenty-five laws to regulate corporate conduct,” some of which targeted the auto 
industry.420 The resurgence the consumer movement was somewhat short-lived. In 1978, Nader 
and his allies failed to get Congress to pass a bill to create a Department of the Consumer within 
the federal government; this signaled the start of an era of enhanced corporate lobbying and 
public relations.  
Ralph Nader’s journey to the center of the consumer movement began as a law student at 
Harvard University in the 1950s. In law school, he first became interested in the auto safety. As 
part of what has been described as the “third wave” consumer movement, Nader argued that 
corporations should be held accountable for their products and that “captured” federal agencies 
made regulation ineffective or difficult to pass.421 By the early 1960s, Nader moved to DC where 
he wrote articles on public safety and automobiles. He even worked as a research assistant for 
Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel P. Moynihan. By 1964, Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff of 
Connecticut was interested in regulating automobile safety. As part of the Senate Subcommittee 
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on Executive Reorganization, he asked for Nader’s input on how the government should 
intervene.422  
From March to July 1965, the subcommittee held hearings on automotive safety that 
delved into a variety of issues, including how much GM spent on safety research. At the time, 
GM’s annual revenue was about $1.7 billion, but it spent only $1 million on safety research.423 It 
became clear that the auto industry prioritized styling, not safety. That same year, Nader’s 
Unsafe at Any Speed was published. Nader argued that the auto industry influenced the “traffic 
safety establishment,” including the National Safety Council and the Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Public Roads, to turn a blind eye toward safety concerns, despite thousands of deaths 
and millions of injuries from automobiles annually. Nader charged that auto manufacturers were 
focused on stylistic successes rather than safety features. Consumers faced the monetary costs of 
annual styling changes as well as the costs of lives lost from lack of safety features.424 Nader 
famously dedicated a portion of Unsafe at Any Speed to investigating the stylish, but poorly 
designed, Chevrolet Corvair.  
Manufactured from 1960 to 1963, the Corvair had a multitude of problems that resulted 
in more than 100 product liability lawsuits. Its “swing axle” meant that the Corvair tended to flip 
over, which GM had ignored during product testing despite concerns from product engineers.425 
Some Corvairs also vented carbon monoxide into the cab through the heater. The Corvair lacked 
an intermediate safety shield, so carbon monoxide became trapped in the car if the windows were 
up while the heater was on. GM refused to acknowledge injuries and deaths related to the 
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Corvair’s safety problems.426 Unsafe at Any Speed led to wide-ranging public concern about 
automobile safety and placed GM at the center of the controversy. Although the auto industry 
asserted that Nader’s criticisms were unfounded, no manufacturers responded to his challenge to 
debate him publicly in 1966.427 Furthermore, state investigations into auto safety cropped up. On 
January 7, 1966, the Iowa Attorney General held a hearing on auto safety with Nader, a few 
other public intellectuals, and a representative from the Automobile Manufacturers Association. 
On January 14, 1966, Nader visited GM to see a presentation about the Corvair but left 
unconvinced that the vehicle was safe.428 Nader’s direct challenge to GM led the automaker to 
pursue its own investigation of Nader to prove that his claims were not credible.  
In February of 1966, Nader testified before the Senate subcommittee about auto safety. 
Prior to the hearing, Nader reported receiving harassing phone calls. After the hearing, he 
noticed that he was being followed by two individuals. A case of a mistaken identity led a 
journalist to report in March of 1966 that Nader was being tailed by unidentified individuals.429 
This was the beginning of a saga that would lead to a public investigation of GM and a lawsuit 
from Nader. Initially, the auto industry claimed that they did not have an interest in investigating 
Nader, and if they had had an interest in doing so, Nader would not have noticed the 
investigation because it would have been better.430 After evidence surfaced that GM was 
associated with the investigation, GM issued a statement admitting to it but justified it on the 
basis that they were only checking on whether he was compromised by ongoing Corvair cases 
when writing Unsafe at Any Speed. GM asserted their investigation was defensible because 








Nader might have used information from pending Corvair cases in Unsafe at Any Speed and 
might have been affiliated with attorneys involved in the Corvair lawsuits.  
Nader’s prominence as a witness in 1965 and the news coverage of the investigation 
prompted a Senate investigation into whether GM had broken federal law by intimidating a 
witness. On March 22, 1966, the Senate subcommittee held a hearing on GM’s investigation of 
Nader. At the start of the hearing, GM apologized for the investigation but denied that any 
harassment had occurred. Throughout the hearing, GM argued that the investigation had been a 
routine investigation to determine whether Nader had ties to lawyers or litigants in Corvair 
cases.431 GM’s public relations successfully portrayed the automaker as apologetic and penned 
the blame for any misbehavior on Vincent Gillen, a private investigator hired by GM. The New 
York Times’ headline the following day focused on GM’s apology rather than the nature of the 
investigation.432 Nader’s testimony focused on the impact of investigation on his reputation 
because some questions might have led others to assume that he was gay or anti-Semitic. Nader 
argued that these questions could discourage other critics of the auto industry who might fear 
that they would be subjected to similar investigations. Although the Senate subcommittee asked 
the FBI to investigate whether GM had harassed or intimidated a witness, the FBI did not 
recommend prosecution.  
GM’s choice to portray Gillen as the “villain” may have resulted in a public relations 
victory, but it created a legal nightmare.433 Nader filed suit against both GM and Gillen over 
violation of privacy as a result of the investigation. GM abandoned Gillen to defend himself, so 
GM’s former private investigator worked with Nader to document the investigation. Gillen 
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surreptitiously recorded conversations with GM executives and others involved in the Nader 
investigation; he offered Nader’s legal team a transcript of the meeting when GM hired him. The 
transcript showed that GM wanted to craft a smear campaign that would foment doubt about 
Nader’s investigation. In order to smear Nader’s reputation, GM asked for compromising 
information on Nader’s sex life and ties to “leftist” groups.434 Ultimately, Nader and GM entered 
into a settlement in 1970 to resolve the case. The $425,000 settlement meant that GM funded 
Nader’s consumer activism.435 
GM’s investigation of Nader may have also influenced the Senate to pass the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which was signed by President Johnson in September of 
1966. Under the Act, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) created 
safety standards and civil penalties for not meeting those standards; NHTSA was also tasked 
with the promotion and development of safety technology.436 Under the Act, companies were 
required to notify customers of defects and recall faulty vehicles. However, it did not include 
criminal penalties.437 Although the Act was not as strong as Nader wanted, it did have some 
teeth. On August 18, 1966, GM attempted to dispose of 17,000 customer complaint letters about 
the Corvair, so that they would not be subject to scrutiny under the pending Act. In April 1971, 
the letters were found by junk dealers who offered them to both GM and Nader. GM paid 
$20,000 for the letters, but it was too late. Consumer Reports and others reported on the carbon 
monoxide complaints found within many of the letters, leading the Department of Transportation 
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to notify GM that the heater was a safety issue.438 In 1971, GM finally sent customers letters 
about the Corvair heater but declined to offer compensation or payment for repairs.  
The NHTSA began with lofty goals but has transformed from an organization focused on 
rulemaking to one focused on recalls. From 1966 to 1974, the NHTSA crafted forty-five rules; 
yet, it only created a few in the years following. In 1971, the NHTSA released “Program Plan for 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards” that included safety technologies that were ahead of their time, 
such as the air bag. Unfortunately, the plan ran into problems in the courts.439 In Chrysler vs. 
Department of Transportation, the Court ruled that the NHTSA “bore the burden of 
demonstrating somehow that the technology it was forcing was both technically and 
economically feasible and that it would produce real-world benefits.”440 This constraint meant 
that the NHTSA was held to very high testing standards that delayed innovative technology, like 
the airbag, for decades. Other court decisions extended the time frame on the rulemaking 
process, so that “new rounds of notice and comment could go on for decades.”441 Auto 
manufacturers celebrated these victories because they could draw out conversations on new 
technologies and avoid regulation.  
While the auto industry’s lobbying and public relations machine grew to deal with public 
concerns about safety, Nader founded the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) and Public Interest 
Research Group (PIRG). Through these organizations, Nader and his allies influenced 
congressional oversight of the NHTSA.442 Furthermore, Nader received a multitude of letters 
about auto defects and safety issues that provided data for the CAS to use to help auto safety 
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litigation.443 Unfortunately, Nader, the CAS, and PIRG’s resources were not infinite. Public 
interest advocates had gained access to lawmakers, but the auto industry was learning how to 
slow down rule making and dismantle regulatory structures.  
The 1974 amendments to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act heated up 
the conflict between the auto industry and consumer advocates. The auto industry testified that 
regulations would create hardship for the industry because of competition from small, imported 
vehicles and the oil crisis.444 They also argued that consumers had a right to choose what 
vehicles they wanted. This argument would later be used to support selling SUVs despite their 
environmental drawbacks. The 1974 amendments prioritized the NHTSA’s recall authority over 
its rulemaking power.445 Under the amendments, consumers could get recalled vehicles repaired 
for free, but they were not compelled to get the repairs. Unfortunately, this means that many 
consumers do not get the needed repairs. As a result of the amendments, the NHTSA shifted 
toward a model of favoring recalls over rules about safety technology.  
The delayed implementation of airbag standards demonstrates the failures of the NHTSA 
and the ways in which the auto industry has influenced safety regulations. The origins of the 
airbag date to the 1950s, but they were virtually unused at that time. In 1971, the NHTSA called 
for the installation of air bags. However, air bags were delayed until the 1990s. At the time, the 
only auto manufacturer that supported air bags was GM.446 Although GM invested millions in 
airbags, the optional airbag feature was relatively unpopular with consumers when it was offered 
from 1974 to 1976.447 Despite its early start on airbags, GM had fewer airbags in use by 1990 
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than Chrysler or Ford. In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act that required the use of air bags beginning in 1998. As will be described in 
Chapter 4, air bags were a key PR issue for GM in the 1990s.  
As the industry fought safety regulations, they also dealt with public concerns about 
pollution and the environment. In response to the environmental movement, Congress passed 
two major environmental regulations: the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act in 1965 and 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970.448 These Acts enabled the Environmental Protection Agency 
to regulate pollutants from auto emissions, such as carbon monoxide. During the 1970s, the auto 
industry lobbied against the CAA intensely. As it would argue in the future in the 1990s, the auto 
industry made the case that fuel economy standards were detrimental to employment; in order to 
comply with CAA regulations, auto manufacturers would have to cut models and plants. 
Congress felt that the threat of job losses did not outweigh a speedy implementation of standards. 
In 1977, the Clean Air Act was amended to lower requirements and extend the time that the 
industry had to comply with standards.449 This would set the stage for decades of the industry 
slowing environmental standards.  
The OPEC embargo in the early 1970s led to more problems for the U.S. auto industry. 
Consumers began to favor smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles because of high gas prices. In 
addition to the CAA, consumer pressure led to the first fuel economy regulations. The NHTSA 
was authorized to regulate fuel economy through the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards. While the auto industry opposed fuel economy standards, they could not afford to 
fight them and had not prepared an elaborate defense. The 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act set the first CAFE standards based on vehicle production volume and set monetary penalties 
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for failing to meet that standard.450 The Act also created two categories of vehicles for the 
purposes of fuel economy standards: passenger cars and light trucks. Light trucks were exempt 
from CAFE standards because they were primarily used for business. Unfortunately, this 
compromise had devastating consequences for the environment and vehicle production.  
 Clean air and environmental regulations were tied to the plight of the auto industry in the 
1970s and 1980s. With the threat from Japanese imports, the U.S. auto industry positioned itself 
as the victim of a foreign aggressor and in need of “relief” to survive.451 In 1979 and 1980, 
President Jimmy Carter expressed a willingness to work with the auto industry, including union 
leaders, to save American automakers. The Carter plan included exemptions from the Clean Air 
Act, loans to dealers, tax relief, relaxed emission standards, and the creation of an Auto Industry 
Committee.452 President Carter emphasized that the government had an interest in protecting the 
American auto industry.  When President Ronald Reagan entered office, rising import sales still 
seemed to be threatening the U.S. auto industry. In 1981, the Reagan Administration revised the 
CAA with looser terms of compliance and other reforms that favored the industry over public 
health.453 Collaboration between the federal government and the industry would continue to be 
the norm in the decades that followed.  
To exploit the light truck loophole and avoid strict CAFE standards, U.S. automakers 
began manufacturing and marketing more trucks and SUVs to keep their fleet average within the 
guidelines. Paradoxically, the law that was intended to curb the use of gas-guzzling vehicles 
increased their presence on the roads. Furthermore, U.S. fuel economy increased only 
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marginally, “from 11.9 mpg in 1973 to 16.9 mpg in 1991.”454 The auto industry also learned 
from their initial failures in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s and 2000s, GM and the auto 
industry used PR, lobbying, front groups, and greenwashing to fight CAFE standards, while 
appearing to acquiesce to environmental concerns, as I discuss in chapter 5. 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
With mounting attacks from consumer groups and activists like Ralph Nader, 
corporations needed to deploy charity strategically. Corporations began to report their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programs through PR, advertising, and annual reports in the 1970s.455 
From 1971 through the mid-1970s, GM published the General Motors Public Interest Report. It 
also held annual public interest conferences from 1971-1974. The report was published primarily 
for stockholders, academics, the media, and other stakeholders outside the corporation.456  The 
GM Foundation, which was founded in 1976, formalized GM’s corporate philanthropy.457 GM’s 
philanthropy attempted to enhance its reputation in communities where it operated, similar to 
earlier “welfare capitalism” practices.  
GM’s choice to create the GM Foundation in 1976 was a response to the changing 
atmosphere around corporate PR and activism. In a 1971 memo, future Supreme Court Justice 
Lewis Powell argued that corporations needed to use their PR, lobbying, and advertising to fight 
for the free enterprise system. In response, corporate leaders redesigned trade associations 
around lobbying. New organizations like the Business Roundtable and the American Legislative 
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Exchange Council (ALEC) sprang up.458 GM contributed to both the Business Roundtable and 
ALEC. Both organizations supported many of GM’s lobbying and public relations goals, such as 
fuel efficiency standards. However, because these coalitions represented broad business interests, 
they were less active on other issues, like vehicle safety, where member corporations had 
disagreements.  
Neoliberal philosophy emerged with the growth of corporate power in the 1970s. 
Corporations perpetuated a dichotomy between business and government. Neoliberalism’s 
proponents argued that unfettered free markets were paramount, and that unnecessary big 
government hurt those markets.459 They opposed government regulation, even for safety. 
Neoliberals and corporations slowly weakened the safety standards that Nader fought for in the 
1960s. In this atmosphere, CSR re-emerged. Although the term CSR was first used in the 1950s, 
it still mainly pertained to corporate philanthropy.460 CSR practices would broaden in the 1970s 
because of the widespread critiques of business. The need for corporate social responsibility and 
philanthropy was summarized by the Business Roundtable in 1981:  
All business entities should recognize philanthropy as good business and an obligation if 
they are to be considered responsible corporate citizens of the national and local 
communities in which they operate.461 
The Business Roundtable urged its members to engage in corporate philanthropy to build 
relationships with communities. Likewise, National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
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argued that CSR was necessary because “the pendulum can swing back to the onerous levels of 
past adversary relationships.”462 Both associations argued social responsibility helped 
corporations build relationships and avoid future problems. By definition, CSR was self-
interested PR in which corporations aided communities for a political purpose.  
CSR served two purposes. First, it assuaged social concerns about corporate behavior. 
Corporations were able to demonstrate that they cared about the consumers’ concerns, although 
there were limitations on what changes corporations would willingly make.463 Second, CSR 
became a solution to social problems. In the throes of economic crisis and cuts to social services, 
CSR offered a private solution to the failure of government services. In particular, “the Business 
Roundtable linked their support for the Reagan tax and spending cuts to increases in corporate 
philanthropy.”464 Under this logic, charity made up for the losses in social services. In reality, 
corporate philanthropy is insufficient to fill the loss in government support under neoliberalism. 
Although corporations contribute billions of dollars to charity, the most generous only contribute 
about 2% of their pre-tax profits, far less than they would contribute in taxes.465 Additionally, 
donations are tax-deductible, so corporations use donations to reduce corporate tax payments, 
which further erodes the tax base. The biases of corporate philanthropy mean that areas of need, 
such as “economic development, hunger relief, or job training” often go unmet by corporate 
donations.466  
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In the mid-twentieth century, GM faced intense criticism from Ralph Nader, the 
consumer movement, and environmentalists. Although the auto industry was unsuccessful at 
preventing regulations entirely, it severely gutted them by reducing the NHTSA’s role in 
developing safety technology and manipulating the CAFE guidelines. Safety and the 
environment would continue to be important in the 1990s with GM expending money to support 
corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility campaigns on both subjects. 
Beginning in 1967, GM incorporated safety into its donations to university research programs.467 
GM’s use of CSR demonstrates that CSR served as “window dressing” for the corporation. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, GM used safetywashed CSR programs to mask their lobbying 
campaigns against federal safety standards. Likewise, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, GM 
used greenwashed PR to present their anti-CAFE stance as a protection of individual rights to 
consume.  
Influencing News and Influencing Policy 
As I have described, GM quickly learned to fight consumer campaigns for safety and the 
environment in the 1970s. GM could not forestall regulations but shaped them favorably in the 
years following. The industry also used its influence over news coverage to control the terms of 
debate in many policy areas. For example, in the 1990s and 2000s, GM used its front group, 
Citizens for Vehicle Choice, to turn the debate over CAFE standards into a debate over whether 
CAFE prevented consumers from buying the vehicles they wanted, like SUVs. Further, 
manufacturers argued that CAFE standards would endanger consumers’ lives because small cars 
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were less safe than SUVs.468 In addition these issues, labor relations were an important area of 
news influence for GM and its allies for many decades.  
At the end of the 1920s, the Big 3 had an oligopoly over American auto manufacturing. 
Ford, GM, and Chrysler would dominate the industry for decades.469 As demand for vehicles 
grew, the auto industry began to use automation to speed up the production process, leading to a 
dependency on “unskilled” labor and immigrants.470 Because auto manufacturing employed 
“unskilled” laborers and a variety of craft laborers, it posed a problem for the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which was divided by craft. Members of the AFL wanted 
autoworkers to be incorporated into existing craft unions instead of creating a union for all auto 
workers. Between 1933 and 1936, the AFL attempted to organize by craft, but failed. In 1935, 
the AFL created the United Automobile Workers (UAW) as a union for all auto workers.471  
The UAW and Walter Reuther succeeded where the AFL had failed. A key factor to 
success in organizing the auto industry was playing the three automakers against each other. 
Once one auto manufacturer capitulated, the others would too. Reuther strategically chose to 
begin organizing the UAW at GM. Beginning in 1936, Reuther led workers in a series of strikes. 
Workers in Flint, Michigan, where GM employed 80% of the population, began striking in 1936 
and 1937.472 The strikes spread to other GM plants and brought GM production to its knees. 
After the strikes ended in February 1937, Reuther organized Ford and then Chrysler. Union 
membership exploded and continued to grow during World War II.  
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After World War II, the auto industry reconverted to civilian production. However, they 
faced labor turmoil and a wave of strikes. In 1946, the U.S. experienced the most strikes 
nationwide since 1919 due to stagnating wages and widespread demand for price controls. 
Workers won a wage increase, but the government removed price controls. Thus, workers 
spending power was still limited.473 Despite this setback, workers continued to fight for other 
benefits in their contracts. The “Treaty of Detroit,” the famous contract between the UAW and 
GM in 1950, included pensions, insurance, and a “no strike” clause.474 The “Treaty of Detroit” 
was not only a labor agreement; it was a symbol of how post-war prosperity would be won. 
Union workers won heavy benefits from GM, Ford, and Chrysler.475 At the time, these gains 
represented prosperity for blue collar workers, but, in the 1990s and 2000s, critics would claim 
that the UAW received too many benefits.   
During the post-war period, unions had relatively strong membership with nearly 35% of 
the country unionized in 1954. This was the peak of U.S. union membership in 20th century.476 
Although labor unions brought prosperity to middle class Americans through gains in wages and 
benefits, unions were also facing internal turmoil. In 1955, the AFL and CIO merged to form the 
AFL-CIO. The merger of the more conservative AFL with a more liberal CIO meant a merger of 
ideals. Reuther, who was president of the UAW for twenty-four years, saw unions as an agent of 
larger social change. For example, Reuther viewed the 1945 GM strike as a referendum on profit 
sharing and price controls, two issues that he saw as central to bringing prosperity to workers. He 
wanted GM to fairly distribute profits and keep prices down under war-time price controls. 
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However, the AFL did not share these wider social goals. Because of this and other leadership 
disagreements, the UAW left the AFL-CIO in 1968. However, UAW members would vote to 
rejoin the AFL-CIO in the 1980s to combat the decline in union membership.477 
At the same time as the UAW was questioning the larger goals of the union movement, it 
also faced internal tensions of its own. In the 1960s and 1970s strikes grew longer. Even when 
the national organization called off strikes, some locals would continue.478 The autonomy and 
independence of UAW locals also fed into management tactics in the 1980s and 1990s. As GM 
invested in automation and laid off workers, unions tried to save jobs, and workers began to fear 
other unionized employees. A practice called “whipsawing” encouraged unionized employees to 
compete with one another for jobs to the point of negotiating agreements that violated the UAW 
contract.479 In an attempt to save workers’ jobs, the 1987 UAW contract encouraged competition 
between local unions over jobs. Unfortunately, this compromise did not prevent more plants 
from closing.480  
Despite the UAW’s struggles, most Americans believe unions are necessary. 
Paradoxically, many also believe that unions have too much power, a belief cultivated for 
decades by corporations.481 The AFL-CIO merger in 1955 represented a threat to business 
interests because the joint union could spend more on political action committees (PACs). Trade 
associations and corporations drummed up public support for management when fighting for 
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labor reform laws in the late 1950s.482 They also emphasized the importance of protecting the 
“free enterprise” system and attempted to associate the labor movement with communism. 
Unfortunately, the labor movement lacked access to media outlets and struggled to counter these 
narratives.483 Although strikes continued to be important for accessing workers’ rights, the public 
was less supportive of strikes than they had been in the past.484 Corporations’ opposition to the 
labor movement would deepen in the 1960s.   
As described briefly earlier, the 1971 Powell Memo became a call to arms for all business 
interests.485 The Powell Memo included a variety of suggestions for organizing business 
interests, including expanding public affairs and public relations departments, using the media, 
and using investments in universities to shift curriculum. As a member of the Chamber of 
Commerce, GM was part of the committee that worked to enact these policies.486 The Powell 
Memo not only reshaped the Chamber but re-invigorated corporate lobbying with organized 
labor as one of its central targets. In the late 1960s, there were about one hundred corporate 
public affairs offices in Washington; a decade later, there were more than five hundred.487 
Corporations lobbied individually, but trade associations grew as a way to martial corporate 
power. 
 In the 1970s, major trade associations were re-organized to reflect a renewed emphasis on 
broad business lobbying. NAM created a Public Affairs Committee with seven branches to better 
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respond to lobbying needs.488 Likewise, the Chamber underwent changes to represent business 
and free market interests broadly, adopting a structure like NAM’s with a permanent president. 
The Chamber also began contributing to Business Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) 
by donating $25,000 to the Political Education Division.489 Finally, as mentioned earlier, the 
Business Roundtable became an important means of corporate lobbying.  Its model included 
dodging lobbying regulations by having CEOs serve as lobbyists:  
A CEO chaired each task force and marshaled his own company’s personnel and 
resources to produce position papers and coordinate legislative action. The Roundtable 
itself maintained a very small administrative staff, did not register as a lobbyist in its own 
name, and did not actively coordinate fund-raising for political campaigns.490 
This allowed the Roundtable to avoid reporting requirements, while simultaneously leveraging 
the personal relationships of its members. The Roundtable was so successful that the CEO of 
Volvo founded a similar organization in Europe. 
 General Motors’ executives were heavily involved in the formation of Business 
Roundtable. GM was a member of the “March Group,” the pre-cursor to the Roundtable. The 
“March Group” was a combination of the Labor Law Study Committee (LLSC) and the 
Constructions Users’ Anti-Inflation Roundtable (CUAIR).491 The LLSC developed out of a need 
to organize against the AFL-CIO’s influence over the Johnson Administration. Both 
organizations challenged the AFL-CIO by funding business challenges to the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB). CUAIR was determined to fight inflation by lowering the cost of 
production through lower union wages or eliminating union workers. GM, along with Ford, was 
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an early member of the organization. In 1973, GM became a member of the newly formed 
Business Roundtable.  
 GM’s membership in the Roundtable immediately proved useful. In 1978, to combat 
inflation and unemployment, President Carter created the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
(COWPS). Although, the rules were intended to limit wage and price increases, they were 
flexible. GM increased its prices beyond federal limits by negotiating various exceptions.492 In 
the following decades, the Roundtable’s membership expanded beyond traditional industrial to 
include financial firms, pharmaceutical companies, and other major corporations. GM, with its 
own shift toward finance through GMAC, remained a member.  
 Although the goals of the Roundtable expanded beyond labor issues, the galvanizing 
issue at the start was the threat of the labor movement. The labor movement also suffered from 
changes in the corporate media. In the 1950s, at the peak of the labor movement, it was common 
for newspapers to have labor reporters who regularly covered union issues. However, some 
right-leaning newspapers, such as those owned by William Randolph Hearst, made sure to give 
their labor coverage an anti-labor bent. At the same time, other owners promoted labor stories, 
demonstrating the power that publishers and editors can have over story framing and tone.493 In 
an era of corporate ownership, there are few labor reporters left, and corporate owners may have 
a more vested interest in avoiding labor issues or framing labor issues in management terms. 
Attempts to cover the labor perspective were, and still are, complicated by the fact that 
corporations often have stronger and better PR than labor unions.494 Thus, reporters may over 
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play the management point of view because they have limited time to research and develop 
stories.  
 Coverage of strikes is the primary coverage that the labor movement receives.495 Strikes 
are a show of labor’s power, but how they are framed can affect how citizens view and interpret 
strikes. By overplaying the impact of strikes or focusing on labor as the reason for the strikes, 
reporters may encourage citizens view strikers unsympathetically.496 The UAW and other labor 
unions have long held that this focus on strikes does not help citizens understand the value of 
labor contracts for the community. Yet, the lack of drama inherent in agreement means that 
agreements get less coverage than strikes; citizens may need information on labor agreements to 
assess the livelihood of their fellow citizens, but the constraints of the commercial media limit 
that coverage.  
 Furthermore, with the decline of unionization, media coverage of labor likely shapes 
public opinion more than it did in the past.497 The number of strikes annually has decreased since 
the 1970s, so strikes typically receive special coverage. This distinguishes and magnifies their 
importance. Even at The New York Times, reporters noted that “the quality, rather than the 
quantity of coverage may have changed…with the decline in union membership, union-related 
events are no longer as significant to the economy as was once the case.”498 While strikes are 
covered, they are exceptions to a general lack of coverage of labor issues. Instead of hearing 
about prolonged struggles, most people hear about union workers as agitators. For example, a 
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study of Chicago Tribune stories published between 1991 and 2001 found that strikes and labor 
disputes made up 37.8% of stories, the largest category of stories about labor.499 The Tribune’s 
coverage was largely negative, so unions were positioned as aggressors during strikes.  
 In addition to strikes, whipsawing and downsizing were often the focus of labor stories in 
the 1980s and 1990s when GM made UAW locals compete for contracts. Through whipsawing, 
UAW locals had to articulate their value in monetary terms, while acquiescing to the corporate 
logic that whatever was in the best interest of GM was in the best interest of the community. In 
1991, GM made the decision to close either the Willow Run plant in Michigan or the Arlington, 
Texas, plant. GM announced that the closure would be based on which plant was more costly to 
keep open. This launched a fight for survival between the plants as both attempted to reduce 
costs.500 The media pounced on the drama of the “whipsawing.”  
The media did not ask whether the downsizing was necessary or why factory workers 
were being asked to sacrifice more than the executive suite. Furthermore, the story’s framing 
placed emphasis on what the communities would do instead of asking why GM would do this to 
communities that it supposedly cared about.501 Even though GM made numerous public 
statements alleging that the company was not seeking tax breaks in exchange for keeping the 
factories open, both communities offered GM massive tax breaks to keep the automaker happy. 
Additionally, the workers in Arlington were willing to make changes to their union contract, 
while those at Willow Run were not. GM chose to close Willow Run. The media’s praise of 
Arlington’s willingness to compromise indicates that labor receives positive coverage when it 
acquiesces to management. 
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 Yet, it should have been a surprise that GM chose to close Willow Run. Even with 
Arlington’s concessions, Willow Run was cheaper.502  The Township of Ypsilanti, Michigan, 
home of Willow Run, sued GM on the basis that GM had been granted tax breaks to maintain a 
factory that it was now closing. Instead of debating the merits of the giving tax breaks to 
corporations that can simply walk away, the media positioned Ypsilanti as fighting a needless 
battle in the face of downsizing. GM still closed the plant. The court case revealed that Willow 
Run was cheaper than Arlington all along, but that could not save Willow Run.503  
Although Arlington won the factory, local problems persisted. GM received tax breaks, 
and workers agreed to work more hours. Yet, GM decided to cut the union workforce at the 
plant. Even when GM made clear that Arlington might still close in a few years, the local 
newspaper, the Dallas Morning News, praised GM for keeping any jobs in Arlington. 
Effectively, the Morning News argued that auto workers should be grateful to GM for giving up 
on a deal for which they had sacrificed. The Morning News also praised the workers for the 
concessions made in their modified contract. However, the workers began to tire of the lost 
money and benefits.504 The loss of income hurt not only the workers but also Arlington. GM’s 
years of tax abatements led to a poorly funded school district. Rather than considering the 
negative externalities of the factory, the Morning News continued to praise GM. The commercial 
media stood by the corporation rather than the community members.  
The problems of the Morning News are more widespread than they appear. As I examine 
in chapter 7, auto manufacturers and auto dealers are major advertisers for local news outlets. 
Auto dealers typically receive funds for advertising from the manufacturer and provide 






additional funds from their own accounts. At the local level, dealers provide so much funding 
that some television stations no longer cover auto stories. Local car dealers often boycott or 
remove ads based on coverage.505 Stations and newspapers may also cancel or revise stories in 
light of dealers’ criticism. The influence of dealers has hindered consumer interest stories about 
cars and dealers, which might protect consumers from fraud and lemons.506 GM has also shown 
itself to be willing to pull advertising from national media, including NBC, the Wall Street 
Journal, and the Los Angeles Times.507 As commercial propaganda, ads not only shape 
consumers perception of vehicles, consumerism, and capitalism, but also give advertisers 
significant leverage over commercial news.  
In recent years, journalism has faced a funding crisis, particularly at newspapers. Budgets 
have been slashed because ad dollars have declined.508 Given that the auto industry is one of the 
largest ad spenders nationally, they have tremendous leverage over news content. The decline of 
labor news has led to an increase in business and financial news, which is particularly vulnerable 
to the use of corporate press releases.509 Previous studies have found that local news, even when 
covering labor struggles, can be biased toward corporate interests. Further, this imbalance may 
be even worse at the national level. One interesting exception in the coverage of Willow Run 
was the Detroit News, which offered more balanced coverage between the union and GM; 
interestingly, the paper’s corporate owner, USA Today, was biased toward GM.510 I explore the 
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issue of local coverage of auto industry problems in chapter 7, which addresses coverage of the 
auto bailout by the Detroit Free Press.  
Conclusion 
 The auto industry has used commercial propaganda to shape public opinion in critical 
areas. GM used both institutional and product advertising to shape the its public image and the 
public perception of its products. Yet, product advertising has done more than sell cars. The 
popularity of the automobile has reshaped American society around driving from federal road 
subsidies to the interstate highway system.511 This restructuring has led to a variety of 
externalities, including pollution and safety concerns.512 GM used its PR to fend off the most 
stringent safety and environmental regulations while reshaping regulations to suit corporate 
needs. Finally, advertising allows GM and its dealers access to news outlets that can be 
leveraged to publish corporate PR. As commercial propaganda, promotional communication 
shapes consumption and public policy through the commercial media system. In the following 
chapter, I focus on how GM’s advertising in the 1990s and 2000s co-promoted on financial 
contracts SUVs.  
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CHAPTER 4: FUELING FINANCE THROUGH SUV ADVERTISING 
Introduction 
In 1990, GM was the biggest auto manufacturer in the world and one of the biggest 
advertisers. Its cars were featured in TV shows, films, songs, and at sporting events, all of which 
served as advertising. My previous chapter described GM’s promotional communication before 
1990 and explained how GM modernized auto advertising through models and styling. When 
U.S. auto manufactures began to lose out to foreign manufacturers in the 1980s, GM shifted 
toward finance. In the 1990s and 2000s, some auto ads put financing and leasing options before 
features and information about vehicles. This brought customers into dealerships for offers that 
were seldom available to them. In this chapter, I argue that GM used ads that featured financial 
promotions to co-promote GMAC products and GM vehicles. Unfortunately, these promotions 
can have negative consequences for consumers. Although the FTC has rarely investigated auto 
advertising, there have been two key investigations that show how auto manufacturers and 
dealers misuse the fine print on auto ads.   
In this chapter, I first describe the GM’s advertising spending in the 1990s and 2000s. I 
then discuss trends in auto ads with an emphasis on SUV safety and environmental appeals. For 
most of the chapter, I focus on special financing promotions in auto ads. In particular, I examine 
how auto manufacturers advertised 0% APR rates in the 2000s. Next, I describe how Consumers’ 
Union and Public Citizen responded to fraud by auto dealers that has been enabled by misleading 
advertising. I conclude with a discussion of auto leasing and planned obsolescence.   
Auto manufacturers and dealers are some of the largest advertisers in the world. Their ads 
are profitable for ad agencies and media companies. Accounts with auto manufacturers come 
with prestige for agencies because of the cost and high-profile nature of the ads. Mad Men, a 
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television show centered on a New York ad agency, dramatized this when the agency competed 
for an account with Jaguar. In speech to his employees, Don Draper describes the importance of 
landing Jaguar: “Every agency on Madison Avenue is defined by the moment they got their car. 
When we land Jaguar, the world will know we’ve arrived.”513 Although U.S. auto manufacturers 
had lost market share by the 1990s, they had not lost advertising power. In 1990, GM was ranked 
the fourth biggest advertiser, with about $1.5 billion in ad spending, a massive increase from just 
five years earlier when GM ranked fifth and spent about $800 million.514  Even adjusting for 
inflation, GM spent $500 million more in 1990 than in 1985. Likewise, by 2005, GM was 
spending over $4 billion dollars on advertising annually.515 Adjusted for inflation, this was 
double the amount spent in 1990.516 GM was not alone in its splurge; spending by all advertisers 
has gone up over the decades.517 
By the numbers, GM has been one of the biggest advertising spenders for decades. As the 
trade publication Advertising Age put it in 1999, “At the top, the annual list contains one sure 
axiom: If you're not Procter & Gamble Co., GM or Philip Morris, you don't belong there. Its [sic] 
a virtual divine right that one of these three top the list, for none other has reached the 
pinnacle.”518  Over the decades, GM was one of the biggest advertisers in the world and the 
biggest in the auto industry. Despite increased ad spending, GM’s share of the market 
plummeted during this period, as described in Chapter 1. Some auto market observers argued 
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that GM lost market share because financial incentives lowered the value of GM’s products 
through association with cheapness, while other have argued the GM simply suffered from bad 
design during this period.519 Alternatively, the loss in market share may have been the result of 
GM’s decision to largely drop out of the car market in favor of more lucrative SUVs and trucks. 
Regardless, financial incentives increased the overall market in some years. For instance, in 
2001, manufacturers sold about 21 million vehicles, instead of the usual 17 million. Because of 
their success, financial promotions even spread to initially resistant Japanese auto manufacturers. 
GM pushed these financial promotions harder than its competitors because its status as the 
market leader enabled the corporation to do so.  
During the 1990s and 2000s, GM changed their media makeup. This chapter addresses 
both print and TV advertisements to draw similarities between them. In 1990, GM spent almost 
48% of its ad dollars on TV. In contrast, GM spent about 23% of its dollars on magazines, 
Sunday magazines, and newspapers combined; this sum amounted to less than the $450 million 
spent on network television.520 By 2006, GM spent about 10% of its ad dollars on newspapers 
and about 60% on TV. Magazines took up most of the remainder.521 As time went on, GM’s 
spending shifted more toward TV with internet spending growing in small increments in the mid-
2000s. Beyond GM’s corporate spending, GM dealers also spent money at local news stations 
and newspapers nationwide. Many of these promotions were partially supported by GM, but 
money was also contributed by the local dealer. When dealer spending is added, spending on 
auto ads climbs even higher. GM and its dealers command hundreds of millions of dollars in 
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local media spending for TV stations and newspapers. Chapter 7 describes how GM’s ad 
spending commanded influence in the newsroom and gave GM and its dealers access to 
commercial media. 
Auto Ads in the 1990s and 2000s 
 As described in chapter 2, two trends defined the auto industry in the 1990s: the rise of 
SUVs and the increasing importance of auto finance. GM’s advertising connected these trends by 
co-promoting SUVs and auto loans. Of GM’s fleet, SUVs were the most advertised during this 
period; ads for SUVs made up $9 billion of the auto industry’s ad spending from 1990 to 2001. 
This total reflects a rapid rise in spending on SUVs in the late 1990s and 2000s; by 2001, the 
auto industry spent over $1 billion annually on SUVs.522 In the following pages, I examine 
previous work on SUV advertising and its use of the environment and safety as themes. This 
serves as background information for both the study of advertising in this chapter and the studies 
of greenwashing and safetywashing later in this dissertation.  
Most book-length studies of automobile advertising are non-scholarly works that focus 
on the appeal of vintage car ads.523 Despite the noted importance of price in selling cars,524 most 
scholarly studies focus on the styling, models, and symbolic meaning related to the automobiles 
themselves. Ads for SUVs exploit the idea of people exploring nature, even though most drivers 
will never take their vehicle off-road. Furthermore, these ads counter the narrative of SUVs as 
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harmful for the environment by associating them with “green” imagery.525 Likewise, the theme 
of safety in SUV ads is common. These appeals are seldom stated directly but are usually 
implied through the mention of features, like four-wheel drive, and images of being the toughest 
vehicle on the road. However, scientific evidence has not linked four-wheel drive to safety. 
Likewise, SUV size is a dubious marker of safety as will be discussed more in this chapter.526 
 Despite their environmental impacts, which I describe in chapter 6, SUVs are marketed 
as an escapist fantasy. Auto manufacturers advertise SUVs to suburban and urban consumers 
who fantasize about exploring the outdoors. The vehicles are often pictured “in the wilderness, or 
at the top of a mountain.”527 The ads seek to appeal to opposing cultural narratives: simultaneous 
harmony with and dominion over nature. The SUV is shown conquering terrain, yet it does not 
harm the babbling brooks that it crosses. It leaves no trace in its domineering trek, unlike real 
SUVs. These ads suggest that the best way to get close to nature was to buy a vehicle with poor 
fuel economy that would damage the environment. Some later SUV ads also emphasized 
improved fuel economy, even though fuel economy largely dropped in the 1990s and 2000s.528 
The paradoxical SUV was simultaneously fuel efficient and used to oppose fuel efficiency 
standards, as will be described in chapter 6.  
 A second theme in SUV ads was safety. After their bitter defeat in the 1960s, the auto 
industry recovered by lobbying their main safety regulator, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
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Administration (NHTSA).  Simultaneously, manufacturers turned to safety as a marketing tactic. 
Although safety features have been used in marketing vehicles and in corporate social 
responsibility, safety is a minor theme compared to vehicle power and financial incentives. Even 
ads for cars and minivans, which are more likely to depict safety as a feature, only depicted 
safety as a feature 10% of the time in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, nearly 60% of ads by 
U.S. manufacturers deployed details of financial promotions.529 Much like the paradoxical 
themes of harmony and dominance over nature, SUVs were depicted as safe, and buyers reported 
that they purchased the vehicles because of their purported safety.530 To their surprise, auto 
manufacturers frequently found that women in focus groups reported feeling safer because of the 
SUV height.531 Participants failed to realize that the vehicle’s height also made it more likely to 
roll over, a safety issue that I discuss in the next chapter.  
 SUVs were subject to scrutiny from environmental activists and safety advocates. A 
variety of groups, ranging from evangelical religious groups to the Environmental Liberation 
Front, criticized SUVs for their impact on the environment.532 SUVs were also subject to other 
high-profile criticism. At the New York Times, journalist Keith Bradsher began investigating 
SUV safety in 1997. His stories alerted Times readers to the safety issues of SUVs but also led 
the auto industry and Detroit journalists to criticize him for his stance. Some went so far as to 
accuse Bradsher and the New York Times of engaging in “SUV Jihad.”533 USA Today refused to 
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run stories similar to Bradsher’s because “it seemed like it went beyond the facts.”534 After 
Bradsher wrote a book on SUV safety, he was moved from the Detroit bureau to Hong Kong. In 
addition to criticizing Bradsher, auto manufacturers defended SUVs as an individual choice and 
claimed that critics were disconnected from the experience of the average American. GM even 
used a front group, Citizens for Vehicle Choice (CVC), to argue SUVs were safer than cars and 
that a push for environmentally conscious vehicles was a push for unsafe vehicles. I explore this 
criticism and the industry’s response more thoroughly in the following chapters.  
 Beyond Bradsher’s criticism, mainstream media criticism was rare. However, there was a 
notable exception. In 2000, a Houston TV station reported that the tire tread on the Firestone 
tires that came standard on the Ford Explorer was likely to come apart in hot weather.535 When 
the tread came off the tires, it could cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle and cause the 
vehicle to roll over. The initial report led to an NHTSA investigation and a public feud between 
Ford and Firestone over whether the tires or the vehicle design was at fault. Shortly after the 
NHTSA investigation began in 2000, Firestone voluntarily recalled the tires.536 Despite the 
recall, SUVs were still wildly popular, and SUV sales continued to climb in part due to financial 
promotions.537 A 2003 Kelley Blue Book survey found that less than half of SUV buyers were 
concerned about rollover. Indeed, despite the high-profile case, the same survey found that 
“more than half [of respondents] rate the vehicles high for safety.”538 Respondents also rated the 
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environmental impact of the vehicles and their fuel economy last in their concerns related to 
SUV purchases. The Kelley Blue Book survey demonstrated that the public debate on SUVs was 
biased by auto industry PR. Consumers’ desire to purchase SUVs blunted the criticism against 
the vehicles. Overall, consumers in the Kelley Blue Book survey were resistant to criticism that 
they felt was overblown.  
 By the time the Ford-Firestone story aired in Houston, Ford and Firestone had known 
about the issue for years, but nothing had been done. The local news story resulted in both a 
flurry of calls to the station and action by the NHTSA. The NHTSA had previously received 
reports on the tires but failed to act until the story broke.539 This story demonstrates the 
importance of local news. Despite the rise in internet usage, local television stations are still one 
of the most important sources of news.540 Yet, almost all local TV stations are heavily dependent 
on advertising, much of which comes from local auto dealers.541 As I discuss in chapter 7, 
advertising dollars allow the auto industry to shape news or prevent stories from being published. 
SUV ads were rarely criticized for the false safety and environmental claims that were made. 
Indeed, as I describe in chapters 5 and 6, GM was largely successful at preventing unwanted 
regulation. Any criticism from journalists was also likely to be flanked by advertisements 
showing gas-guzzling SUVs available at a new low price. The presence and appeal of these ads 
directly undercut criticism levied at GM. 
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 Customers continued to purchase SUVs, despite prominent inquiries into SUV safety and 
environmental impact. While previous studies have addressed the environmental or safety 
aspects of SUV ads, this chapter focuses on financial promotions, which helped to sell SUVs 
even at the peak of the Ford-Firestone controversy. I argue that product ads from this period 
were co-promotional and demonstrate the fusion of GM’s attempts to sell vehicles, principally 
SUVs, and sell financial products. The composition of some ads even suggests that the financial 
product is the primary product being sold. While no one would buy a car loan without a car, GM 
endeavored to sell both a GM vehicle and a GMAC loan.  
GM uses a mix of national, regional, and local advertisements. When local dealers 
participate in GM advertising programs, GM provides materials and some funding. Local dealers 
then adjust the ads to their needs.542 My study focuses on national-level product ads that mention 
GMAC, although some were designed to be adapted by local dealers. As previous studies have 
indicated, most advertising incorporates financing to some degree. This sample is assumed to be 
generally representative of auto ads that incorporated financial products, which likely constituted 
most auto ads in this period. The vast majority advertised financial terms, although some only 
mentioned GMAC in the fine print. I examined over 250 television ads for GM automobiles from 
1990 to 2009. Due to the popularity of the Chevrolet brand, more than half were Chevrolet ads. 
Cadillac, GM’s luxury brand, was the next most common make with about 30 ads. GMC, 
Pontiac, and Buick followed with about 20 ads each.543 In addition to television ads, I looked at 
over 400 print ads. These ads were typically national or regional ads that were published in 
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newspapers and magazines. I focused on print and television because these comprise most of 
GM’s ad-spending during the 1990s and 2000s.  
The ads gave me a sense of the scope and nature of the financial promotions from 1990 to 
2009 and a sense of how financial promotions were generally presented in the advertisements. I 
supplemented this data with information from GMAC annual reports that provide background on 
the role that these promotions served for GMAC. In addition to these primary documents, I also 
used secondary documents. I primarily consulted trade press publications, such as Automotive 
News and Advertising Age. I also used news coverage from mainstream news sources, such as 
the New York Times, to validate how important financial promotions were to GM and how these 
financial promotions factored into their profitability.   
Advertising Auto Loans and Automobiles 
 In Chapters 1 and 2, I described GMAC’s role within GM after its formation in 1919. 
From early ads touting GMAC installment plans generically to the financial promotions 
discussed in this chapter, GMAC always played a role in advertising. With heavy competition 
from foreign auto manufacturers in 1980s, GM CEO Roger Smith shifted the corporation toward 
finance as an area of profitability. GM advertised early installment plans differently from the 
loans and leases provided by GM in the 1990s and 2000s. Unlike the early twentieth century, it is 
now common to see specific interest rates advertised to pull customers into the dealer.  
In the past, such rates might not have been specifically advertised or included. For 
example, in 1935, the Federal Trade Commission charged that GMAC, Ford, and two other 
finance companies had deceptively advertised a “6% plan.” Customers assumed 6% referred to 
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the interest rate.544 However, it did not. Instead, 6% referred a “flat multiplier.”545 Although the 
companies stopped running the ad campaign before the FTC filed formal charges, GM continued 
to fight the FTC and refused to sign an agreement that stated that they would not advertise using 
percentages unless those percentages represented simple interest rather than a “carrying 
charge.”546 A reporter at the New Republic elaborated on this theme when he wrote about his car 
buying troubles after discovering that his GMAC installment plan had a “finance charge,” not 
interest.547 Since these early experiments in financial ads, auto ads have expanded to include 
more detailed information about potential financial contracts. Auto loan ads are now subject to 
variety of regulations for advertising financial products. However, customers’ sense that auto 
loan ads are misleading is not misplaced as a recent FTC investigation shows. I address this later 
in this chapter.  
In the 1930s, ads for installment plans were usually vague. Occasionally, advertisements 
mentioned a price, but they typically shared few details on specific payment amounts. For 
example, a 1935 Buick ad referred to “favorable G.M.A.C. terms.”548 A  Cadillac ad from the 
same year stated, “Your Cadillac dealer will gladly give you price details and information on the 
convenient G.M.A.C. payment plan.”549 Similarly, in 1932 Chevrolet advertised “easy G.M.A.C. 
terms.”550 These ads implied that many customers were eligible for good loan terms but were 
vague about what those loan terms might be. Ads in the 1990s and 2000s were much more 
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specific. They advertised low interest rates and low monthly payments. These ads were designed 
to draw customers in, even though the rates shown are not available to most customers. The goal 
was to get customers to believe they are eligible for low rates so that they come to the dealer.  
 In the early twentieth century, GMAC played an important role in expanding access to 
credit through loans like those described above. By the 1990s, the financial services company 
supported GM’s financial health through auto loans, mortgages, and other products. GM wholly-
owned GMAC and received stock dividends. In 2006, GM sold 51% of GMAC but still received 
dividends. GMAC continued to provide loans for GM’s dealers and customers. One method 
through which GMAC raised money was mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In chapter 2, I 
briefly described MBS, a type of asset-backed security (ABS) in which a finance company 
packages and sells mortgage loans to investors. Similarly, in the 1980s, GMAC began selling 
securities backed with auto loans.  
 In 1985, Valley National Bank issued the first ABS using auto loans. Like mortgage-
backed securities, these securities bundle auto loans together to create a product that can be 
bought by investors.551 This allows the loan holder to be paid off immediately, while the future 
loan payments go to the new investors. ABS increase liquidity for banks and financial 
institutions by bringing in cash that enables them to lend out more money. In 1986, GMAC 
issued its first auto loan backed ABS, which was worth more than a billion dollars. Along with 
other captive finance companies, GMAC was one of the largest producers for auto loan backed 
ABS.552 Through the securitization process, those loans gained value separate from GM’s 
automobiles.553  
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Because auto loan ABS served as a low-cost way to finance more loans, banks and 
finance companies issued auto loan ABS rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s. Auto loan ABS 
made up a fifth of all ABS issued; GMAC and captive finance companies issued more than half 
all auto loan ABS.554 ABS enable banks and other loan issuers to turn illiquid assets, consumer 
debt, into liquidity to further fuel the loan-making process. In theory, these securities also 
increase consumer access to loans.555 However, they are part of a larger structure of finance that 
has increased consumer indebtedness. Consumers rely more on loans and credit to meet basic 
needs. Advertising and marketing fuel this cycle by encouraging consumer spending. Auto ads 
on television and in print publications in the 1990s, and 2000s emphasized purchasing 
promotions, leasing offers, and cash rebates, even though many consumers would not qualify for 
those programs.556 Special financing offers to increase sales in lackluster years turned into 
regularly timed promotions, such as the now ever-present year-end sale. 
In addition to the growth of traditional auto loans, GMAC promoted auto leases in the 
1980s and 1990s. When a customer signs a lease agreement, they agree to monthly payments for 
a specified period and purchase price if they choose to purchase the vehicle at the end of the 
agreement. At the end of the lease, the lessee may choose to buy the vehicle or give it back to the 
dealer. If the lessee chooses to give it back to dealer and the car has more damage than agreed 
upon in the lease agreement, the lessee must “pay then for any damage above normal wear and 
tear.”557 Leasing increases customer loyalty because customers return to their dealer to lease 
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another vehicle at the end of their contract. Customers who lease spend more money with the 
manufacturer because they return for leases every few years and are often brand loyalists. Just 
like auto loans, leases could be packaged as ABS.558 Leases increased in popularity in the 1990s; 
by the mid-1990s about one-third of vehicles were leased, double the amount leased a decade 
earlier.559 
Special Financing Promotions   
Auto pricing is often confusing or misleading, and research shows that customers use 
promotional pricing and deals to signal when they should purchase a car.560 The “low” 12.8% 
APR offered in 1982 would seem very high when compared to 0% financing offers today. Over 
the past century, financial information in auto ads went from prices or vague promises of the best 
deals to specific offers with paragraphs of fine print. In many of these ads, the primary product 
has become the auto loan; dealers entice customers with low offers for which they may not be 
eligible. Combined with financial illiteracy, the confusing loan making process at dealerships can 
lead consumers to sign unfavorable contracts. Over time, consumer debt has increased because 
consumers take on larger loans more frequently.  
Facing lackluster sales in the 1980s, GM initiated national finance promotions based on 
annual percentage rate (APR). Low APR appeals to consumers because lower interest rates 
typically mean lower monthly payments. However, interest rates are not the only thing that is 
important when making a financing decision. Furthermore, the dealer does not offer all 
customers the same terms. The truly low rates are meant as a gimmick to bring people in, but 
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conditional rates do not violate advertising regulations if ads follow legal disclosure 
requirements. During the 1980s, GM periodically used these rate promotions to spur increases in 
sales. Over time, GM’s APR promotions got lower and more persistent. In 1982, GM offered 
12.8% APR on new cars and trucks in the spring and 10.9% APR in November and December.561 
GMAC welcomed 1983 with another low-rate program to meet “the need for continued market 
stimulation” and ended up continuing the program through the year.562 In 1984, without the aid 
of reduced rate programs, GMAC financed fewer of GM’s cars.563 As one former GM employee 
noted, “Without basic price cuts, traditional local incentives, or exciting product offerings, it 
looked like GM had permanently hooked itself to the artificial supports.”564 By the 1990s and 
2000s, GM was touting even lower rates, including its famous 0% APR promotion.  
  During the 1990s and 2000s, auto ads shifted from focusing on vehicle features to 
focusing on financial offers. While ads repeated financial offers in text and voiceovers, features 
might be listed in smaller font or not mentioned at all. This design demonstrated that finances are 
important and that auto loans from captive financing companies are essential products. Seasonal 
sale ads are a key component of auto ads today. Most Americans are likely familiar with 
seasonal sale ads for cars. In December and January, during the summer, and even on President’s 
Day, auto manufacturers offer a variety of enticing sales and deals to lure customers in. While 
these ads are standard now, the practice developed during the 1990s and 2000s when promotions 
                                                          
561 General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 1982 Annual Report, 1983, General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(GMAC) Annual Reports 1980-1989 (Bound), General Collection, GM Heritage Center, General Motors, 2. 
562 General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 1983 Annual Report, 1984, General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(GMAC) Annual Reports 1980-1989 (Bound), General Collection, GM Heritage Center, General Motors, 4. 
563 General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 1984 Annual Report, 1985, General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(GMAC) Annual Reports 1980-1989 (Bound), General Collection, GM Heritage Center, General Motors. The same 
situation as reported in 1988 and 1990, indicating that low rate programs were absent for a time prior to their regular 
use in the mid-1990s and 2000s.  
564 Lee, Call Me Roger, 137. 
132 
 
and auto loans became essential parts of the auto manufacturing business. In 1991 and 1992, 
Chevrolet ran a “Winner-Time” ad series on television and in print. A bit of wordplay on 
“wintertime,” these ads aired at the end of the year and followed the now-common format of 
focusing on finance offers over makes, models, and features.  
On television, the “Winner-Time” ads featured Fred Willard as game show host asking 
customers questions like, “Come here often?” In one ad, a young woman responds, “I’ve never 
even bought a new car before,” prompting Willard to provide information about financing 
options. As would become common in later ads, the financing options included “cash back or 
low financing.”565 Unfortunately for customers, it may be difficult to know whether cash back or 
low financing is the better deal, if they even qualify for either of the televised offers.566 Other ads 
in the “Winner-Time” series featured specific low financing offers, such as 2.9% APR. These 
ads were used by GM’s Geo brand that targeted young customers who might otherwise buy 
small, imported vehicles.567 These young customers would likely have been buying a car for the 
first time. Because young customers often lack knowledge of financing deals, these ads put them 
in a prime position to get taken advantage of by dealer offers. 
The ads also featured fine print that would become ubiquitous with auto ads. In the 
“Winner-Time” ads, the fine print at the bottom states, “length of finance contract is limited.”568 
Thus, the 2.9% APR offer may draw customers in, but customers may face higher payments than 
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they anticipate because they cannot draw out the payments over a long period. A longer loan 
with lower payments would likely require a higher interest rate. Alternatively, customers might 
choose no payments for 90 days. The all-important fine print again indicates that there is a catch: 
“finance charges accrue from date of purchase.”569 While customers may reason that no 
payments means they do not owe anything, they are accruing debt on their account. While these 
ads feature makes and models of cars, the information on the screen foregrounds the financing 
deals. This shows that finance, not features, can be a draw for consumers. These financing deals 
are only available through GMAC, so these auto ads are selling GMAC loans in addition to 
vehicles. 
In print, the “Winner-Time” ads emphasize financial customization depending on 
location. In very large font at the top, the ads proclaimed, “Everyone Can be a winner during 
Chevrolet/GEO Winner-Time.” Underneath the heading, small font spelled out the overall deals, 
“Now's the time to get to your Chevrolet dealer because it's WINNER-TIME. Win with up to 
$1,000 Cash Back or low GMAC 7.9% APR financing, Preferred equipment group discounts on 
select vehicles, and even no payments for 90 days.”570 The body of the ads featured 6 photos of 
Chevrolet and Geo models, typically sedans. Each sedan featured a large math problem 
describing the discounts available, including cash back, “preferred equipment group bonus,” and 
“first time buyer bonus” because Geo models were marketed to young adults.571 Notably, these 
ads featured a “low” APR rate that was higher than the television ads that ran later in the 
promotion. This suggests that the rate dropped to incentivize even more purchases in January 
1991. Although GM tailored the print ads to specific locations, the difference was often in the 
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fine print because some states limiting financial offers based on vehicle price.572 As with the 
“Winner-Time” television ads, these ads featured virtually no information about vehicle features.  
The “Winner-Time” ads demonstrate how GM co-promoted vehicles and loans. These 
ads show that product ads often emphasized financial products. The “Winner-Time” ads are also 
early examples of the year-end sale phenomenon. The gimmick varies, but year-end ads always 
emphasize the limited nature of the financial offers to drive customers to the dealership. The 
“Make Your Money Count Year End event” from 1994-1997 made several appearances across 
television and print ads. The December 1996 – January 1997 versions of the ad offered a 3.9% 
APR rate, much lower than the 7.9% offered in print ads in 1990. The change in APR 
demonstrates that financing terms drifted downward over time to attract customers because of 
lackluster sales. Financing terms fell even lower in 2001.  
The Rise of 0% Financing 
Advertised APR rates declined sharply during the 1990s and 2000s. In the aftermath of 
September 11, APR dipped to the lowest possible level: 0%. Ten days after September 11, 2001, 
GM started the “Keep America Rolling” campaign that offered 0% APR on all vehicles.573 The 
Bush Administration requested that the auto industry help pull the U.S. out of a possible 
recession; GM responded with the “Keep America Rolling” campaign. In a speech to the 
Executives’ Club of Chicago, GM President and CEO Rick Wagoner described how Bush 
Administration officials met with labor leaders and GM executives “to discuss what we – 
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business, labor, and government – could do, together, to help America in the wake of the 
September 11 tragedy.”574 Wagoner cited GM’s role during World War II as an example of how 
GM had long-served American interests in the face of hardship. GM deployed their history 
strategically during ongoing regulatory debates in the 2000s, including during the bailout.   
The Wall Street Journal, trade publications, and other outlets praised GM’s “Keep 
America Rolling” for keeping the economy afloat.575 Yet, some in the advertising industry felt 
that it was inappropriate to use patriotism to sell cars after thousands of people died in the 
attacks.576 The editors of the trade publication Adweek gave GM an award for “Most Gratuitous 
Use of Patriotism” and argued that “equating the purchase of a new car with helping the country, 
with being a part of the emotional recovery from the terrorist attacks, goes too far down the road 
of manipulative advertising.”577 Despite these criticisms, GM’s campaign was both successful in 
growing sales and bolstering GM’s reputation.  
“Keep America Rolling” was significant for three reasons. First, it tied patriotism to 
consumption and the purchase of American-made vehicles, reinforcing GM’s common refrain 
that practices that were harmful for American manufacturers were bad for the economy. As I 
discuss in chapter 6, Americans who are skeptical of the impact of environmental regulations on 
the economy largely support GM’s claims. Second, this program started a few years of 0% offers 
on SUVs. 0% financing skillfully combined the individualistic, patriotic appeal of American 
SUVs with profitability. Because SUVs already earned about $10,000 per vehicle, dealers and 
manufacturers could more than afford the financing program. Third, “Keep America Rolling” 
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increased sales in 2001 but tethered GM to financial promotions.578 GM would return to 0% 
promotions in 2002 and 2003 as it continued to struggle with profitability.579 
As with previous financial promotions, GM started the trend toward 0% financing. Other 
auto manufacturers followed suit, and customers flocked to dealerships in droves to get 0% 
loans.580 However, somewhere between 66% and 90% of customers did not qualify for loans 
with 0% APR.581 In addition, GM created opportunities to upsell new customers on “other 
finance and insurance products” offered by GMAC.582 As with most financial promotions, GM 
took a loss on cars and profited from trucks and SUVs. Because “Keep America Rolling” 
affected all vehicles that meant that GM still struggled, despite being the market leader:  
In North America, weakness on the car side of the business tempered out success in 
trucks. And while our cost-cutting continued at an admirable pace, it failed to offset the 
relentless downward pressure on prices. As we move into 2002, we are aggressively 
pursuing additional structural and material cost reductions, and intensifying our focus on 
cash generation. On the positive side, GM’s financial services unit, GMAC, achieved 
impressive income growth for the seventh consecutive year and posted its third straight 
year of record earning: $1.8 billion, an improvement of 9 percent over the previous 
year.583  
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In contrast, GMAC was profitable for two reasons. First, despite assertions that automotive loans 
remained central to its business, GMAC diversified beyond auto loans into mortgage finance and 
insurance. Second, GMAC’s use of ABS meant that even 0% loans made at a loss, like those for 
cars, could still be sold as securities. This enabled GMAC and GM to benefit from all loans. 
Advertisements shifted their emphasis from vehicles to affordable loans. The APR rates drew 
customers in, while the loans turned into securities that helped propel GMAC’s growing 
financial empire. 
 In 2001, when 0% financing ads first appeared, the ads were sometimes tied to particular 
vehicles or brands.584 For example, a May 2001 ad advertised $0 down, 0% APR, and no 
payments until 2002 on all 2001 Oldsmobiles.585 As is typical of financing ads and 0% APR ads, 
the ad featured a black screen with a large 0 in white font with “Down plus Interest & Payments 
until 2002” next to it. The ads also specified the loans were only available to “qualified buyers,” 
eliding that few buyers qualified. In addition, the ad specified in the fine print that “Length of 
contract is limited.” Many customers found out that monthly payments were higher than 
expected when they went to get 0% financing deals from the dealer.586  Despite claims that the 
0% financing offers were just a phase, the auto industry returned to them again and again.587 
Advertising spending increased as manufacturers fought over financing deals; auto 
manufacturers spent over $2.2 billion in one quarter of 2003 alone.588 
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 GM formatted its prints similarly to the TV ads. A 2002 Buick ad featured an ocean view 
that faded to white halfway through the page. At the top of the ad, above the waves, the ad 
stated, “0% for 5 years” in large white font. The fine print discloses that the 0% offer assumes a 
27.2% down payment, which is larger than most suggested down payments.589 While many 
customers likely had trouble qualifying for the 0% offer, customers may have found themselves 
suffering from the five-year length of the contract due to car depreciation. The primacy of “0% 
for 5 years” in the ad in terms of placement and size demonstrates that the co-promotional ad 
promoted Buick and GMAC loans. In contrast, another 2002 Buick ad showed two Buick 
vehicles and listed several features for each; that ad more closely balanced the importance of the 
finance offer and the appeal of the vehicles.590  
 The appeal of 0% ads was so great that it even spread to GM’s flagship brand: Cadillac. 
As I discuss in the leasing section of this chapter, Cadillac is a luxury brand that was mainly 
featured in lease ads. In 1998, GM invested $30 million dollars in the campaign for the Cadillac 
Escalade that targeted buyers between the ages of 35 and 55 who were younger than the average 
Cadillac consumer.591 GM lowered its spending in the years following but still spent between $3 
million and $5 million annually advertising the Escalade.592 By 2001, the Escalade promotions 
succeeded in recruiting younger buyers to purchase the high-end vehicle by associating it with 
online promotions and sports like the Super Bowl.593 The success of the Escalade, essentially a 
Chevy Tahoe with high-end features and a Cadillac emblem, is emblematic of the SUV and 
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GMAC era. The vehicle sold for thousands more than the Tahoe, epitomizing Americans’ desire 
to purchase a vehicle above their means that came with size, power, and prestige.  
 In 2003, GM concentrated its 0% financing push on SUVs, a sector that could be 
profitable even with 0% financing. SUV sales were lagging, so auto manufacturers needed to sell 
them quickly. GM spurred other manufacturers to discount their SUVs with thousands of dollars 
in incentives.594 In February, GM began offering 0% financing on popular SUVs.595 The 
discounts continued all year. At the end of the year, GM started to apply discounts to Cadillac 
SUVs. Even as it was pushing rebates for Cadillac Escalades, GM was still contemplating how to 
style the vehicle to appeal to luxury buyers, such as including new 20-inch rims.596 By 
December, GM promoted a seasonal Cadillac ad for the Escalade, proclaiming “Not All Good 
Things Come in Small Packages” with 0% APR, a $0 down payments and no payments for 90 
days.597 Of course, not all buyers would be eligible for this offer, and payments might be higher 
than anticipated. Nonetheless, the decision to market Cadillac with 0% financing demonstrates 
that even a luxury brand was not immune from financial promotions. GM and other 
manufacturers continued to design financial promotions around SUVs in the years that 
followed.598 
 These promotions were successful. Customers flocked to dealerships and some dealers 
sold twice as many cars as they had the year before.599 At the same time, the 0% ads also 
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deceived consumers. Many consumers came to the dealer expecting 0% APR loans for which 
they were ineligible. Between 66% and 90% of customers did not qualify for the loans.600 Others 
assumed that 0% APR would result in a lower monthly payment. However, the length of 
contracts was limited, meaning that customers often paid more than they expected.601 Beyond 
deceiving customers with offers that were likely unavailable to them, the 0% loans and ads also 
hurt future auto values. Because the value of the vehicle was lowered by the initial sales contract, 
customers who tried to trade-in vehicles bought on 0% APR contracts found they were worth 
less than what they owed due to depreciation.602 The 0% financing offers drew customers in, but 
the waves of customers eventually became a trickle. Subprime customers, who did not qualify 
for those loans, were attracted by the 0% offer. To compensate and take advantage of their 
interest, automobile dealers and manufacturers developed loans for subprime borrowers.603 
Despite being higher-risk borrowers, subprime loans proved profitable for both the mortgage 
industry and the auto industry until the market crashed in 2008 because the loans could be made 
at a high cost and then sold as ABS. 
News coverage questioned whether the 0% loans made sense. Business news outlets 
primarily addressed how auto manufacturers profited from these loans and how other auto 
manufacturers, like Mitsubishi or Toyota, followed GM’s lead in offering 0% loans. 604 By 2005, 
industry observers wrote that the 0% loan was at its end because the promotion no longer 
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appealed to customers.605 Of course, 0% APR deals never really went away. In 2018, as business 
journalists again predicted 0% ads would end, reports described how beneficial the deals were 
for the auto industry and how Federal Reserve interest rates had eviscerated a good marketing 
tactic.606 A few reports advised customers to read “the little type at the bottom.”607 For instance, 
one article concluded with a question of how this would affect the auto market and whether 
manufacturers were “borrowing” from the future.608 The Journal Star in Peoria, IL, took a risk 
and invited a local credit union to comment on the costs and benefits of a 0% APR loan. Even 
then, the article concluded with comments from a local Chevy dealer and a discussion of the 
benefits of high auto sales.609 Thus, many media outlets focused on the benefits of 0% financing 
for the industry with little attention to the consequences for consumers.  
Overall, news coverage generally emphasized that 0% loans were “bargains” that brought 
people in. Even Time and Newsweek printed articles that were essentially ads for 0% financing 
and rebate offers.610 One article in U.S. News and World Report suggested that customers could 
haggle. However, the article mostly focused on how auto manufacturers raised lease prices to 
pay for 0% loans and how 0% loans negatively affected used car prices because of 
depreciation.611 Thus, the industry perspective largely dominated in an area that should have 
been ripe for consumer reporting. Reliance on dealers and manufacturers for ads has influenced 
news outlets coverage of auto loans, auto safety, and other consumer issues.   
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Consumer Groups’ Responses to 0%  
 Although most journalists were largely uninterested in how promotional finance ads 
might hurt consumers, consumer groups were active in policing auto loans. Both Consumers’ 
Union, which publishes Consumer Reports, and Public Citizen, which is led by Joan Claybrook, 
a former NHTSA administrator, regularly offered advice to consumers looking to purchase 
vehicles. A few strategies converged in the financial promotion era to hurt consumers. First, 
consumer loan contracts continually increased in length. Although initially 0% loans were only 
available for short lengths, such as two or three years, they were extended to six years after the 
financial crisis.612 Other auto loan contracts were also lengthened to lower monthly payments. 
Second, 0% loans were not available to most customers. They were designed to draw customers 
in with the promise of a loan for which they likely did not qualify. Third, the Federal Trade 
Commission, which regulates advertising, has rarely intervened on deceptive auto ads, except for 
a 2014 investigation that revealed widespread use of misleading terms in auto loan ads.  
The length of consumer loan contracts has two detrimental effects on consumers. First, 
with a longer the contract, it is more likely that consumers will default on the loan. This means 
that the buyer’s vehicle may get repossessed. Repossession can leave low-income, subprime 
buyers without a vehicle to get to work. Secondly, longer contracts mean that vehicles depreciate 
quickly.613 Customers who want to trade their vehicle in in three years, about halfway through 
their contract,614 might be surprised to find out how much they must pay to get out of their loan. 
Customers who want a new car could be tempted to sign a worse financial contract. Many 
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dealers use misleading strategies to buy consumers out of existing contracts when they want to 
buy a new car. These loans cost more in the long run.  
By 2017, the average auto loan lasted nearly six years.615 In addition to the increased risk 
of default with a longer loan, borrowers pay thousands of dollars more in interest for their 
vehicles and tacked-on costs, like extended warranties. A long loan means that a borrower will 
owe more than the vehicle is worth for years. According to Consumer Reports, in the event on an 
accident, “you could owe a lot more on the car than it’s worth. Insurance payouts are based on a 
car’s depreciated market value, so you’ll be left holding the bag.”616 Despite the risks of long 
loan terms, auto manufacturers and dealers promote them because consumers crave the low 
monthly payments. Unfortunately, the insights from Consumer Reports do not always make the 
news. When they do, they may be framed as a dispute between Consumers’ Union and the auto 
industry, such as a USA Today headline that read “Consumer Reports disses Detroit.”617 Some 
consumers may miss the insights from Consumer Reports or cast them as one-sided.  
In addition to the increasing contract length during this period, many customers visited 
dealerships and found that they were not qualified for the lowest advertised interest rate. For 
example, subprime borrowers, who qualify for much higher interest rates, were often lured in by 
the 0% offer.618 Dealers use strategies to ensure that customers are uncomfortable leaving 
without completing the transaction. Customers may feel like they cannot negotiate with a dealer 
or get a better rate, but that is often untrue. Consumer Reports advises borrowers to negotiate and 
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shop around, as does the federal government.619 Unfortunately, by the time they arrive at the 
dealer, consumers may already be on their way to making a bad financial decision.  
Beyond being charged more for their auto loans because of credit, consumers have also 
been charged higher interest rates based on their race and ethnicity. In 2003, Public Citizen 
reported that millions of consumers were the victims of dealer fraud. One strategy dealers used 
was to charge customers a higher interest rate than authorized by the bank or captive finance 
firm.620 This is referred to as a “dealer markup.” Minorities were likely to be charged markup 
rates that were higher than those of white borrowers. Because the markup was added by the 
dealer without transparency, minority borrowers pay more for their loans without realizing it. 
Despite the long-standing history of racial discrimination in auto loans, there has not been 
widespread coverage of the issue. In 2001, the New York Times investigated dealer markups with 
20/20. The investigation focused on cases brought by the National Consumer Law Center against 
captive finance companies, including GMAC.621 A few years later, USA Today published a brief 
report on markups with evidence from the Consumer Federation of America, an organization that 
argued for a flat fee on all loans instead of markups.622  
According to CFA, GMAC marked up loans between 25% and 41% of the time. About 
53% of African American customers’ GMAC loans were marked up, compared to about 28% of 
white customers. Furthermore, loans for minority customers were subject to higher markup rates 
than marked up loans for white customers, so African American customers paid much more for 
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their vehicles.623 GMAC was not alone. The practice is routine among captive lenders and 
dealers. Eventually, the National Consumer Law Center reached a settlement that capped the size 
of markups for five years after the settlement.624 CFA and other groups argued for a flat fee on 
all loans to replace dealer markups. Instead, under the settlement, dealers were permitted to add 
markups, but the size of the markup was limited. This settlement would not last long in the face 
of dealer opposition to limits on markups.  
The auto industry’s powerful network of dealers has prevented legislation on dealer 
markups. Efforts to legislate markups are met with criticism from dealers and manufacturers who 
argue that such laws would harm dealers’ ability to profit and hurt local economies. Furthermore, 
dealers argue that the markups are necessary for risky loans and that they would not be able to 
make as many loans without them. As I discuss in chapter 7, news outlets must choose between 
the public good of reporting on markups and one of their biggest advertisers. Most local papers 
choose their advertisers. The only coverage on dealer markups I found was from national and 
trade publications. In 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau stepped in to protect 
minority borrowers from discrimination. However, in 2018, the CFPB’s ability to regulate dealer 
markups was rescinded because of lobbying by auto manufacturers and dealers. Minority 
borrowers were left without protection.625 
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Public Citizen offered a variety of solutions for the problems faced by consumers; many 
of which still have not been implemented. For example, consumers who buy a vehicle “on-the-
spot” can still be charged more than what was agreed to. Dealers can claim that the paperwork 
was incomplete or that the bank declined the loan. This allows them to change the terms after the 
consumer believes that they have bought the vehicle.626 Public Citizen has also suggested a clear 
disclosure of all financial terms with and without add-ons. Dealers often use add-ons to inflate 
the vehicle price without the consumer’s knowledge. Unfortunately, the complicated paperwork 
and pressure to buy mean that consumers may end up paying for things that they do not need or 
do not understand the price of.627 A clearer disclosure form would help consumers understand 
the paperwork that they are signing.  
  Despite widespread confusion among consumers and lack of trust of auto dealers, there 
have been surprisingly few investigations into auto ads. Auto loan and lease ads are subject to 
multiple sets of rules under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In accordance with the 
general FTC regulations, “claims in advertisements must be truthful, cannot be deceptive or 
unfair, and must be evidence-based.”628 In describing what constitutes a misleading ad, the FTC 
uses an auto ad with “$0 down” as the example.629 In addition, auto loan ads must comply with 
the Consumer Leasing Act and the Truth in Lending Act. Both require additional disclosures 
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related to financial terms. These disclosures are usually included in the fine print under the ad. If 
the fine print is there, the ad is typically acceptable. 
However, even though most customers would not qualify for 0% financing, those ads 
were not considered deceptive or misleading. The FTC does not appear to have subjected them to 
any scrutiny, nor did the FTC receive objections from consumer groups about the ads. From 
2014 to 2015, the FTC launched its first nationwide investigation of auto ads. The commission 
deemed some the ads deceptive.630 In many of these cases, the fine print was difficult or 
impossible to read. For example, some of the ads claimed that “you can get out of your current 
loan or lease for just $1.00” with “a fine-print super, a portion of which was similar in color to 
the background.”631 Online versions, meanwhile, included no fine print. A Spanish-language ad 
had English-language fine print that was too small and would be difficult or impossible for 
primarily Spanish-speaking customers to understand. In 2017, the FTC issued a similar 
complaint.632 The FTC filed these complaints because the fine print was hard to read, even 
though most auto ads studied in this chapter featured fine print that would be difficult to read 
during a thirty second commercial.  
 During the 2014-2015 investigation of auto dealer ads, the FTC emphasized that the 
investigation was important because “Buying or leasing a car is a big deal, and car ads are an 
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important source of information for serious shoppers.”633 While the investigation curtailed some 
practices, the FTC did not seek to change regulations to address why so many ads were 
misleading in the first place. Inscrutable fine print holds a lot of information and demonstrates 
that the price shown on screen is not reflective of the actual price of the vehicle. For example, 
while a vehicle with expensive optional features may be shown, the price listed is the base price. 
A customer might walk into a dealer think they can afford a car with all the bells and whistles, 
but they cannot.634  
In addition to super-charged vehicles with base prices, huge down payments are often 
hidden in fine print, while low monthly payments are touted.635 Many rates or prices are not 
available to most customers. Although these ads play a role in people coming into the dealership, 
the FTC does not consider misleading prices or payment rates to be deceptive. Beyond pricing, 
ads make implied claims about safety and environmental impact, as I discussed at the start of this 
chapter. Ads also emphasize terms and downplay potential drawbacks, such as low monthly 
payments with long contract terms. The FTC has acknowledged these problems and issued 
consumer education documents about how to read auto ads, including information about when 
0% loans are misleading. However, they have not attempted to change existing regulations.636  
Regulations, like those proposed by Public Citizen, would begin to address how consumers can 
become informed about their financial decision.  
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Misleading Lease Ads  
 Thus far, this chapter has focused on loans used to purchase cars. During the 1990s and 
2000s, retail leases, an alternative to buying, grew dramatically. Leasing reinforces the logic of 
planned obsolescence by encouraging customers to return every few years for a new vehicle. In 
addition, leasing makes high quality used vehicles available. Traditionally, manufacturers 
avoided selling used vehicles because they are viewed as riskier transactions. Leasing created the 
opportunity to rebrand used vehicles as “Certified Pre-Owned.” Beginning in 1981, GMAC 
started a Direct Leasing Plan that leased directly to consumers.637 The Direct Leasing Plan grew 
rapidly in the mid-1980s. In, 1984, about 280,000 vehicles were covered by the plan; by 1985, 
that number had nearly doubled to 530,000.638 Capitalizing on this success, GM introduced the 
SmartLease program in 1988.639 It was a standard closed-end vehicle lease wherein consumers 
paid monthly payments for a set amount of time and had the option to purchase the car at the end 
of the lease 
 Part of the goal of the GMAC SmartLease was to “encourage shorter customer trading 
cycles” to bring customers back to the dealership more often.640  For instance, a GMAC 
SmartLease pamphlet argued, “In the final example the price and the monthly payments are 
similar too. However, in the SmartLease example, you’re ready to get into a new vehicle after 
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just three years. In the purchasing example, you continue to make payments for five years.”641 
Leasing preys on the consumer society ideal of having the newest and best product at all times; 
GM had previously emphasized this through annual models and planned obsolescence. 
Furthermore, the ad argues that the SmartLease customer “can drive more vehicle for the same 
payment.”642 The pamphlet describes how SmartLease customers can borrow themselves into a 
higher class of car, such as a Cadillac. Leasing reinforces the growth of finance to spur middle 
class buying; even if customers cannot afford a fancy new car, they can at least drive like they 
can. GMAC further capitalized on this by initiating a loyalty program in 1993. These programs 
promised the consumer good feelings and freedom from long car loans, while keeping the 
consumer indebted to the corporation through continued leasing.  
 Leasing grew dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s due to GMAC’s efforts advertising 
leasing and making customers aware of the option.643 By 1994, there were about 500,000 leased 
vehicles.644 By 2002, leasing comprised 20% of American auto sales.645 GMAC’s lease financing 
volume dropped slightly in the late 1990s and early 2000s.646 However, it remained an important 
part of GMAC and GM’s strategy. For decades, the auto industry relied on planned obsolescence 
in its advertising strategies through annual model changes. Leasing accelerated their strategies 
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and provided a source of high-quality used cars.647  Leasing has continued to rise with customers 
leasing more than 4.5 million vehicles or about 32% of all auto sales.648 
 Because most lessees return their cars to the dealers at the end of the lease, dealers have 
an opportunity to sell a new leasing contract and a used car.649 In 1997, GMAC purchased a 
“nonprime” subsidiary, Nuvell, to make “nonprime” loans for used cars to customers who fell 
below GMAC’s standards.650 Leased vehicles are also subject to fees if returned in poor 
condition. Because lessees are incentivized to return the vehicle in good condition, the vehicles 
typically sell for higher costs than other used vehicles. To take advantage of the value of leased 
vehicles that had been returned to the dealer, GM began a certification of used cars in 1996.651 
Through the certification program, dealers paid the manufacturer to certify used cars.652 This 
certification added additional value to the already higher value used vehicles.  
  In Roland Marchand’s “Parable of the Democracy of Goods,” advertisers attempt to sell 
goods by showing that “mass production and distribution enabled every person to enjoy the 
society’s most significant pleasure, convenience, or benefit.”653 Marchand argues, “By implicitly 
defining ‘democracy’ in terms of equal access to consumer products, and then by depicting the 
everyday functioning of that ‘democracy’ with regard to one product at a time, these tableaux 
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offered Americans an inviting vision of their society as one of incontestable equality.”654  
Marchand’s observation demonstrates that advertisers prey on consumers’ desires to live in the 
way that they imagine their neighbors live. All ads use this appeal. However, this method is 
important in leasing ads because they prey on consumers’ need to appear middle-class or higher. 
As leasing advertisements show, one need not be rich to own a Cadillac.  
 In the mid-1990s, just over half of all Cadillacs were leased by customers who were 
likely to return to the dealer for another Cadillac.655 For example, a 1994 GMAC pamphlet 
states: “lower your out-of-pocket cost with SmartLease, enjoy low monthly payments and have 
the flexibility to drive the new Cadillac of your choice every few years.”656 The pamphlet 
advertises the lease as 24 months, half the time of traditional 48 month financing. It also 
advertised lower monthly payments. The advertising is geared toward customers who are 
currently priced out of Cadillac and want to move up or current Cadillac customers who want to 
have new Cadillacs more frequently. The front page of pamphlet states, “SmartLease is right for 
you if you like to drive a new Cadillac every two or three years while taking advantage of lower 
monthly payments.”657 Print advertisements simultaneously emphasize the status afforded by a 
Cadillac and the affordability of a lease.  
 A 1998 ad states “Cadillac is open for business” in large black letters at the top. The 
simple black and white ad follows that statement with a paragraph describing the “year-end 
offers” available, while the paragraph ends with the statement, “There’s no reason to settle for 
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less than a Cadillac.”658 Below, it features pictures of two Cadillac models, a Deville and a 
Catera. The Catera is advertised as available for lease with $1,848 due at signing. This relatively 
low amount is equivalent to a 20% down payment for a $10,000 car. Thus, the pricing attempts 
to make the vehicle accessible, even though it would be difficult to own the Catera at the 
completion of the lease. Like the 1994 pamphlet, this ad utilizes the brand appeal of the Cadillac 
to suggest that consumers can afford to be upwardly mobile through a lease offer. One Cadillac 
ad went further to appeal to those who lacked funds to own a Cadillac. According to a 1999 
Catera ad, no down payment or security deposit was required with a lease.659 These super low 
options make the Cadillac lease tempting for people who might otherwise be unable to afford 
one. The 36-month leases played on Cadillac’s brand image of being stylish and fashionable by 
speaking to both upwardly mobile individuals and those who wished to take advantage of 
Cadillac’s style by exchanging it for a new Cadillac. When lessees returned their cars, it created 
an opportunity to market used Cadillacs.  
 Most customers who lease choose to lease because the payments are often less than 
purchasing a car, and lessees can drive a nicer vehicle.660 Yet, consumers are not necessarily 
fully informed on the other costs of leasing, such as the costs at the end of vehicle. Other 
consumers may be confused about the up-front costs. The FTC found that some consumers were 
confused by early lease ads. Many included phrases like “no money down” or “low monthly 
payments” that were misleading because key lease terms were revealed in the fine print. GM’s 
early lease ads were found to contain many of these confusing terms, so the corporation settled 
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with the FTC. GM’s settlement included a monetary penalty of $12,500 payable to the each of 
the 20 states involved in the suit.661 Like the 2014-2015 FTC investigation, the reason for the suit 
sounds similar to most auto ads: “these other charges were disclosed, but in tiny print at the 
bottom of print ads and in small print on television that scrolled by too quickly to read.”662 A 
writer for the trade publication Broadcasting & Cable indicated that the FTC case mandated that 
ads have “clear and conspicuous” disclosures. This meant making them readable, but most 
disclosures are still in small font at the bottom of the screen.663 The difference between legible 
and illegible is a fine line for manufacturers, dealers, and consumers.  
 Importantly, leases not only drove up the sales of Cadillacs, but they also created the 
opportunity for a new used product: a certified pre-owned Cadillac. In 1996, GM began offering 
certified pre-owned vehicles to compete with “used-car superstores,” like CarMax.664  Certified 
pre-owned synergized with leasing because some certified vehicles were leased vehicles that 
were returned to the dealer. Certified vehicles reduced the risk in buying a used vehicle because 
the dealer or manufacturer inspected the vehicle before it was put up for sale. Certified vehicles 
also include additional warranties.665 The certification allows the dealer to charge more for the 
vehicle, and customers pay extra for peace of mind.666 Certified pre-owned vehicles come with 
higher interest rates but were still part of the move toward financial promotions in advertising. 
Both auto manufacturers and dealers profited from certified pre-owned because the program 
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cultivated customer loyalty and was profitable for dealers.667 However, as the FTC found in 
2016, some certified pre-owned vehicles were subject to recalls. Yet, GM offered them as 
certified even though the repairs had not been made.668 Consumers went decades without 
realizing that certification was largely an advertising gimmick.  
The Cadillac Escalade was a large, powerful SUV that helped rebuild Cadillac’s 
reputation and increase the proportion of younger customers who purchased Cadillacs. A 2002 
Cadillac certified pre-owned ad showed the front of an Escalade driving toward the viewer in 
black and white. Above the vehicle, the ad states, “Cadillac certified pre-owned experience.” 
Underneath the vehicle, in white font, the ad reads, “Imagine how the guy who had to turn it in 
felt.”669 The ad attempts to evoke the consumer’s imaginary – imagining themselves in almost 
new Cadillac. Unlike other ads discussed in this chapter, the Escalade ad does not include 
specific financing information. The absence of financing information is likely because 
manufacturers do not typically offer deals on used vehicles. Used vehicle loans are generally 
riskier for the lender. Less qualified buyers are likely to look for used car loans because they 
cannot afford a new car. The ad, like several others for different Cadillac models in 2002, offers 
a “like new” experience with owner benefits and a new warranty. The appeal of the used or “pre-
owned” Cadillac is that someone who could not dream of new Cadillac can dream of themselves 
in a used one. Evoking Marchand’s democratic parable, the leased Cadillac is returned, made 
new, and sold again to another customer.  
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 During the 1990s and 2000s, GM profited increasingly from finance within the auto 
industry. The corporation relied on financial promotions to bring in customers and sustain 
profits. This chapter argued that GM’s advertising became co-promotional. Ads promoted not 
only vehicles but also loans and leases from GMAC. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
GM began a 0% financing promotion that never ended. This promotion demonstrates the 
inherent problems with ads that use financial promotions. Most customers were not eligible for 
these loans but were lured in by the sales. This presents an opportunity for dealers to use dense 
financial paperwork to trap consumers in long contracts with bad terms. Unfortunately, many of 
the problems identified by Consumers’ Union and Public Citizen have not been remedied. Dealer 
markups are again legal, so dealers can apply them discriminatorily. FTC investigations into 
lease ads and auto loan ads found that many ads had misleading language and opaque fine print. 
Yet, nearly all auto ads contain financial terms and fine print at the bottom. That fine print can be 
difficult to decipher and leaves consumers vulnerable to deception. Revisiting the policy 




CHAPTER 5: AUTO SAFETY OR JUST SAFETYWASHING?  
Introduction  
 The financial promotions described in the previous chapter helped GM sell millions of 
SUVs. Consumers not only bought SUVs for their price but also their safety. Along with safety 
in ads, GM featured safety in its corporate social responsibility campaigns. In the 1990s and 
2000s, GM used CSR to fight public perception that its SUVs were unsafe. In this chapter, I 
argue that GM used CSR as a form of “safetywashing” to detract from lobbying against National 
Highway and Traffic Administration (NHTSA) standards. Combined with the ad campaigns for 
SUVs discussed in the previous chapter, safetywashing has led consumers to underestimate the 
risks of driving an SUV. Unfortunately, SUVs have had a negative impact on consumer safety, a 
problem that was particularly stark in the late 1990s and early 2000s when popular SUVs were 
susceptible to rollover. In this chapter, I continue the arguments of the previous chapter. I argue 
that PR and lobbying have influenced auto safety due to the flaws of the commercial media 
system. 
As I described in chapter 3, PR has had a long relationship with commercial media in the 
U.S. Press releases, edited or unedited, have long been published in news outlets. With declining 
revenue and staff, news outlets increasingly rely on press releases as a source of news. In the 
past, about 40% of newspaper articles were derived from press releases. Today, the number may 
be as high as 86% for some papers.670 Meanwhile, the influence of advertising allows 
corporations to have even more favorable access to journalists, especially those that work for 
local media. Corporate influence can range from “information subsidies” wherein press releases 
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and corporate facts are substituted for other sources of information to local news stories about 
CSR efforts that build community trust.671 In this chapter, I discuss GM’s lobbying of the 
NHTSA and its safetywashing using primary and secondary sources. By examining GM’s PR 
and its control over auto safety regulation, this chapter shows one way in which promotional 
communication has influenced the commercial media system.  
In the following pages, I first describe corporate social responsibility. Next, I give an 
overview of my methods before turning to an examination of how the NHTSA became a 
“captured” agency. I focus on a few key SUV safety issues and the GM ignition switch scandal. I 
show how the industry was able to compromise the NHTSA and prevent robust regulation. 
Finally, I discuss GM’s safetywashing efforts and how they reflected GM’s emphasis on driver 
behavior in lobbying. I focus on three programs: child safety, the promotion of air bags, and 
work with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).  
Corporate Social Responsibility  
Studies of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cross multiple disciplinary boundaries, 
including management, public relations, and sustainability studies. All these different fields have 
a myriad of definitions for CSR.672 CSR typically involves a corporation addressing the needs of 
“stakeholders,” such as customers, employees, and shareholders, that fall beyond legal 
requirements.673 CSR programs include corporate philanthropy, community involvement, 
                                                          
671 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public Policy (Norwood, NJ: Ablex 
Pub. Co., 1982), 64. 
672 Donnalyn Pompper, Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainability and Public Relations: Negotiating Multiple 
Complex Challenges (London: Routledge, 2015); Beal, Corporate Social Responsibility; W. Timothy Coombs and 
Sherry J. Holladay, Managing Corporate Social Responsibility (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).  
673 Roy Leeper, “In Search of a Metatheory for Public Relations: An Argument for Communitarianism,” in 
Handbook of Public Relations, ed. Robert L. Heath and Gabriel Vasquez (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc., 2001), 93–104; Derina R. Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass, “Strategic Communication: Pillars and Perspectives 
of an Alternative Paradigm,” in Public Relations and Communication Management: Current Trends and Emerging 
159 
 
sustainability, and other charitable activities, such as corporate donations after catastrophes or 
employees volunteering with Habitat for Humanity.674 Despite the lofty goals set for CSR, the 
programs are really PR that enhances the appeal of the corporation. Most CSR programs are run 
out of PR offices because “communication is central to all variations on the CSR theme.”675 CSR 
programs are not useful to the corporation unless they are publicized. Like other contemporary 
corporations, GM’s promotional communications are synchronized. In 1990, GM even dropped 
the name “public relations” for its PR department and replaced it with “Communications and 
Marketing.” GM’s CSR was not simply about doing good but was strategic. CSR serves to 
“cover up” company practices and defend the corporation from criticism; this means any benefits 
derived from CSR are often outweighed by other practices.676  
CSR serves a political purpose. 677  With the advent of neoliberalism, CSR became an 
attempt to replace government taxation and social services with private funding as described in 
chapter 3. In response to a new wave of consumer criticism in the 1990s, corporations invested in 
CSR to placate their customers and employees. By investing in philanthropy, employee 
volunteerism, and cause-related marketing, corporations could demonstrate their commitment 
committed to social causes.678 This defensive tactic staved off criticism and brought in 
customers.679 With the benefits of CSR clear, spending on corporate giving rose during the 
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2000s.680 In 2004, corporate foundations spent $12 billion on philanthropy; by 2014, they spent 
$18 billion.681 Corporation foundations do not tell the whole story. For example, more than half 
of GM’s 1994 donations were from the GM corporation instead of the GM Foundation. In 
addition to the political and social benefits of donations, corporations can deduct donations on 
their taxes, creating a financial incentive for donation. 
While CSR programs may appear to be in the community interest, they instead uphold 
the structures of power within the neoliberal landscape.682 CSR programs create a “perception of 
corporate social responsibility [that] decreases community resistance to controversial 
organizational initiatives within the community.”683 In other words, CSR programs are an 
inadequate replacement for social services,684 and they are a means of creating good community 
relations to help the corporation. By building a relationship with the community, corporations lay 
the groundwork for preventing unfavorable regulations or negotiating favorable agreements. 
Economist John Kenneth Galbraith argued that corporate philanthropy can lead to too much 
corporate influence over policies and governance.685 His theory has been supplemented by recent 
evidence that suggests that corporations are likely to support non-profits with key politicians on 
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their boards of directors.686 As the New York Times put it, “there are many doors that corporate 
America can use to buy influence.”687 For example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), a 
non-profit partner of GM, previously worked with Elizabeth Dole, a former head of the NHTSA. 
Today, MADD’s board includes both a former NHTSA Administrator and a former GM 
employee.688 Favoring charities favored by regulators frequently grants benefits.  
Corporations also engage in “CSR washing” by using CSR to cover up for bad 
behavior.689 Some scholars have identified particular kinds of “washing,” such as pinkwashing 
when “companies marketing pink ribbon products while at the same time producing and/or 
selling products that are associated with breast cancer.”690 I propose the term “safetywashing” to 
describe the CSR campaigns discussed in this chapter. GM engaged in “safetywashing” by 
promoting auto safety, while lobbying against regulations by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and making misleading statements about SUV safety. The 
consequences of this have been dire for consumer safety. In the 1990s and 2000s, there were 
thousands of victims of rollover SUV crashes. 691 In addition, drivers in small cars are more 
likely to die in an accident with an SUV, a problem known as vehicle incompatibility. As I 
outlined in the previous chapter, despite high profile rollover accidents, Americans believed 
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SUVs to be safe.692 Furthermore, thanks to used car sales, faulty SUVs sold years ago may still 
be on the roads and sold to new owners. Today, GM still touts safety as a selling point for 
SUVs.693 
As I described in the previous chapter, GM was one of the biggest advertisers in the U.S. 
It was also the largest auto manufacturer in the world by sales for most of its history. GM has 
also held the top spot on the Fortune 500 listing of top companies by annual revenue and is one 
of only three companies that have done so during the past fifty years.694 GM achieved the 
number one rank on the Fortune 500 listing in 1998 but slid to number four in 2008 when it 
faced a bankruptcy crisis. As an industry leader, other automakers mirrored GM’s corporate 
strategies. GM’s CSR strategies are representative of the auto manufacturers’ commitment to 
using CSR to cover for corporate practices. The U.S. auto industry collaborated on lobbying the 
NHTSA and even overlapped on some CSR activities.  
Beyond GM’s leadership, GM’s CSR programs show how the auto industrial complex 
used promotional communication to cement its policy leadership with consequences for 
consumer health and safety. As I discussed in the previous chapter, safety became a selling point 
for SUVs. This chapter shows how GM’s CSR reinforced the advertised message of safety. 
Because of the dependency of commercial media on PR and advertising, GM’s CSR campaigns 
gained a wider reach. The success of the ad and PR campaigns set the U.S. on track toward a 
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future where SUVs are still best-selling vehicles. GM’s CSR program characterized the 
corporation as a safety-oriented company. This chapter focuses on a few major types of CSR that 
GM used. First, I discuss the evolution of corporate philanthropy. Then, I describe how corporate 
sponsorships served an important role for GM. After that, I discuss how GM used employee 
volunteerism. Finally, I discuss cause-related a marketing, a strategic philanthropy tactic.  
First, GM invested millions in corporate philanthropy. Before the advent of corporate 
foundations, corporate philanthropy was a hap-hazard affair that was often overseen by the 
president’s wife who simply chose her favorite charity. By the mid-1980s, major corporations 
had created corporate foundations to formalize and centralize their giving. Recently, corporate 
philanthropy has shifted to strategic philanthropy wherein “companies now expect a return on 
their bottom line for a contribution.”695 In the 1990s and 2000s, the GM Foundation spent 
millions of dollars on a variety of philanthropic programs, although most of the money went 
toward education programs for science and engineering.696 The GM Foundation also took the 
strategic part of donations literally and donated to conservative public policy organizations, 
including the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation.697 GM’s 
investment in AEI and Heritage paid off in the early 2000s when both organizations supported 
GM’s arguments against Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Neither 
organization was heavily involved in auto safety, except to claim that CAFE standards would 
hurt consumer safety as I discuss in the following chapter.698 
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Second, the GM Foundation also supported marketing sponsorships.699 Sponsorships of 
special events, like sports, concerts, and festivals, can be considered “hardball giving,” wherein a 
return on investment is expected, although sports sponsorships, unlike arts or cultural 
sponsorships, are not always considered philanthropy.700 GM sponsored a variety of art and 
media presentations, including Ken Burns’ Civil War and Baseball documentaries.701 Similarly, 
GM sponsored a variety of sports events from the Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour to 
the World Cup. In addition to the promotional benefits of sponsorship, GM benefited from 
traditional product advertising opportunities during the events. These sponsorships may have 
constituted CSR, but they also served a strategic purpose as outlets for GM advertising by tying 
key brands like Cadillac to sports.  
Third, GM corporate philanthropy included employee volunteerism. GM encouraged 
employees to volunteer their time as a demonstration of their commitment.702 Employee 
volunteerism can serve a managerial purpose as a team building activity. GM also used pictures 
of volunteering employees in annual reports to showcase that GM cared about the communities 
in which it operated.703 This chapter addresses some employee volunteerism projects, such as 
GM’s campaign with MADD. Frequently, GM and the UAW participated in the same volunteer 
projects to demonstrate that the corporation and the union shared a commitment to the 
community. The collaboration also masked the problems between GM and the UAW because of 
plant shutdowns in the 1990s.  
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Fourth, GM sometimes used cause-related marketing (CRM), a practice through which 
corporations monetize philanthropy. CRM has variously been described as corporate 
philanthropy, CSR, and a “cousin” of philanthropy because it is paid for by operating funds 
rather than corporate foundations.704 Samantha King describes CRM as strategic philanthropy 
that preys on consumers’ desires for giving by incentivizing them to purchase products with 
“good” intentions, such as the (Red) products that raise money for the Global Fund.705 Both 
corporate and consumer interest in CRM increased after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001.706 CRM combines philanthropy with advertising and marketing. GM’s partnership with 
MADD offered consumers the opportunity to get a red ribbon at their local dealer for their 
vehicle, which triggered a donation from GM. This functioned similarly to most CRM programs. 
Local dealers benefitted from a flood of consumers who might consider shopping for a new 
vehicle. Similarly, Ford has a “Warriors in Pink” program that raises money for Susan G. Komen 
with purchase triggered donations from merchandise.707 
Methods 
PR programs contain multiple components ranging from press releases to press kits to 
videos and photographs. Press releases have been a basic component of PR practices for 
decades.708 In historical studies of PR activities, press releases and statements are used to identify 
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the narrative pushed by PR practitioners.709 For example, in a study of casino PR in Las Vegas, 
Jessalynn R. Strauss used casino press releases to show how casinos promoted Las Vegas 
through press releases about performers and amenities.710 Press release are still widely produced 
to plant positive stories and to garner influence over news media.711 Today, press releases have 
increased importance as time-strapped journalists may publish them in their entirety or with 
minimal editing.712 Alternatively, journalists may rely on releases to supplement other research. 
Press releases demonstrate what a corporation wants the public to know about its programs, 
services, and campaigns.  
At the General Motors Heritage Center, PR programs were primarily archived through 
press releases. By examining the releases, I got a sense of how GM used its PR offices. While 
many of GM’s press releases dealt with quarterly financial reports and sales figures, others 
present a nearly comprehensive scope of CSR campaigns and the narrative that GM wanted to 
push with them. To address whether these campaigns constituted safetywashing, I needed 
additional evidence. Critical PR scholar Jacquie L’Etang argues that scholars must “include 
analysis of historical, political, ideological, and sociocultural factors in designing CSR 
programs.”713 Therefore, I place the press releases in the political context in which they were 
produced through secondary sources, including books about the period and contemporary news 
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and trade publication coverage. This context shows how the press releases operated as 
safetywashing to obscure GM’s lobbying campaign. Secondary sources also show if press 
releases were published and how news agencies supplemented or altered them. Finally, I 
consulted contemporary polling data to judge how effective these campaigns were. The limited 
polling data available and the continued rise in SUV sales provides some information on how the 
public perceived the SUV safety claims.   
I collected 1753 press releases from GM and GMAC in their entirety. Because I gathered 
primary research at the GM Heritage Center’s collection, the majority were from GM. There 
were very few press releases from GM subsidiaries, including GMAC. The releases ranged in 
date from January 2, 1990 to October 22, 2009, a few the months after GM’s bankruptcy and the 
start of the “new GM.” The releases from 1990 to 1998 were largely comprehensive because 
copies of the paper press releases were available at the archive. There were some paper copies of 
press releases between 1999 and 2003, but the sample was more limited. The digital collection 
began with the year 2000; thus, there are likely press releases in 1999 that were not archived on 
paper or digitally. The sample for the years 2000 to 2009 was more limited. I curated a collection 
that focused on CSR, advertising, and marketing. The press releases concerning advertising and 
marketing programs were used to augment the previous chapter. 
To sort through the releases, I categorized the press releases based on content into one of 
twelve categories: CSR, production and sales numbers, car models, appointment and executive 
updates, union relations, speeches and awards received by GM or GM employees, lobbying, 
green or environmental releases, technological or engineering, news related to mergers and 
subsidiaries, recalls, and other. The other category included a large portion of financial and 
investor relations releases, such as issues of stock, and was the largest category of releases; it 
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accounted for 443 releases. Production and sales numbers were released by quarter and annually, 
with some additional releases that included production numbers for some models. As expected, 
production was the second largest category with 304 releases. Finally, CSR and news related to 
mergers and subsidiaries had roughly the same amount of releases; there were 215 CSR releases 
and 218 on mergers and subsidiaries.  I placed some releases in two categories. For example, 
union relations might overlap with technological or engineering related news in the case of news 
release for a Saturn plant that mentioned innovating in engineering and labor. In addition to these 
rough categories, I made notes on themes of the releases to find projects that stretched across 
multiple years, as well as persistent corporate activities by General Motors.  
The “Captured” NHTSA 
This section describes the political and legislative context of GM’s safetywashing 
campaigns. As described earlier in this dissertation, the auto industry’s primary regulator is the 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA). The NHTSA should operate in 
the public interest to protect consumer safety. However, over the past few decades, the NHTSA 
has become a “captured” agency, so the industry now holds more sway than the public over 
NHTSA’s decision-making. In this section, I describe how the auto industry compromised the 
NHTSA and the consequences for consumer safety. Then, I describe some specific consequences 
for SUV safety. I conclude this section with a discussion of the GM ignition switch scandal.  
As I described in chapter 3, the NHTSA is the primary regulator for the auto industry; it 
is responsible for both auto safety regulation and fuel efficiency standards, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. The NHTSA was originally focused on how auto manufacturers 
could better design vehicles to be safe; the agency instituted a variety of safety standards in its 
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first decade. 714 However, even in the early years of the agency, industry concerns hobbled 
NHTSA regulations. The auto industry alleged that they could not meet regulatory standards 
within a few years, so the NHTSA extended the deadline to comply. This capitulation set the 
general practice at the NHTSA; the agency would now alter rules in light of industry concerns 
regarding pricing and feasibility. In the following years, to get rule extensions or changes, the 
industry regularly claimed that safety measures were expensive or impractical.  
The NHTSA was not always a captured agency. President Jimmy Carter appointed Joan 
Claybrook, formerly the head of Ralph Nader’s Congress Watch, to run the NHTSA. Claybrook 
led the NHTSA from 1977 to 1980. Claybrook created the New Car Assessment Program 
(NCAP).715 Although NCAP became a model for assessing auto safety worldwide, other 
countries have expanded their safety regimes beyond the U.S. standards in the decades since 
NCAP was created. Despite Claybrook’s tenacity, regulatory delays persisted. In the 1980s, the 
U.S. auto industry was struggling, and President Ronald Reagan promised to de-regulate the auto 
industry. The NHTSA became a target of Reagan’s ire, so the agency adapted by integrating 
Reagan’s concerns about economic feasibility into rulemaking. One NHTSA administrator even 
stalled on installing hooks for child safety seats because they cost $1 per vehicle instead of 
ninety-seven cents per vehicle. The NHTSA also delayed rulemaking by heavily researching 
proposals to prove they were necessary rather than instituting regulations.716 
Long-serving Michigan representative John Dingell, an ally of the U.S. auto industry, 
played a critical role in creating the current model of NHTSA regulations. While a liberal 
Democrat in many respects, Dingell was also tied to the auto industry, which provided him with 
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campaign funds for decades; Ralph Nader described him as “the No. 1 enemy of consumers on 
Capitol Hill.”717 From 1981 to 1995, Dingell served as the chairman of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee where he was known as “The Truck” because he stopped any regulations 
that targeted the auto industry. During that time, he maintained an “autocratic” control over the 
committee.718 His removal as Chairman of Energy and Commerce meant Congress could 
institute some legislation calling for the NHTSA to take regulatory action, such as rollover 
protection. However, the NHTSA was not required to act under congressional legislation. After 
he was removed as Chairman in 1995, he still served as ranking member on the committee, so 
his voice was undoubtedly influential.  
Despite its authorization, the NHTSA resisted implementing many regulations Congress 
ordered. The NHTSA holds secret meetings with the auto industry, does not make use of its 
subpoena powers, and does not usually issue mandatory recalls.719 Further, the NHTSA budget is 
meager. Only about 16% of its budget goes to auto safety regulation; the majority goes to 
highway safety. Furthermore, some of Congress’ regulations instantiated rules that were already 
in place, like air bags, or laws that were already common around the world, such as antilock 
brakes.720 As I discuss later in this chapter, the auto industry delayed air bags for decades before 
they were implemented in the early 1990s. By the 1990s, the NHTSA regularly worked with auto 
manufacturers and was slow to implement rules. These problems came to a head with SUV 
safety issues.  
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SUV Safety  
GM spent millions during the 1990s and 2000s promoting SUVs because they were a key 
area of profitability, as described in chapter 2. Although consumers often distinguish SUVs from 
trucks, federal regulations consider them to be “light trucks” because they often have a truck 
chassis. Light trucks are treated separately from cars for safety and fuel economy legislation, so 
safety measures come to light trucks and SUVs later. During the 1990s and 2000s, the number of 
SUVs on the road increased dramatically; this led to immediate impacts on safety and fuel 
economy; fuel economy will be discussed in the next chapter. Many consumers purchased SUVs 
believing they were safe, despite numerous court cases against auto manufacturers detailing their 
risks. This section describes three key SUV safety issues: braking, vehicle compatibility, and 
rollover.  
The first safety issue with SUV is braking. SUVs have a longer stopping distance because 
of the vehicle’s weight, tires, and brakes. The first SUVs still had cheap brakes despite their high 
cost because of the design process. In the early 1990s, all SUVs used a light truck chassis. 
Because light trucks were designed as work vehicles to be sold for commercial use, 
manufacturers put the cheapest possible brakes on them to keep the price low for business 
purchases.721 These cheap breaks made it hard to stop the large vehicle quickly. Another factor 
contributing to the SUV braking problems was the tires that came standard on SUVs. SUV tires 
were meant for driving off-road, so they had less grip on the road. However, buyers of SUVs did 
not drive them off-road.722 While these tires were an asset when selling the vehicle, they became 
a problem when drivers drove their SUVs on highways and suburban roads. Off-road tires made 
                                                          




it difficult to stop quickly, particularly when combined with the poor brakes. Breakthroughs at 
Ford led to some improvements in brake design in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, thousands of 
SUVs with poor brakes had already been sold by that time. Because many vehicles stay on the 
road for about a decade after they are sold, this means that these problems persist long after 
design changes are implemented.  
The second safety issue that continues to plague SUVs is vehicle incompatibility, a term 
that refers to the effect of SUVs on other vehicles in accidents. As SUVs grew larger during the 
1990s and 2000s, their size was promoted as a safety advantage. Auto industry focus groups 
indicated that women perceived the higher, larger SUV as safer for their families. Unfortunately, 
SUVs put other motorists at risk.723 In the 1970s, researchers found that high front ends are 
dangerous to other cars on the road. In an accident, the SUVs front end is so high that it may 
slam directly into drivers in small vehicles and cause disastrous damage. Public Citizen has 
reported that the death rate for car drivers in crashes with SUVs is over four times higher than 
the death rate for SUV drivers.724 Yet, auto manufacturers dismiss studying vehicle 
compatibility. Like the choice to drive SUVs, auto manufacturers argue that discussing vehicle 
incompatibility means telling SUV drivers that they cannot drive SUVs.  
Auto manufacturers have also turned to science to argue that vehicle incompatibility is 
not solvable. They argue that the weight and size of the vehicle, not the design, is what causes 
damage to cars. By this logic, because people cannot be prevented from buying large vehicles, 
everyone should just buy larger vehicles to be safer. However, this ignores the other safety issues 
and environmental drawbacks of SUVs.725 In Europe, foreign manufacturers designed vehicles 
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that were more compatible with smaller cars on the road. Working from these designs, Ford 
added a “Blocker Beam” under its SUVs to prevent the front end from rolling over cars. When 
used in crash tests between the Ford Excursion and Ford Taurus, the tests were less deadly; the 
results suggested that design plays a role in the danger posed by a car. Unfortunately, Ford could 
not recall SUVs without the “Blocker Beam” because installing it requires other changes to the 
car that need to happen in production. 726 Had Ford considered vehicle compatibility from the 
start, many more lives could have been saved.  
Despite auto manufacturers attempts to discourage discussion of vehicle incompatibility, 
environmentalists and public safety advocates loudly criticized SUVs on multiple fronts. After a 
Congressional hearing on SUV safety that addressed vehicle compatibility, the NHTSA needed 
to consider how to regulate vehicle compatibility without raising the ire of auto manufacturers 
dependent on SUVs.727 In 2003, the NHTSA turned that authority over to the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.728 Instead of NHTSA 
standards, the auto industry would determine what was needed for vehicle compatibility without 
any measure of compliance. The auto industry had until 2009 to create standards for all vehicles 
and to adopt new technologies to reduce deaths. However, without NHTSA requirements, “the 
voluntary program is a diversionary tactic to stave off meaningful federal regulation and 
standards that consumers can rely on.”729 Voluntary standards for safety have been ineffective at 
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promulgating safety technologies, but those standards are all that exist for vehicle compatibility. 
The NHTSA has continued to research vehicle compatibility in recent years, but no regulation is 
on the horizon.730 
The third SUV safety issue that continues to plague SUVs is vehicle rollover. In the case 
of rollovers, the vehicle height, which customers consider a safety feature, makes the vehicle 
more likely to rollover than cars. Rollovers often result from the vehicle striking a curb or 
guardrail. Because of the vehicle’s height, the SUV is more likely to strike the guardrail and flip 
over; in these accidents, SUVs often land on their roofs. If the roof is not strong enough, then the 
SUV will collapse, which can lead to severe neck and head injuries.731 While rollovers made up 
only 1% of all accidents in 1990s, they were responsible for 10,000 deaths. Recent statistics 
show that rollovers are now 3% of all accidents and 30% of all deaths.732 In addition to rollover 
deaths, some studies suggests that rollovers are responsible for most cases of paralysis following 
accidents.733 In the late 1990s and 2000s, rollovers became a particularly salient issue because of 
the Ford-Firestone scandal. The Firestone tires included on many Ford SUVs were likely to 
blowout and cause the vehicle to rollover. After a flurry of court cases across the nation, the 
Ford-Firestone tire problem made rollovers a national issue.734  
An important component of SUV safety with rollovers is how strong the roof of vehicle 
is. The roof crush standard refers to how much of a vehicle’s weight the roof can bear. 
Occupants are less likely to be injured if the roof can bear more than the weight of the vehicle. 
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Roof standards are another place where the regulatory difference between light trucks and cars 
has affected consumer safety. In 1973, the federal government instituted roof strength standards 
for cars, but there were no standards for light trucks until 1991. Unfortunately, the largest trucks 
and SUVs are exempt from roof strength requirements entirely because of their size. Thus, the 
largest SUVs are more likely to rollover and pose more danger when they roll. This is 
particularly problematic because SUVs have grown larger. Finally, while increasing roof 
strength would reduce future rollover fatalities, the roof strength of vehicles currently on the road 
cannot be increased. This means that old SUVs are still dangerous. Unfortunately, the average 
age of vehicles on the road is nearly 12 years old.735 Attending to safety issues before vehicles 
are produced is important because those safety issues can linger for over a decade.  
Public Citizen actively argued SUVs were more dangerous and prone to rollover. The 
organization even attempted to organize SUV owners through www.betterSUV.org, a website 
that called for SUVs to ask for better safety and fuel efficiency.736 Meanwhile, Sport Utility 
Vehicle Owners of America, an industry front group, argued that the increase in rollover deaths 
was simply attributable to the number of SUVs on the road, not the design of SUVs.737 Despite 
industry attempts to counter public concerns, widespread public concern about rollover led 
Congress to pass two acts that authorized the NHTSA to act: the Transportation, Recall 
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act and Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). With these 
                                                          
735 Jack Walsworth, “Average Age of Vehicles on Road Hits 11.6 Years,” Automotive News, November 22, 2016, 
https://www.autonews.com/article/20161122/RETAIL05/161129973/average-age-of-vehicles-on-road-hits-11-6-
years. 
736 Laura MacCleery, “Detroit Can Do Better: SUV Owners Should Demand Safer, More Fuel-Efficient Vehicles,” 
Public Citizen, July 18, 2003, https://www.citizen.org/article/detroit-can-do-better-suv-owners-should-demand-sa. 




acts, Congress attempted to hold the NHTSA accountable for the Ford-Firestone scandal and 
SUV rollover but also allowed the NHTSA to slow rulemaking.  
After the national scandal over the recall of Firestone tires, the TREAD Act was passed 
in 2000. The Act tried to hold tire manufacturers accountable for recalls. Tire serial numbers 
were moved to the outside of the tire, so that consumers could more easily tell if their tires had 
been recalled. 738 Because the faulty Firestone tires had caused Ford SUVs to rollover, TREAD 
also required the “develop[ment] of a dynamic rollover test for motor vehicles, to carry out a 
program of dynamic rollover tests, and to disseminate results to the public.”739 Thus, TREAD 
authorized NHTSA to develop rollover tests that consumers could consult when looking to 
purchase a vehicle. Congress was well-intentioned, but the implementation of TREAD was 
flawed as will be discussed shortly. In 2005, Congress passed SAFETEA-LU. SAFETEA-LU 
was a step back from TREAD. It slowed down the rulemaking process by extending the time for 
compliance. Critically, the Act also permitted the NHTSA to wait until 2009 to release new roof 
crush standards. Even when standards were released, the industry would have years to update 
their vehicles. Consequently, roof crush standards were not updated during the mid-2000s when 
SUVs were growing in popularity and SUV rollover deaths increased. 
Congress allocated the NHTSA additional funds and staff to investigate rollovers and 
create a rollover test under the TREAD Act, but consistent with decades of delay, the NHTSA 
stalled in looking at rollovers and creating a test.740 The Center for Auto Safety, Public Citizen, 
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Consumers Union, and other consumer groups continued to pressure the NHTSA over the roof 
crush standard and the SUV rollover problem. In 2003, the NHTSA finally followed the TREAD 
directive to test rollover and issue new standards.741 Yet, the tests developed by the NHTSA 
were flawed. In 2004, Joan Claybrook of Public Citizen testified that the NHTSA rating did not 
accurately assess rollover risk because the rating system is inflated. Most vehicles get at least 
two starts out of five, even when they tip-up in testing.742 Although Congress attempted to hold 
the NHTSA accountable for testing that could help consumers make buying decisions, 
consumers may still be left confused about which vehicles are safest from rollover.  
Due to the increasing deaths from SUV rollover and public pressure, in 2005, Congress 
ordered the NHTSA to upgrade the roof crush standard by 2008.743 By then, roof crush standards 
and tests had been delayed forty years.744 In response to proposed updates to roof strength, auto 
manufacturers lobbied the NHTSA for weaker roof standards; they argued that increased roof 
strength was not helpful, was too expensive, and would be impossible to update by 2010.745 The 
industry also advocated that roof crush be tested on either the driver’s side or the passenger’s 
side rather than both.746 The final NHTSA standards, which took effect in 2009, mandated that 
the roof had to bear three times the weight of the vehicle; this standard was not as high as 
consumer advocates wanted. Complicating the issue of SUVs and roof crush, the NHTSA set a 
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much lower standard of one and a half times the vehicle weight for vehicles that were over 6,000 
pounds, so the largest SUVs and trucks were still dangerous. Finally, the NHTSA gave the auto 
industry years to update roofs. Some vehicles would be updated by 2012, but the full fleet would 
not be updated until 2017.  
When the NHTSA finally updated roof crush standards in 2009, the industry had eight 
years to complete updates that were forty years behind schedule. This long lead-in period is 
characteristic of NHTSA regulations and its capitulation to the industry. In contrast to the 
NHTSA, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) tests roof crush at four times the 
vehicle’s weight. When IIHS did its SUV rollover tests in 2012, only four out of eight SUVs 
passed. This high failure rate suggested the NHTSA standards are not robust enough.747 While 
the auto industry was fighting federal regulations, manufacturers also argued for their preferred 
technological solution to SUV roll-over: electronic stability control (ESC). While roof standards 
were delayed, ESC went from a feature on Mercedes vehicles to a federal requirement in less 
than ten years. This discrepancy demonstrates that the auto industry can update vehicles quickly 
when it suits their needs. Likewise, despite the NHTSA’s typical tactic of delaying rulemaking, 
ESC shows that the NHTSA can quickly create rules when it is beneficial to maintaining its 
relationship with the auto industry. Furthermore, ESC demonstrates another problem. Without 
federal requirements, safety features are relegated to optional extras for “high-end” customers.748 
The disparity between how ESC and roof crush standards have been implemented shows the 
impact of auto industry lobbying and NHTSA stalling.  
In addition to the roof crush standard, the NHTSA developed a roof crush and rollover 
test after TREAD. The federal roof crush test presses down on the vehicle with a metal plate to 





see how much the roof dents in. Unfortunately, consumer advocates have argued that that the 
federal test not accurately simulate roof crush in a rollover crash because it is not “dynamic.”749 
Public Citizen suggested using the Jordan Rollover System (JRS).750 Unlike the NHTSA test, the 
JRS test uses conditions that are similar to real-world crashes. The NHTSA tests attempt to hold 
auto manufacturers accountable. However, the NHTSA has been captured, so consumers are not 
as protected as they could be.  
The roof crush and rollover test should provide consumers with information about what 
vehicle is best to purchase. However, Joan Claybrook at Public Citizen has argued that the 
rollover test is inadequate because “The current rating system is based on a measure of the 
vehicle’s geometric rollover propensity, called the static stability factor, and the vehicle’s 
performance on the fishhook test, which measures ‘untripped’ rollover propensity. ‘Untripped’ 
rollover crashes represent only 5% of total rollover crashes.”751 Similarly, Consumers’ Union has 
argued that the rollover test did not provide enough information for consumers to make a 
decision about vehicle safety.752 Thus, the federal rating does not reflect the actual 
crashworthiness of a vehicle in a rollover crash. Furthermore, the rating is inflated and measured 
in stars, which can be hard for consumers to decipher. 
Consumer Reports, the magazine published by Consumers’ Union, regularly tests vehicle 
safety and reports it to readers. Consumers’ Union has been active in calling out SUV safety 
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issues and in calling for the NHTSA to update its roof crush standard, particularly for vehicles 
that weigh over 6,000 pounds.753 In addition to the problems with testing and standards discussed 
previously, the NHTSA has failed as a watch dog. According to Consumer Reports, in 2017 “the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched 13 investigations. The high 
point was 204 investigations in 1989.”754 Investigations have declined for decades. This means 
that safety defects, like the GM ignition switch, go unnoticed for longer. Instead of being a 
watchdog, the NHTSA has moved to a closer, cooperative relationship with the companies it 
regulates. After problems with GM’s ignition switch were discovered, as I discuss shortly, GM 
entered a three-year agreement to work with NHTSA on safety that expired in 2017. Even if the 
agreement helped GM avoid safety problems, it was only a temporary solution after hundreds of 
deaths and injuries from the ignition switch defect.755 
The NHTSA makes do with an auto safety budget of only $134 million, despite over 
34,000 deaths from auto accidents annually.756 Deprived of the power to do adequate testing and 
investigation, the NHTSA has failed to hold auto manufacturers accountable. Testing does not 
even include child safety restraints.757 Even more troublesome, NHTSA’s voluntary recalls are 
ineffective. As many as 30% of vehicles that are recalled are never brought in to be repaired, 
consumers may purchase used vehicles that have not been repaired by dealers before being 
sold.758 More used cars are sold than new cars, so cars with defects can be on the road for years 
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without being repaired. Although SUVs are now much safer than they were in the 1990s, there 
are still no ratings for vehicle compatibility.  
The NHTSA’s Legacy: The GM Ignition Switch Scandal 
The NHTSA has an early warning data system to notify the public about vehicle defects. 
However, this system does not function as intended. For example, had the NHTSA effectively 
used early warning data before the Firestone tire recall, the agency could have prevented 
hundreds of deaths. However, when deciding how to use early warning data, the NHTSA 
authorized the auto industry to limit the release of proprietary information.759 In a 2008 court 
case, Public Citizen argued that the NHTSA could not keep this data secret. Although Public 
Citizen won, the NHTSA still did not have to follow up on early warnings.760 As in other areas of 
regulation, the captured agency routinely stalled, so auto manufacturers produced vehicles with 
deadly problems for years or decades. GM experienced this first-hand when its ignition switch 
problem was discovered in 2014.   
The GM ignition switch case demonstrates how NHTSA’s captured status has allowed 
safety problems to fester and why voluntary recalls are an ineffective regulatory technique. In 
2001, GM became aware of problems with the ignition switch in the Saturn Ion. The ignition 
would sometimes turn off while the car was on and cause the vehicle to stop. Although GM 
assumed their engineers fixed the problem, the issue re-emerged when testing the 2004 Chevy 
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Cobalt. GM declined to fix the ignition despite design fixes because of the cost.761 By 2004, GM 
was aware that drivers had experienced the ignition switch problem, and that some had been 
injured or even died because of it. GM filed an early warning report with the NHTSA, and the 
agency followed up in 2004. GM and the NHTSA jointly determined that “stalling is not a per se 
safety-related defect.”762 Thus, the NHTSA’s close relationship with the auto industry 
compromised its ability to investigate a known safety issue for years.  
In 2007, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS), a non-profit organization, began its own 
investigation on the GM ignition switch problem. CAS concluded that the NHTSA should have 
issued a recall because of deaths from the ignition switch problem. Yet, the agency still declined 
to issue a recall.763 Seven years later, a New York Times investigation prompted GM to issue its 
own recall of the defective vehicles. Although GM initially estimated that the recall would be 
less than 1 million vehicles, the auto manufacturer ultimately recalled about 11 million vehicles. 
By the time of the recall, 174 people were known to have died as a result of the defect.764 
NHTSA fined GM $35 million, which was less than a comparable fine assessed to Toyota. GM 
could have solved the ignition problem in production over 10 years before when the Saturn Ion 
was in production but did not. Alternatively, the NHTSA could have issued a recall when they 
noticed the pattern of deaths in 2004.  
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GM blamed company structure for its failure to properly assess the risks of the ignition 
switch defect. After the scandal, more than a dozen people were fired or disciplined.765 Although 
the ignition switch scandal demonstrates a problem with GM’s company culture and the culture 
around safety technology at auto manufacturers, it also demonstrates problems with the 
NHTSA’s investigations and recall practices. Without the budget or political will to investigate 
the early warning report, the NHTSA ignored the ignition switch scandal until it became a front-
page issue at the New York Times. Further, GM, not the NHTSA, issued the recall. Because most 
consumers will not bring in their recalled cars, GM’s voluntary recall means that consumers’ 
lives are still in danger.766 A more proactive NHTSA with stronger standards could better protect 
consumers by making sure that safe vehicles are manufactured in the first place instead of 
relying on recalls.   
I have provided the political context for GM’s safetywashing campaigns. I have 
demonstrated how GM and the auto industry captured the NHTSA and prevented or stalled 
meaningful regulation. GM has also exploited safety through ads and PR. Safety was a minor 
theme in some TV ads, mostly for minivans and cars.767 However, safety also played a role in the 
appeal of the SUV.768 The contradiction between GM’s use of safety themes in advertising and 
PR while lobbying the industry impacts consumer safety. Consumers who believed large, high 
SUVs in truck chassis were safe bought vehicles that were more likely to rollover. As a result, 
GM’s quest for profitability threatened consumer safety.  
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Although the auto industry fought federal safety regulations, safety became a key area of 
PR for GM. This section first describes three CSR tactics GM used: child safety, promoting air 
bags, and partnership with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). In all efforts, GM 
emphasized that safety was a driver behavior issue, not something that could legislated through 
technology. The child safety efforts and partnership with MADD enabled to GM to work 
alongside community organizations in communities to build relationships. GM’s promotion of 
air bags occurred as the NTHSA was finalizing much-needed air bag rules. Thus, the 
automaker’s changes served as an argument that the market could handle safety, even though 
GM had stalled on air bags for decades.  
Child Safety  
 The first area on which GM safetywashed its products was child safety. GM had two 
main programs dealing with child safety: educating consumers on the correct installation of child 
safety seats and trunk safety. Child safety seats are difficult to install and are often installed 
incorrectly, which contributes to deaths and injury. To help mitigate those issues, GM is a 
sponsor of the National Safe Kids Campaign, now Safe Kids Worldwide.769 Through the GM 
Foundation, GM supports the Safe Kids Buckle Up Program.770 The program provides a variety 
of services, but GM emphasized the Check Up events where members of the public were trained 
on how to install children’s car seats correctly.771 The Check Ups were administered through 
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local coalitions, often with ties to GM dealers. Some dealers were even presented with awards 
for their involvement in the program.772 As with many of GM’s CSR efforts, the Check Ups were 
localized to GM communities and strengthened the relationship between GM and its company 
towns.  
The National Safe Kids Campaign succeeded at teaching parents how to install safety 
seats; some of the Check Ups focused on parents from disadvantaged backgrounds.773 GM’s 
work on child safety demonstrates how corporate social responsibility can benefit the public, but 
also serve other purposes. By sponsoring the campaign, GM has done measurable good. 
However, at the same time, GM has campaigned against safety technology, such as air bags and 
roof crush standards, that would also save lives. By focusing on parental behavior, GM also 
draws accountability for crashes away from the corporation and vehicle design.  
By 2000, GM reported that over four years “more than 82,000 car seats have been 
checked and 2,000 dealers have participated.”774 By tying in GM dealers, dealers earned even 
more credibility in their communities where they often serve as sponsors to local events, 
enriching the ties between GM and the local communities. This also served a political purpose by 
enriching the relationship between GM and its dealers who are important lobbying allies for GM 
in Washington, D.C., as I describe both in the next chapter and chapter 7. The UAW, another 
important lobbying ally, also partnered with the program.  
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As part of their campaign, GM partnered with the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Council of La Raza (La Raza) 
beginning in 2000.775 As part of America’s Promise, the UAW also supported the $5 million, 
three-year program to reach out to communities of color about safety with children’s car seats.776  
GM used this program as an opportunity to highlight diversity initiatives. GM’s partnerships 
with the NAACP and La Raza were well-received in local media, such as the Los Angeles Times 
and the Chicago Tribune.  
 The Los Angeles Times portrayed GM, Ford, and Chrysler as partners in child safety, 
boosting the status of the auto industry. Despite GM’s claim to be the first to foray into child 
safety, the Los Angeles Times positioned Chrysler as the first to offer child safety seat installation 
sessions and GM as “not about to be left behind.”777 All three U.S. auto manufacturers were 
involved in efforts to raise awareness about child safety to counteract the narrative that auto 
manufacturers do not care about safety. This is the essence and goal of safetywashing. The 
NHTSA was not mentioned except when the author noted that the Department of Transportation 
had not yet released regulations for the strength of front seats. Front seats can endanger children 
in accidents, even if they are in car seats.778 While news coverage portrayed auto manufacturers 
as taking steps to ensure child safety, the government was shown to be incompetent. This 
                                                          
775 General Motors, “General Motors Partners with Los Angeles Agencies to Distribute Child Safety Seats,” April 
14, 2000, GM Media Archive, General Collection, GM Heritage Center, General Motors; General Motors, “Alivio, 
El Hogar, National Center for Latinos with Disabilities, General Motors, and National Safe Kids Campaign Partner 
to Distribute Child Safety Seats to Chicago Families,” March 8, 2000, GM Media Archive, General Collection, GM 
Heritage Center, General Motors. 
776 General Motors, “GM’s SAFE KIDS Buckle Up Program Gets Impressive Results.” 





narrative supported auto manufacturers’ claims that safety is better administered by the market 
than by government regulation.  
GM’s child safety program received less coverage in Chicago.779 However, GM’s 
partnership with La Raza was the lead in an article about the auto industry in the Chicago 
Tribune.780 Both the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times emphasized child safety as a 
point of pride for U.S. auto manufacturers. If U.S. auto manufacturers were behind on fuel 
economy, they were ahead on safety. The Tribune even noted that that “the National 
Transportation Safety Board criticized six automakers Monday for failing to establish programs 
to make sure children are properly secured in car safety seats.”781 Safety became a marketable 
area for the auto manufacturers as long as it was on their terms. Auto manufacturers still resisted 
regulations by the NHTSA and preferred marketability over safety in product development. 
 GM also emphasized child safety related to other aspects of vehicle safety. In April 2000, 
GM announced that the company had launched a webpage about trunk safety in conjunction with 
the National Safe Kids campaign. Because trunks lacked trunk releases, some children had been 
trapped in trunks and died. In response, GM created a “retrofit kit available for most GM cars 
dating back to 1990.”782 The kit was designed to make trunks safer for children by enabling them 
to escape by pulling an internal trunk release. GM’s press release about the trunk kits placed the 
company ahead of the curve. GM claimed to be a leader in trunk safety. However, the company 
only acted after there were 11 deaths in GM trunks in 1998. More deaths were reported in GM 
trunks in the years following, including in 2009 and 2011.  
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In the New York Times, KidsAndCars.org noted that GM had “pledged previously to take 
a leadership position on the issue.”783 Despite the deaths, GM never issued a recall or mandated 
that the trunks be retrofitted. GM could have mandated retrofits to the trunks, or the NHTSA 
could have issued a notice for recall. In 2002, the NHTSA ruled that internal trunk releases must 
glow-in-the-dark. However, the agency did not issue a recall. This demonstrates some of the 
problems with the current regulatory model. Instead of a recall, GM charged $50 for the updated 
trunk releases. Unfortunately, the cost and lack of awareness of the update kits could discourage 
people from updating their cars. Trunk safety was a design flaw, not a driver behavior problem. 
However, GM’s PR did not effectively deal with the design changes. GM focused on press 
releases that minimally addressed the issue, instead of a more costly recall.  
Air Bags 
The second issue on which GM safetywashed was the use of air bags. Air bags are 
“passive restraints” that protect vehicle occupants without the occupants having to do anything, 
unlike seatbelts that require action on the part of the passengers. Air bags were originally 
patented in 1952, but industry lobbying delayed the production of air bags for decades. In 1974, 
GM produced Oldsmobiles with air bags. However, shortly after, the auto industry determined 
that air bags were not ready for production and stalled on the issue. The NHTSA rulemaking 
process has been effectively hobbled by automakers. The industry resisted government 
regulation requiring air bags until 1991, and air bags were not fully implemented until 1998.784 
The combined pressure of consumer groups and the insurance industry finally led to air bag 
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requirements. Much like increases in fuel efficiency standards, auto manufacturers fought the 
imposition of standards but lauded the technology as life saving once implemented. By 
safetywashing their anti-safety lobbying, the auto industry appears to be an advocate of 
consumer safety, while maintaining an army of lawyers and lobbyists to prevent accountability.  
GM’s promotion of its air bags in 1990, while still lobbying against federal air bag 
regulation, demonstrates how the industry used safetywashing to avoid accountability. In August 
1990, a GM press release announced that it would “triple the number of its cars equipped with 
driver-side air bags.”785 The release noted “GM has sold about 450,000 cars equipped with 
driver-side air bags, offered as standard equipment on 13 car lines and as an option on two.”786 
Further, all GM vehicles would feature airbags by 1995. This sentiment was reiterated in a 
speech by Robert A. Rogers, Director of Safety at GM, at the Annual International Extrication 
Competition and Learning Symposium where GM indicated its willingness to work with first 
responders on how the airbag might affect rescues. The venue became a PR opportunity for GM 
to both present its progress on safety and demonstrate that it was willing to improve further.787 
Despite concerns about the overregulation, GM was certainly willing to use regulation to 
generate a competitive advantage, even while lobbying against it. GM’s self-promotion of its use 
of air bags portrayed the auto manufacturer as at the forefront of technological breakthroughs, 
functioning as a form of safetywashing that masked GM’s lobbying agenda.  
Consumers who had seen GM’s 1990 release on air bags or bought vehicles with air bags 
might have been surprised to hear what else GM had to say about air bags. In 1991, as Congress 
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was considering an air bag law, Lloyd E. Reuss, the President of GM, spoke at the Society of 
Automotive Engineers annual meeting. He described GM’s approach to both safety and fuel 
economy: “We've got to ask ourselves what will happen if the U.S. auto industry, in trying to 
respond to government's voice, winds up sacrificing quality and productivity improvements, and, 
as a result, has to turn a deaf ear to the marketplace voice.”788 Reuss emphasized that air bags 
were only an additional measure to seat belts, in contrast to their press release less than a year 
earlier extolling the virtues of the air bag. Rather than focusing on air bags, he argued that GM 
should be focused on getting people to change their behavior by buckling up. This perspective 
again emphasized safety as dependent on driver behavior, not design. Reuss also made the oft-
repeated claim that larger cars are safer, a selling point of SUVs and an issue in the fuel economy 
debate as I discuss in the next chapter. Reuss’ address exhibits GM’s use of PR to hide its true 
intentions; flaunting air bags to the public, while lambasting attempts at accountability in private.  
GM’s approach to safety emphasized that individual behavior, not design or technology, 
was to blame for accidents. 789 GM only emphasized safety technology when it would be useful 
for marketing purposes as in the case of air bags. By emphasizing driver behavior, GM absolved 
itself of accountability for crashes because they could not control drivers, only design. In a 
release outlining GM’s strategy for safety, GM described its “three-pronged approach to safety” 
that included crash avoidance, driver behavior, and crash protection. Even though driver 
behavior was one category, GM emphasized driver behavior in both the crash avoidance and 
crash protection categories. Crash avoidance included braking and swerving, even though the 
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ability to do either was constrained by vehicle design. Crash protection included drivers’ choice 
to wear seatbelts. Thus, no matter how many prongs there were, all prongs were ultimately 
related to driver choice.790 GM resisted design changes mandated by the government while 
focusing on driver behavior rather than technological change. This strategy de-emphasized the 
role of design in crashes and reinforced the company’s legal arguments that design was not at 
fault for deaths. 
MADD 
GM’s emphasis on individual behavior as a factor in crashes made GM a natural partner 
of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). MADD, which also had support from auto 
manufacturers like Ford and Chrysler, happily accepted GM’s partnership despite disagreements 
over air bags.791 The MADD-GM partnership also involved employee volunteerism. Employees 
were encouraged to “Tie One On For Safety” by attaching red ribbons in honor of MADD to 
their vehicles. Up to 9,000 GM employees were expected to participate.792 GM teamed up with 
MADD from 2000 to 2005 with a five-year sponsorship worth $2.5 million.793 The donation 
supported the creation of a diversity officer and other programs, synchronizing with GM’s 
previous emphasis on diversity in its car seat program. The “Tie One On For Safety” campaign 
functioned like a CRM campaign by encouraging customers to pick up red ribbons for their 
vehicles at GM dealers. The campaign promised “For the first 2,500 ribbons picked up, GM and 
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GMAC will donate $5 per ribbon to MADD” in various states, such as Indiana and Minnesota.794 
GM spent $101,000 advertising the campaign, an amount that was considerably more than the 
$12,500 donated to state MADD affiliates. This discrepancy is consistent with other CRM 
campaigns, which generally emphasize advertising over impact.  
There was little media coverage of GM’s campaign with MADD. One exception was the 
magazine AutoWeek that praised GM by stating, “nobody has done more to help MADD 
decrease drunk-driving deaths in this country than GM.”795 However, not everyone felt 
“gratitude” toward GM. GM’s campaign elicited a response from the American Beverage 
Institute (ABI), a restaurant trade association. The ABI launched a direct mail campaign that 
urged members to boycott GM products or let GM know that they should not support MADD 
because people would end up getting arrested simply for drinking. Likewise, American Beverage 
Licensees (ABL) started “MADD at GM” to encourage its members to let GM know that it 
should not associate with MADD, an organization that ABL described as “radicalized.”796 If this 
counter campaign impacted sales, GM did not notice it. The GM Foundation is still a MADD 
supporter.797 GM’s PR made clear the driver error was a primary factor in automobile safety as 
far as GM was concerned. GM walked a careful line of praising safety innovations, while also 
reiterating that regulation was burdensome on the industry and that individual choice still 
mattered. Even when GM is engaging in CSR, it is reaffirming the industry narrative that 
individual choice and freedom are of more importance than social costs. 
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In this chapter, I demonstrated how GM used safetywashing to position itself as an 
advocate for safety, while lobbying the NHTSA and producing SUVs. I showed how the NHTSA 
is a “captured” agency that has acquiesced to the industry on many issues. The auto industry has 
continued to resist safety regulations and favored self-regulations that have a lower level of 
accountability. The NHTSA even relies on the auto industry to institute their own voluntary 
recalls. GM has lobbied the NHTSA while simultaneously using safetywashing to promote itself 
as a company concerned with consumer safety. GM’s safetywashing campaigns have focused on 
issues of driver behavior, such as learning to properly restrain a child or not drinking and driving. 
Their focus on driver behavior reinforces GM’s lobbying strategy by emphasizing that design is 
less important than choice. The exception to this was GM’s promotion of air bags, a technology 
that the automaker delayed thirty years. 
In chapter 4, I showed how GM’s ads sold SUVs by using financial promotions that were 
misleading. Consumers who entered dealerships likely did not quality for those promotions and 
may have ended up with a bad loan. This chapter showed how GM used misleading and 
dangerous PR to hide its true policy intentions. GM’s PR impacts consumer safety because 
consumers may not understand how to properly evaluate vehicle safety and regulators may miss 
safety issues. GM successfully sold SUVs during this period, despite the widespread criticism. 
Confusion about SUV safety has persisted because the commercial media system is flawed in its 
coverage of the industry, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 7. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Detroit reporters were unlikely to cover the SUV safety issue. Polling data 
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indicated that SUV drivers and non-drivers evaluated safety differently.798 Yet, safety was not 
the only issue GM faced in the 1990s and 2000s. Due to concerns about climate change, 
Congress suggested raising requirements for Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). GM 
approached CAFE the same way that it did SUV safety issues. In the next chapter, I discuss how 
GM was able to change the terms of the CAFE debate through greenwashing.  
  
                                                          




CHAPTER 6: GREENWASHING SUVS AND ANTI-CAFE LOBBYING  
Introduction  
While GM promoted its SUVs as safe, affordable vehicles, it also fought regulations 
aimed at making SUVs and other vehicles more fuel efficient. This chapter serves as a 
companion chapter to the previous chapter. After Ralph Nader’s success in the 1960 and 1970s, 
GM was forced to address auto safety and environmental regulations through PR and lobbying. 
In the decades since the NHTSA’s founding, GM and the auto industry “captured” the NHTSA. 
The captured agency has delayed rules on both auto safety and fuel economy. In this chapter, I 
argue that GM used “greenwashing” PR to distract from lobbying against Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations and promoting trucks and SUVs. GM and GMAC 
implemented CSR programs at the local level that were covered by local press; that coverage 
strengthened GM’s relationship with citizens in factory towns. Yet, these communities were 
often deprived of tax dollars by GM because of tax abatements and tax-deductible CSR 
programs; furthermore, CSR programs could not fully replicate lost social services. GM’s 
greenwashing and CSR has had a negative impact on fuel economy standards and the 
communities in which GM operates. Through lobbying and PR, GM reshaped the debate around 
CAFE. Today, GM’s legacy still impacts the debate over fuel economy standards continues.  
In this chapter, I first give background information on greenwashing and some key tactics 
that GM used. Then, I describe how GM lobbied against CAFE standards to contextualize GM’s 
greenwashing activities. I then describe GM’s greenwashing PR. I describe educational CSR 
programs targeted at universities and misleading PR about GM’s electric car, the EV1. Finally, I 
describe how GM partnered with Habitat for Humanity in GM communities while receiving tax 
breaks in those communities.  
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Background on Greenwashing 
As I described in chapter 3, the political realities of neoliberalism led to increases in 
spending on both CSR programs and corporate lobbying. This chapter expands that discussion by 
contrasting GM’s anti-CAFE lobbying with its corporate CSR. GM was a leader in greenwashing 
wherein corporations attempt to portray themselves or their products as environmentally friendly 
while misleading the public about their environmental impact.799  The Big 3 collaborated with 
the government on vehicle research that functioned as greenwashing. They also collaborated on 
lobbying against CAFE. This section briefly reviews some concepts related to greenwashing as a 
context for this chapter.  
As I described in chapter 3, GM regularly reported on CSR beginning in the 1970s.800 
After the creation of the NHTSA, auto safety and the environmental regulations became key 
areas of focus for GM’s PR. In nearly all the annual reports across two decades, GM reported on 
environmental issues, such as air pollution and alternative fuel sources.801 Consistent with my 
criticism of CSR in the previous chapter, GM simultaneously advocated for environmental issues 
while pursuing contradictory policy goals, such as lobbying against regulations that would limit 
air pollution.802 Corporate efforts to prevent accountability in environmental regulations 
routinely contradicted GM’s CSR. Over the decades, GM stalled CAFE regulations and 
exploited the light truck loophole to produce SUVs without being penalized under CAFE. GM’s 
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CSR was part of a larger corporate promotional communication strategy geared toward avoiding 
regulation and promoting SUV production.  
As described in the previous chapter, the “Communications and Marketing” staff at GM 
worked on GM’s PR, advertising, and communication programs to synchronize their goals. CSR 
programs typically fall under the purview of PR departments because they are strategic, but they 
are also frequently used for advertising purposes. Greenwashing refers to using PR, advertising, 
and other corporate communication to make the company appear to be environmentally 
conscious.803 Scholars have attested that an ad can be identified as greenwashing when is 
misleading or deceptive. For example, auto companies have engaged in greenwashing by 
claiming that “cars with catalytic converters … actually clean the atmosphere.”804 This is not 
factually accurate but misleads consumers into purchasing cars that they believe to be 
environmentally friendly. Greenwashed PR and advertising are often contradicted by other 
corporate behaviors, such as lobbying.  
 Greenwashing is frequently tied to CSR programs. Coke and Pepsi have promoted water 
conservation while using local sources of water and depriving communities of clean water.805 
The public might believe that Coke’s and Pepsi’s involvement in water conservation means that 
their consumption of those beverages does not negatively impact water use worldwide, even 
though it does. CSR programs may even be product-focused, such as GE’s “Ecomagination” 
products. These products may be slightly be “greener” than others, but they still contribute to 
pollution and unsustainable practices. Similarly, GM engaged in green marketing of its SUVs 
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and trucks, often associating them with the environment, as I described in chapter 4. In one such 
ad, GM displayed a truck among the California Redwoods and advertised a corporate donation to 
the Nature Conservancy. The ad argued that one could buy a truck and be environmentally 
conscious, despite the impact of trucks on the environment.806  These programs are examples of 
greenwashing.807  
As I described in the previous chapter, GM used strategic philanthropy, CSR, and other 
charitable programs as safetywashing to protect the auto industry from criticism. In this chapter, 
I discuss how GM also engaged in greenwashing by spending millions supporting education, 
particularly at universities. Beginning in the 1970s, GM invested in universities, focusing on 
business and engineering schools.808 Through these contributions, GM supported the future of 
the automotive engineering field and shaped the development of new technology in corporate 
interest. Some of GM’s contributions went toward engineering competitions to create greener 
vehicles. Yet, these technologies were often over-stated or far from implementation, so the 
technologies were more PR than reality.  
This dissertation has documented two parallel trends in the auto industry: SUVs and 
financing. As described in chapter 4, GM’s use of financial promotions was tied to its 
dependency on SUVs. The high return for SUVs meant that GM could still make money when 
financial promotions were used.809 Beyond SUVs, GM increased its profitability using GMAC’s 
mortgage industry operations. Through employee volunteerism efforts with Habitat for 
Humanity (Habitat), GM sought to bring GMAC into the auto manufacturing family. The Habitat 
partnership was a case of strategic philanthropy because it allowed GMAC to make loans to 
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Habitat chapters. Additionally, as with many CSR efforts, GM focused its Habitat for Humanity 
efforts on GM communities, such as Pontiac, Michigan. In this way, GM sought to use its CSR 
programs to improve the corporation’s relationship with the local community.810 Habitat home 
builds even garnered local press coverage, as I discuss below. Despite the positive press 
coverage, the Habitat project also reveals the downside of CSR when placed in the context of 
GM’s betrayal of communities through factory closures and tax abatements.  
Methods  
 Like the previous chapter, this chapter uses the press releases archived at the GM 
Heritage Center as a primary source of evidence. These press releases provide insight into the 
scope of the greenwashing campaigns and the narrative that GM hoped to present in its PR. 
Many historical studies of PR use press releases as a source of information because they are a 
basic component of campaigns.811 Press releases continue to be important as a source of 
information for news media today.812 As I described in the previous chapter, I collected 1753 
press releases from GM and GMAC spanning from January 2, 1990, to October 22, 2009, when 
the “New GM” was founded. 813  The paper releases were largely comprehensive. However, I 
sifted through the digital releases to collect releases pertaining to CSR. There were about 215 
CSR releases in the sample, most of which concerned safety and the environment.  
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To supplement this data, I use secondary sources, such as mainstream news and trade 
press coverage. I also consulted local news sources that covered CSR pseudo-events. These 
secondary sources give insight on how GM’s PR was received and how it was publicized. As 
with the previous chapter, I also used secondary literature to investigate the context and explore 
GM’s anti-CAFE lobbying. The secondary literate showed that GM promoted itself as pursuing 
green technology but did not want to be held accountable under CAFE. By placing CSR in its 
political context, I demonstrate how CSR served as greenwashing to benefit the corporation.814 
Anti-CAFE Lobbying  
 CAFE regulations were first implemented in 1975. The standards require automakers to 
meet fuel efficiency requirements across all vehicles sold. If an auto manufacturer sells more 
small cars, it is easier to meet the standards.815 However, CAFE standards also contained an 
exemption for light trucks, which were primarily used for business purposes when the 
regulations passed. Auto manufacturers abused the exemption to sell SUVs, so they skirted the 
rules. Environmentalists argued that the truck loophole undid the benefits of CAFE; auto 
manufacturers took this criticism as an attack against SUVs. This became a particular point of 
contention in the 1990s because SUVs and light trucks made up a large percentage of the Big 3’s 
sales and were key to their economic recovery in the mid-1990s.816 
Automakers have typically emphasized two arguments when fighting CAFE: consumer 
choice and the impact of fuel standards on U.S. auto manufacturers. First, auto manufacturers 
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have emphasized that CAFE standards prevent consumers from choosing the vehicles they want 
to drive by forcing them to drive more fuel-efficient vehicles. The implication is that fuel 
efficient vehicles are small sedans, in contrast to the large SUVs that many consumers prefer. 
This argument expanded with implications for consumer safety. Auto manufacturers alleged that 
small, fuel efficient cars were not as safe as SUVs. A General Motors Public Interest Report 
described how “customers’ preferences have shifted to larger, family-size vehicles and better-
performing engines.”817 What is left out is that GM and other auto manufacturers have spent 
billions of dollars marketing those vehicles and driving up demand for SUVs. Second, GM has 
emphasized that fuel economy means lost income and layoffs because U.S. auto manufacturers 
mostly manufacture SUVs and trucks that are negatively affected by CAFE standards.818 
Automakers worked for decades to fight CAFE using lobbying, front groups, and collaboration 
with the UAW to stall CAFE regulations. 
The U.S. auto industry used direct and indirect lobbying as part of its “obstructionist” 
opposition to CAFE.819 The industry used direct lobbying, a term that describes how 
corporations and others persuade members of Congress through personal communication, such 
as meetings on Capitol Hill. This kind of lobbying is tracked by federal reports. However, GM 
also engaged in indirect lobbying using its front groups, PR, and the GM Foundation. Through 
indirect lobbying, GM sought to change the opinions of the public and opinion leaders, like 
politicians, in ways that are not counted by federal reports, such as issue ads and PR events. As I 
described in the previous chapter, the GM Foundation also donated to the Heritage Foundation 
and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The foundation used money ostensibly meant for 
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philanthropy for public interest lobbying. Heritage and AEI served as powerful allies during the 
CAFE debate. 
GM was actively involved in a variety of corporate lobbying groups, including the 
Business Roundtable and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). The Business 
Roundtable was formed in 1972 by the merger of two other industry groups as described earlier 
in this dissertation. According to historian Benjamin C. Waterhouse, “it emerged in direct 
response to business’s crisis of confidence and quickly became a powerful symbol of business 
leaders’ desire to shape politics as well as an expression of their collective power.”820 General 
Motors had a presence in both groups that formed the Business Roundtable directly and in the 
March Group that influenced the early policy directions of the Business Roundtable, such as a 
focus on labor issues and inflation.821 The Business Roundtable was a key ally in the fight 
against CAFE and supports the privatization of education, a philosophy that drives GM’s 
involvement in university education.  
The campaign against CAFE was heavily funded. During the 1980s, “GM alone spent 
more than $1.8 million.”822 In addition, the auto industry has spent millions of dollars funding 
candidates and PACs. Politicians from Michigan, such as John “The Truck” Dingell, and other 
states tied to the auto industry have been particularly vocal in shooting down CAFE standards. 
Both the Bush and Clinton administrations largely acquiesced to industry concerns, particularly 
on the question of fuel economy. For example, when the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1990 was 
passed, it did not include fuel economy standards. While it was somewhat of a setback to the 
industry to update clean air standards, the industry had delayed the CAA for a decade when it 
                                                          
820 Waterhouse, Lobbying America, 78.  
821 Ibid., 102, 104. 
822 Peter Freund and George Martin, The Ecology of the Automobile (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993), 136. 
203 
 
was finally passed.823 Beyond compromises in legislation, the government also partnered with 
the auto industry which made auto industry lobbying even more effective. Through the 
Partnership for a New General of Vehicles, the U.S. auto manufacturers could say that they were 
working on developing future cars and used their relationship with the administration to prevent 
new CAFE requirements.824 Auto manufacturers were also aided by its national network of 
dealers. With dealers in nearly every congressional district, dealer opposition can be a powerful 
ally. Despite tension with the UAW throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the UAW also served as a 
powerful ally; the union also partnered with GM’s front group, the Coalition for Vehicle Choice, 
as I discuss later in this chapter.825  
 Since 1998, General Motors has spent about $10 million lobbying annually.826 Since 
2012, GM has increased its election spending from about $785,000 to just over $2.4 million and 
has donated to both Democrats and Republicans.827 GM’s size, spending, and history has made it 
a leader in its industry; GM’s efforts are representative of the strategies of the U.S. auto 
manufacturers during this period. The auto industry succeeded in delaying CAFE and lowering 
requirements. By 2006, Toyota joined the U.S. auto manufacturers in fighting CAFE.828 The 
delay in reforming the U.S. transportation system has led to disastrous consequences for 
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.     
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The auto industry used front groups to shift public opinion and lobby against CAFE. 
Front groups became an important tool in corporate lobbying in the 1990s and 2000s, but they 
originated decades earlier. In 1920s and 1930s, Edward Bernays created the first front group, a 
group that appeared to be a public interest group but was created by a public relations firm and 
financed by corporate partners.829 Bernays used front groups in support of the Tobacco 
Industry.830 Carl Byoir has also been credited with the invention of front groups for creating a 
front group for railroad companies to lobby against trucking regulations. A Supreme Court case 
concerning the railroad front groups ruled that the front groups were deceptive but not illegal. 
Although front groups declined in popularity over the course the twentieth century, they grew in 
popularity during the 1990s. They are “typically transient in nature, reflecting their often single-
issue focus.”831 The name of group is usually stylized as “Citizens for [Something Good].” GM 
used the Coalition for Vehicle Choice (CVC), a front group that supported SUVs, to promote the 
idea that CAFE regulations would make consumers unsafe. CVC’s arguments served as 
safetywashing for SUVs by perpetuating that SUVs were safe; the CVC was effective not only at 
shaping public opinion but also effectively lobbied Congress. Through CVC, GM was able to 
effectively change the terms of debate around CAFE.  
The Coalition for Vehicle Choice (CVC) was a front group created by PR firm E. Bruce 
Harrison for a few major players in the auto industry, including the National Automobile Dealers 
Association and the three U.S. auto manufacturers.832 The E. Bruce Harrison firm not only 
supported GM’s PR efforts but also supported a host of other anti-environment PR efforts. The 
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firm also worked for the Business Roundtable, which made it a key player in the rise of corporate 
anti-environment PR in the 1990s.833 Although the group described itself as having citizens as 
members and the name “Coalition” implied broad membership, it was funded by auto 
manufacturers, the National Auto Dealers Association, and other industry groups interested in 
preventing fuel economy legislation. The CVC was also aided by the “revolving door” between 
federal agencies and corporate lobbying. The head of the CVC was Diane Steed, who had once 
led the NHTSA.834 Although the group was formed in 1991, there are no lobbying records prior 
to the implementation of the Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1996. In 1998, the group spent only a 
few thousand dollars; in 1999, it spent $60,000. But, in 2000, as debate over CAFE regulations 
again heated up, the group spent nearly $1 million.835 Funding declined again in 2001, consistent 
with the observation that front groups are usually single-issue groups that are transient.836  
However, the lobbying numbers do not tell the full story. CVC reportedly received “more 
than $10 million” from the auto industry.837 In addition to lobbying, the CVC also sponsored ads, 
such as one claiming that small cars were less safe than large ones that garnered a Harlan Page 
Hubbard Lemon Award for worst advertisement in 1991.838 The CVC also attempted to stymie 
environmentalists’ attempts to alert consumers to the auto manufacturers’ campaign against fuel 
efficiency. In 1993, the Energy Conservation Coalition (ECC), part of Environmental Action put 
out a PSA about CAFE debate. The CVC contacted hundreds of stations that aired a PSA to 
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pressure them to stop airing it.839 Some stations resisted the pressure from the auto industry, but 
there are few reports to determine how many stations caved to corporate pressure.  
GM and CVC used issue ads that frame the terms of debate and are often published in 
newspapers alongside news coverage.840 With increasing environmental criticism, many 
corporations sought to change the terms of the debate. Corporations poured more money into 
their ad campaigns than non-profits could.841 Along with GM’s other PR efforts, issue ads helped 
reframe CAFE as an issue of safety versus the environment. GM also tied lobbying to corporate 
communities by holding PR pseudo-events at factories that to promote the idea that CAFE 
regulations would result in job losses.842 Despite their contentious relationship with GM during 
the 1990s and 2000s because of whipsawing, as described in chapter 2, the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) was actively involved in lobbying against CAFE.  
 GM, the CVC, and the UAW worked together to exert pressure on lawmakers; they 
argued that CAFE policies would destroy state and local economies. A 1991 “vehicle fuel 
economy exhibition” in Washington, D.C. featured a car signed by thousands of employees from 
Wentzville, Missouri, plant; the Baltimore, Maryland, plant; and the North Tarrytown, New 
York, plant.843 Three press releases about the event were identical except for the location and 
workers mentioned. However, the production of individual releases means that they were likely 
meant to be published in local news sources. Local coverage may have encouraged community 
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members to advocate on behalf of GM. The CVC was able to localize and personalize the fuel 
economy debate through its partnership with the UAW. 
The press release purported that these workers “are concerned that production of these 
vehicles and their jobs would be endangered if the proposed fuel economy legislation is 
enacted.”844 UAW representatives from each factory were also present. The potential impact 
voting against the powerful UAW and its thousands of organized workers was imparted on 
politicians who had to walk past UAW workers on their way to Capitol Hill. Congress struggled 
to pass CAFE legislation because it was opposed by both labor and industry leaders.  
In addition to tying CAFE to the destruction of state and local economies, CVC also 
argued that CAFE standards would negatively affect consumer safety. Auto manufacturers 
claimed that CAFE standards mandated the production of smaller cars that would be less safe 
than SUVs. The auto manufacturers and CVC pushed the argument with such force that the 
terms of the debate become centered around vehicle safety: “Following the lead of the CVC, the 
Bush Senior Administration started calling a 1991 CAFE reform bill the ‘Highway Fatality Act’ 
and the ‘National Highway Death Act.’”845 Furthermore, the emphasis on safety was even 
emphasized by the NHTSA, responsible for regulating the auto industry. Yet, the NHTSA 
effectively used the auto industry’s narrative about CAFE’s impact on safety in their own 
communication: “NHTSA created a voiceover for a crash-test film, warning that tighter fuel-
economy rules could lead to more deaths on the road.”846 Furthermore, the NHTSA footage was 
then used in CVC advertising. In the end, the footage was revealed to be misleading because of 
the complicated relationship between SUVs and safety.  
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After failing to pass CAFE legislation in 1990 and 1991, the Clinton Administration 
collaborated with auto manufacturers in the Partnership for a New General of Vehicles. The 
stated goal of the multi-million dollar partnership was for the national laboratories and U.S. auto 
manufacturers to collaborate to produce a vehicle capable of getting 80 miles per gallon.847 
However, the collaboration meant that the administration did not push for improving current fuel 
economy, instead focusing on a future car in development. Beginning in 1994, the NHTSA was 
prohibited from considering fuel economy rules. Ultimately, CAFE averages declined during the 
Clinton Administration because of the influx of SUVs and trucks.848 U.S. manufacturers 
presented their technological solutions to an awaiting public, while stalling on implementing 
solutions or facing accountability in the form of CAFE regulations. 
In the 2002, fuel economy came under serious debate for the first-time in a decade.849 
The 2002 CAFE debate again centered over safety and consumer choice, two lines of reasoning 
initiated by the auto industry and the CVC. This time, opponents of fuel economy standards 
supported their arguments with a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and Department of 
Transportation study that showed increased deaths from increased fuel efficiency standards 
under CAFE. However, the report was misleading because the NAS did not support that 
conclusion.850 The McCain-Kerry amendment that would have raised fuel economy standards to 
36 mpg by 2015 was defeated after a Senate floor debate that centered on safety. By 2002, 
corporate talking points about safety had altered the terms of the CAFE debate. The auto industry 
was able to shift the fight over CAFE to fight over safety, a fight that it could more easily win.  
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GM’s success is remarkable in part because the NAS and Department of Transportation 
report concluded that CAFE standards should be raised. Yet, excerpts from the report would 
continue to be used by opponents of CAFE. The NAS and Department of Transportation also 
acknowledged that U.S. auto manufacturers would be negatively affected by the standards; the 
report concluded that CAFE standards should be adjusted appropriately by adopting different 
standards based on the size of the vehicle, effectively perpetuating the truck loophole. Yet, the 
report was another area where the auto industry influenced its captive regulator. Despite the 
obvious conflict of interest, the CVC participated in some meetings about the report.851 The auto 
industry was able to shape an official government report to its advantage and use key statements 
from the report to support the idea that auto safety and fuel economy were not complementary 
goals.  
GM’s allies at AEI and the Heritage Foundation promoted the idea that consumers had 
the freedom to choose to drive an SUV, regardless of the safety and environmental impacts. In an 
article published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, James K. Glassman, who was a both a journalist 
and an AEI fellow, argued “As a simple matter of personal freedom and consumer choice, it 
should not be up to the government to determine how many miles my car can travel on a gallon 
of gasoline.”852 His line of reasoning followed the auto industry’s PR exactly. Glassman argued 
that “Higher CAFE standards mean lighter cars, and lighter cars are less safe.”853 Further, the 
higher CAFE standards would even be a direct attack against GM, “a cruel irony” because of 
their 0% financing offers at September 11. A similar article from AEI published in the National 
Journal also cited the flawed NAS report. The article stated, correctly, that women wanted SUVs 
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because they felt safe but did not clarify that large, high SUVs were not as safe as claimed.854 
These arguments were also advanced by the Heritage Foundation. The GM Foundation’s 
charitable donations to AEI and Heritage returned dividends during the CAFE debate.855  
GM continued to use its workers a political tool to exert pressure on lawmakers. In 2002, 
GM held town halls in company towns to convey to those communities the threat that CAFE 
posed to GM. The town halls were held at plants in Pontiac, Michigan; Toledo, Ohio; and 
Janesville, Wisconsin. Like the UAW and CVC event in DC, these town halls emphasized that 
CAFE would result in job losses. The town halls were also a clear collaboration between GM 
and the UAW because officials from both groups spoke.856 GM Vice President Guy Briggs 
stated, “No pickup, van or SUV GM builds today could survive the higher requirements.”857 
Similarly, UAW International Vice President Richard Shoemaker said that the CAFE policy was 
biased toward Japanese manufacturers, a key talking point for GM. When GM needed to, it 
flexed its technological muscle to make green engineering changes happen, such as the 
production of the EV1 electric car discussed later in this chapter. However, in the face of CAFE 
standards, GM claimed those standards were unfair and would favor foreign manufacturers. U.S. 
auto manufacturers’ choice to focus on building and marketing SUVs meant that they had ceded 
the market for cars to Japanese manufacturers. At the same time, GM wanted to be recognized as 
environmentally friendly for producing an electric vehicle and working on hydrogen fuel cells. 
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Anti-CAFE lobbying shows that GM had no intention of building electric cars unless it had to. 
Later, GM would produce the Chevy Volt to justify receiving bailout money.  
The 2002 CAFE debate demonstrates how GM shifted the terms of debate to safety and 
CAFE. Consumer advocates, like Public Citizen, worked to disprove GM’s arguments and 
pointed out that GM made “broken promises” on fuel economy before. The industry argued that 
fuel economy should be subject to market concerns, the same logic that industry used to avoid 
regulation for decades. However, the industry had improved fuel economy on their own.858 
Unfortunately for Public Citizen, the industry’s position that fuel economy should be subject to 
the market was emphasized by senators tied to the auto industry or other conservative groups 
during hearings and in newspapers.859 The auto industry’s arguments received wide support from 
other industry groups and conservative organizations. The Competitive Enterprise Institute 
(CEI), a think tank that supports free enterprise and conservative thought, often appeared in 
newspapers and debates about fuel economy. Because CEI appears independent, it may have 
appeared more credible than industry groups fighting CAFE.860 For example, an article from 
CEI’s Sam Kazman published in the Wall Street Journal disputed data that SUVs were unsafe 
and accused the New York Times of propagating misinformation about SUVs.861 The industry 
shifted CAFE from an environmental debate to a safety debate, where experts feuded over what 
vehicles are safe. This strategy muddies the water and confuses consumers as demonstrated by 
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the polling data that indicates that SUV owners believe SUVs to be safer than non-owners do.862 
In the end, Congress and the NHTSA delayed CAFE again.  
By 2006, with a Democratic majority in both houses, CAFE found its way to the floor of 
Congress, where the auto industry faced a tougher compromise. The industry returned to the tired 
arguments that had saved it in the past, but this time the U.S. auto industry was joined by a 
surprising ally – Toyota. Despite its well-received Prius, Toyota began selling profitable trucks 
and SUVs, so CAFE standards were harmful to the corporation’s bottom line.863 The Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers, a trade association in which the U.S. manufacturers and Toyota were 
members, financed a million-dollar ad campaign aimed at persuading representatives in key 
states to vote against CAFE.864 The ad campaign returned to the CVC’s argument of consumer 
choice and safety. According to Automotive News, “One radio spot, with sounds of children 
playing in the background, two women discuss the threat the legislation poses to safe family 
vehicles. One of them says: ‘Automakers are going to be forced to build smaller and smaller 
cars.’”865 The ad emphasized to consumers that their families would be put at risk through small 
cars. Other ads emphasized that auto manufacturers sold a variety of vehicles, including trucks 
that were used by tradespeople like farmers, implying that the ever-popular American farmer was 
at risk from CAFE legislation.866  
Yet, the auto industry’s traditional appeals missed their mark. In 2006, oil prices were 
higher than they had been in 2002 or the early 1990s. Consumers were concerned about the cost 
of oil; more fuel-efficient vehicles would help them spend less. In addition, a new contingent had 
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emerged: Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE). Created by ex-military leaders and 
corporate executives, SAFE argued that dependence on foreign oil was a national security 
problem. Amid a costly war and a hike in gas prices, the industry was forced to argue that other 
corporate leaders and ex-military officials were wrong about a national security problem.867   
The auto industry’s Congressional allies made clear that compromise would be in the best 
interests of the auto industry. In the end, the industry and its allies backed less stringent CAFE 
rules that lowered the fuel efficiency target and created different standards based on vehicle 
size.868 Because the compromise protected SUVs and trucks with different standards, the auto 
manufacturers were joined by their allies from the National Automobile Dealers Association 
(NADA).869 Conservative groups also came out to support the compromise. The Business 
Roundtable offered its support for the compromise bills, stating that “strengthening CAFE 
standards can play an important role in improving vehicle fuel economy, but the CAFE increases 
in the Senate bill are unrealistic and will impose hardship on the domestic auto industry and 
American consumers.”870 After over a decade of debate, CAFE standards were finally raised 
with the blessing of the auto industry.  
Political change and widespread belief in global warming led to the passage of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. Yet, the EISA still incorporated “safety 
concerns” that were corporate propaganda. Under the Act, NHTSA could alter CAFE standards 
to prioritize auto safety. The auto industry fundamentally altered CAFE regulation by inserting 
                                                          
867 Michelle Maynard, “Politics Forcing Detroit to Back New Fuel Rules,” New York Times, June 20, 2007. 
868 Ibid. 
869 Harry Stoffer, “NADA’s Lobbying Goal in D.C.: Make ‘trying Times’ Less So,” Automotive News 82, no. 6272 
(September 10, 2007): 10. 




its safety argument into the legislation. 871 The inclusion of the safety loophole was a massive 
success for the auto industry. Given the industry’s success at working with its primary regulator, 
the safety loophole gives the industry an additional option for lobbying against CAFE in the 
future.  
The CAFE system under EISA did not exclude SUVs. Instead, EISA created a “terraced” 
system based on size.872 SUVs and light trucks had different fuel efficiency targets than cars. In 
addition, the average no longer covered the whole fleet. The “terraced” system allowed auto 
manufacturers to produce SUVs and light trucks while being CAFE compliant. The auto industry 
had agreed to new standards, but those standards allowed them to continue to produce SUVs and 
trucks without facing federal penalties. Furthermore, the auto industry convinced the Bush 
administration EPA to challenge California’s authority to set its own emission standards, which 
it had had under the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970.873 The Big 3 also received access to 
$25 billion low-interest loans to modify existing facilities to produce more fuel efficient vehicles. 
These loans came under scrutiny during the TARP debate.  
Despite American’s love of SUVs, many Americans support fuel economy regulations 
and government programs to develop fuel efficient cars. In 2006, shortly before passage of the 
industry’s CAFE regulations, 84% of Americans wanted the government to provide support to 
develop fuel efficient vehicles.874 In 2009, 79% of Americans supported President Obama’s fuel 
economy standards. Yet, that same year, most Americans felt that economic growth was more 
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important than the environment.875 These polls demonstrate that Americans view the economy 
and the environment as competing choices; this supposed dichotomy is a key talking point of the 
auto industry.  
The U.S. auto industry has long argued that fuel economy standards will cause job losses 
and lower profits for the auto industry. The oil and gas industry, among others, have similarly 
argued that environmental regulations will lead to job losses and industry destruction. Although 
the American public now favors environmental regulation over economic growth, by 65% to 
30%, support has dropped since 1991 when 71% of Americans thought environmental 
regulations were more important than economic growth.876 Over time, the auto industry and its 
allies have made in-roads on American environmental policy. Yet, American support for higher 
fuel economy standards rarely came up in the debates in the 1990s and 2000s. Instead, the auto 
industry pointed to SUV sales as evidence that Americans did not want fuel efficiency 
regulations. What went unsaid in this argument is that the auto industry created the market for 
SUVs in the 1990s to exploit a CAFE loophole and succeeded in selling them because of 
financial promotions. Yet, the auto industry insists that Americans cannot be sold on electric 
vehicles despite doing none of the promotional work necessary to do so.  
Although the CVC no longer exists, the tactics for fighting fuel economy standards 
remain the same. In 2018, President Trump issued a rule maintaining current fuel economy 
standards through 2026. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) issued a statement 
supporting Trump’s rule, stating, “a recent rulemaking by the Trump administration promotes 
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greater choice and affordability for car buying.”877 ALEC also produced a state resolution 
emphasizing the same points.878 Like CVC did decades ago, ALEC supports industry narrative of 
affordability and choice. The “choice” to drive a traditional SUV is situated against federal laws 
controlling that choice, even though higher fuel efficiency standards might lead to better 
offerings, such as electric SUVs.879  
Greenwashing  
 GM’s PR and CSR programs concerning the environment generally fall into two 
categories: technological advancements and university education. GM primarily greenwashed 
through releases about new technology. Although widely reported in the mainstream news 
outlets and trade press publications, these innovations did not ultimately reflect changes in GM’s 
production or marketing strategies. Educational programs and student competitions were the 
second method through which GM greenwashed. These programs enabled GM to reach out to 
future engineers and provide support to university programs, which helped develop GM’s 
relationship with universities and promoted a neoliberal vision of education. These events were 
primarily covered by the trade press and academic journals.  
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 The primary way in which GM greenwashed was through early reports about 
technological developments. While these technological developments were true, they were over-
shadowed by GM’s commitment to SUVs and to lobbying against CAFE regulations. GM 
promoted two developments in the 1990s and 2000s that were more PR than technical change: 
electric cars and hydrogen fuel cells. GM’s famous electric car, the EV1, was notoriously 
dumped in the Arizona desert after being briefly available to consumers. The only EV1 left in 
existence is currently on display at the National Museum of American History as the “first 
modern electric car designed for a mass market,” a title GM claims even though the car was only 
available for lease in California and Arizona for a few years.”880 Toyota has recently made a 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicle available in California. GM has yet to sell a hydrogen car, despite 
publicizing its experiments with hydrogen widely in the 1990s. Both methods appealed to the 
“environmental movement’s fascination with technological fixes” in the 1990s.881 The industry 
paradoxically promoted its environmentally friendly developments, while focusing its sales 
efforts on the SUV and lobbying against regulations that would require the environmentally 
conscious technologies to be implemented.  
 While CAFE governs national fuel economy regulations, California can set its own air 
quality and fuel efficiency standards that other states can adopt. In 1990, the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) set off a flurry of concern in the auto industry by calling for auto 
manufacturers to produce zero-emissions vehicles (ZEV).882 Manufacturers would have to design 
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and produce hundreds of thousands of ZEVs in just over 10 years, a target that the auto industry 
described as impractical. This prompted lobbying against the ZEV mandate in California. At the 
same time, the ZEV mandate prompted GM to experiment with the EV1 in California and 
Arizona.883   
 GM’s famous EV1 began as the Impact. In a 1990 press release, GM Chairman Roger B. 
Smith proclaimed, “(The Impact) is part of our threefold mission to care for our customers, to 
care for the environment, and to be the industry’s technology leader.”884 GM billed itself as an 
innovator with a historical legacy, citing its electric truck produced in 1916 when electric 
vehicles were more common. However, Smith stated that GM did not plan to produce the Impact 
for a few years. The announcement was a PR gambit to show that GM understood the needs of 
its customers, despite its reputation for large, gas-guzzling vehicles. The Impact was received 
well by the audience at the event and by the press. Smith indicated that GM was still looking into 
whether it was feasible to manufacture the Impact, though the auto manufacturer would not 
manufacture it unless it was clear that people wanted to purchase the vehicle.885 GM’s pursuit of 
the Impact was not based on altruism or a desire to do the right thing. It was about sales, 
combined with a desire to boost GM’s reputation among young, environmentally conscious 
drivers. 
 By 1991, GM had decided that producing the Impact was worthwhile. GM again touted 
its “history of environmental leadership in the auto industry.”886 The vehicle was supposed to be 
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produced in Lansing, Michigan. Yet, the following year, the Impact had not yet been put into 
production. In 1992, GM announced that the Impact would be tested with public utilities and 
local governments before being put on the market.887 In a press release, GM attempted to balance 
the “public’s interest in EVs” with perceived market feasibility of the vehicle. GM always 
emphasized that the vehicle would not be produced if there were no market for such a vehicle. 
This allowed GM to cancel production if necessary, by citing lack of interest. While electric 
vehicles are cautiously promoted in light of interest, SUVs were routinely seen as marketable 
and desirable.  
 In 1993, GM moved into the next phase of testing the Impact by making 50 vehicles 
available for two to four weeks. The release emphasized the cooperation between government 
and industry. However, GM continued to hedge on the possibilities by claiming “we still have a 
lot to learn to be able to mass produce an electric vehicle in volume and market and sell it in a 
customer driven marketplace.”888  While GM continued to promote itself as a leader in electric 
vehicle technology, the Impact was always placed in the context of market demand and a future 
yet to come. Beginning in 1994, customers in Los Angeles participated in the testing, known as 
the General Motors PrEView Drive Program. Consumers liked the cars, according to GM, but 
the biggest issues were concerns about when and how much to charge the car, concerns that still 
resonate with electric vehicle users.889 These concerns could be solved by investments in public 
infrastructure, which might be siphoned off from subsidies for oil and gas.  
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 In 1996, GM announced that it would be marketing the electric vehicle, now called the 
EV1, and an electric truck. Both vehicles would be available in limited markets in California and 
Arizona.890 In October 1996, GM announced that the EV1 could be leased from Saturn for about 
$34,000 for 36 months.891 After November 1996, there was no mention of the EV1 or any 
electric vehicle in the GM press releases until the Volt was announced in 2008 when GM was 
facing bankruptcy.892 Based on press release data, it would appear that the EV1 did not happen or 
was simply poorly received. However, the EV1 was good publicity for GM, but it amounted to 
little more than PR. Likewise, the Volt offered an opportunity to change GM’s lineup, and, like 
the EV1, showed GM as a forward-thinking company, even as most of its product lineup stayed 
remarkably similar to the glut of SUVs and trucks in the 1990s and 2000s.  
Automotive News reported that GM spent $8 million promoting the EV1 in California and 
Arizona. The campaign featured an ad produced by Industrial Light and Magic that included a 
gadget similar to R2D2, the Star Wars droid, in which the EV1 is greeted by electric appliances. 
According to the article, one goal was to “position GM as an innovative technical leader.”893 U.S. 
News and World Report even echoed this sentiment, describing in detail how GM had carefully 
chosen potential customers who “are environmentally conscious, between 35 and 54 and well 
educated, have household incomes of more than $125,000, and are willing to take chances on 
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new technology.”894 In national publications, the EV1 was greeted as the future of automotive 
travel. GM’s PR and advertising were working.  
The EV1 was so well-received that there were even waiting lists to drive one.895 Two 
reviews of the EV1 even invoked George Jetson of the space-age animated sitcom The Jetsons. 
The reviews were overwhelmingly positive. Most praised how quiet the vehicle was and how 
futuristic it looked. One reviewer in the Christian Science Monitor wrote, “Now that my EV1 is 
gone, I ride in vibrating, noisy, gas-spewing vehicles that feel like clunkers by comparison.”896 
Despite the multimillion dollar ad campaign, GM produced only 600 vehicles in the first year 
and leased about half of those.897 As I described in chapter 4, leasing is often used by people in 
upper income brackets whom GM was targeting with the EV1. GM eventually lowered the cost, 
but the car was still only available in California and Arizona where there were a limited number 
of charging stations.898 In addition to the leasing costs, the customer also leased the vehicle 
charger, which potentially required customers to upgrade the wiring in their homes.899 Despite 
the drawbacks, the EV1 represented good publicity for GM as a technological wonder that would 
herald in a new era of automobiles.  
Although the reception of the EV1 was largely positive, customers complained about the 
range of the vehicle and feared being stranded with a dead battery. An Automotive News editorial 
described the EV1 as a “Noble Effort by GM” but criticized the range of the vehicle.900 Yet, GM 
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quickly met the concerns about the EV1’s range by upgrading the battery for both the EV1 and 
the electric S10 pickup.901 Battery costs were still high, and GM still limited the electric vehicle 
to California and Arizona. In 2000, GM ceased production of the EV1. However, GM offered 
another futuristic vehicle at the Detroit auto show that year—a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle.902  
GM’s hydrogen fuel cell test vehicle received less attention but used a similar logic to the EV1. 
No functional hydrogen fuel cell vehicles were produced by GM in the mid-2000s, despite 
claims a vehicle would be available “no later than 2004.”903 Auto manufacturers use auto shows 
to demonstrate technological concepts that may never come to fruition while lobbying against 
fuel efficiency regulations. This greenwashing practice attempts to convince consumers that a 
futuristic end to pollution is not that far off while ensuring that the status quo is protected.    
The EV1 has a somewhat mixed legacy among auto industry observers and 
environmentalists. The EV1 was often described in glowing terms as “cute, quick, and fun to 
drive.”904 However, it has also been described as a market failure. In 2004, GM claimed that the 
EV1 was only a test that taught them a lot and even rewrote history. In response to the question 
“When did GM get serious about alternative fuel vehicles and developing this technology?” a 
GM executive stated in an interview with the trade publication Automotive News, “about 70 
years ago with diesel electric trains. We were in production with electric vehicles in the 
1910s.”905 Just as in the early EV1 releases, GM rewrote its corporate history. While many 
vehicles in the early twentieth century used electricity, GM never seriously developed or 
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produced electric vehicles. The GM executive argued the EV1 was “never intended to be a profit 
unit…we felt the learning and some of the image that we would create by producing a vehicle of 
that type was worth the investment that we were going to make.”906 This statement emphasizes 
that the EVI was about the image that it would cultivate for GM. The EV1 was only for sale in a 
few markets and was only targeted to a particular customer. It was not a mass market vehicle, 
despite initial claims that it would be.907 Despite its low sales, it generated buzz in the trade press 
and the popular press for years because of its technological potential. In the end, the EV1 appears 
more PR than vehicle, particularly considering GM’s continued to commitment to SUVs and 
trucks and its lobbying campaign against fuel economy.  
Environmentalists saw possibilities in the EV1 and hydrogen fuel cell concept vehicles. 
Mother Earth News praised the EV1 in 2000, just before it was discontinued, as a “sleek two 
seater” that “has been redesigned and improved upon for nearly ten years.”908 In what seems like 
naiveté, the article further opined that the “growing popularity of alternative-fuel cars” must 
make oil companies nervous and predicted that “the institutionalization of the air-friendly auto 
may finally have graduated from environmental fantasy to the assembly line.”909 Mother Earth 
News had reason to suspect that the tide of vehicles might be turning. Although GM only leased 
the EV1 in a couple of places and produced about 1,000 of them, the car was popular with those 
who leased it. In 2002, EV1 owners in California pleaded with GM to keep their cars. Even the 
trade magazine Automotive News observed, “That creates an odd spectacle. GM is mounting a 
major product offensive to stir passion for its car lines, yet it is rebuffing an admittedly miniscule 
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group of hyper-loyal customers.”910 The EV1’s legacy was in dispute: beloved by owners but 
unavailable for purchase. Further, its legacy was complicated the California emissions standards 
and GM’s lobbying campaign to change them.  
GM’s EV1 was positioned as an outcome of California’s mandate for zero emissions 
vehicles.911 The trade press argued that California was at fault for the problems of the EV1 and 
reflected the recurring criticism that California had forced electric vehicles into existence even 
though consumers did not want them: 
Everybody wants clean air. The way to achieve it is to establish reasonable clean air 
standards that give automakers technological leeway for meeting them. GM developed 
the EV1 in part to meet California’s requirement for zero-emissions autos. The state 
believed it somehow could repeal the laws of physics. There is a clear lesson in all of this 
for the Bush administration, which seems bent on using public policy to make fuel cells 
the next wonder technology, not by regulation but by underwriting fuel cell research with 
tax dollars. That’s a mistake, too. Ultimately, the technology to give us all clean air must 
come from choices made by the automakers and their customers.912 
This logic tied directly into the auto industry’s opposition to CAFE and California’s 
environmental regulations. The industry routinely claimed that the market would support neither 
electric vehicles nor gas vehicles with better fuel economy. Americans were simply unwilling to 
pay for such vehicles. Furthermore, forcing these vehicles on the market would lead to the death 
of the Big 3.913 Even the EV1, which GM touted as the beginning of an era, was only meant for a 
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small market. GM’s technological developments were real, but they were outpaced by GM’s 
commitment to the sale of SUVs and trucks. The EV1 was an attempt to convince younger 
buyers that GM cared about the environment. GM somewhat succeeded at the time. However, its 
legacy became tainted because environmentalists felt that GM was not committed to the 
development of electric vehicles.   
The auto industry now produces more electric vehicles, but those vehicles are still vastly 
outnumbered by traditional gas vehicles. Unfortunately, the auto industry may find it difficult to 
continue dragging their feet. Auto manufacturers have shown that they can produce vehicles 
which meet fuel economy standards, regardless of size. Yet, they have continued to argue that 
the fuel economy standards have a negative impact on their profitability and employment levels. 
Further, auto manufacturers argue that there is an “affordability limit,” so consumers simply will 
not purchase electric vehicles.914 When the EV1 was released, GM argued that affordability was 
the reason it was not more popular, even though it was only released in a few cities in two states. 
Today, there are only a few electric and hybrid options. However, these vehicles are less 
advertised than SUVs and trucks. Without advertising, alternative vehicles will have a hard time 
outselling their gas-guzzling competitors. Today, technology still holds a place as a 
greenwashing tactic. GM has suggested that it can produce a hydrogen cell vehicle soon. Yet, 
this claim is similar to those made 20 years ago, leading to questions of how long the industry 
will continue to greenwash while profiting from traditional gas vehicles.   
                                                          




The second way that GM greenwashed was through funding for University programs and 
engineering contests. First, through educational funding, GM tied engineering programs to GM’s 
product development and enabled the company to outsource some of its research and 
development to universities. The program fulfilled GM’s need to showcase its investment in 
environmentally friendly technologies and furthered the privatization of education. Second, GM 
established vehicle design competitions for university students in which they worked with 
government agencies, including the Department of Energy and the National Highway and Traffic 
Safety Administration, its primary safety regulator. Through these competitions, GM promoted 
the corporation’s commitment to the environment and green technology.  
GM has been involved in education since the post-war period when the Council for Aid 
to Education (CAE) was established.915 The CAE was founded to counter the growth of federal 
funding for education by marshaling corporate support. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
GM’s philanthropy acts a “a vehicle for preventing or stemming the growth of the welfare state” 
and influences the content and outcomes of education.916 In addition to CAE, GM has also been a 
long-term member of the Business Roundtable. The Business Roundtable’s goals in education 
also align with the larger goals of neoliberalism, including privatization of the public sector and 
public education.917 Beginning in the early 1980s, conservative forces reshaped American 
education toward “economic competitiveness,” “business involvement,” and other standards 
geared toward quantifying education and its economic impact.918 GM’s push for involvement in 
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education goes along with other conservative reforms that reframe education as job training, in 
contrast to broad, liberal education.  
 Situated within this larger movement for privatization of public education, GM sought to 
encourage engineering and mathematics education with a focus on the automotive industry by 
donating money to a variety of universities for research, labs, and projects. By providing support 
to universities, GM achieved two goals. First, GM furthered the privatization of public schools. 
They pushed universities toward private funding and re-situated the university in the light of job 
training and economic growth, rather than broader educational goals. Second, GM aligned 
university research with its goals, including using engineering research for greenwashing.  
 GM marshalled most of its corporate philanthropy to support university-level education. 
In 1990, GM reported spending about $40 million on educational projects and $21 million on 
non-educational projects.919 Similarly, in 1994, GM reported spending about $64 million total of 
which half went to education.920 GM continued to spend millions on education in the years 
following.921 About 80% of GM’s donations for higher education went toward science and 
engineering education.922 GM focused on prestigious education institutions, such as 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which bolstered the prestige of GM’s donations.923 
The press releases did not disclose what universities were expected to do after receiving the 
money or what stipulations were placed on the donations. However, other PR materials reveal 
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more about the relationship between GM and recipient universities. For example, GM sponsored 
the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change.924 The program ostensibly 
supports research at MIT related to climate change, yet it also served as another greenwashing 
cover for GM. MIT grants the program legitimacy and produces a plethora of research covering 
various viewpoints on environmental policy. Without much description of the program, a 
customer or shareholder might assume that GM is doing its due diligence on climate change. 
GM also participated in The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC) that 
opposed the Kyoto Protocol. GM worked alongside coal, oil, gas, and other industries to oppose 
the Kyoto Protocol on multiple grounds.925 The opponents of the Kyoto Protocol argued that 
developed countries were over-burdened under the plan.926 In 2000, the Joint Program raised 
doubts that the Kyoto Protocol was fair to all countries.927 This argument follows a similar logic 
to the corporate opposition to the Kyoto Protocol. The Joint Program is one example of how GM 
and other corporations could influence research. Paradoxically, GM’s support of this research 
was cited as environmentally conscious CSR and evidence that “[GM] agrees that the potential 
consequences of global climate change are cause for concern, and… require responsible 
actions.”928 However, GM also worked against this by opposing the Kyoto Protocol and 
environmental regulations. Like GM’s promotion of the EV1, there was some truth that GM was 
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doing something, but the corporation’s green activities were undercut by other corporate 
practices, making its CSR greenwashing.  
Beyond university donations, GM also supported university efforts through scholarships 
and awards for students. For example, University of Michigan students were honored for their 
volunteerism with the GM Volunteer Spirit Award. GM Chairman Roger B. Smith described the 
importance of supporting university education in the release: “It's in the interests of both 
businesses and universities to stimulate leading-edge research, and to see the America's 
scientists, engineers and managers are the best trained and most creative in the world.”929 GM 
offered support to individual students within Michigan. By selecting Michigan students, GM 
demonstrated the corporation’s commitment to Michigan and the importance of the automotive 
industry in Michigan. Smith’s remarks also emphasize that even volunteerism is not about the 
community but about developing a competent workforce.  
In addition to donations and scholarships, GM also donated equipment to universities. 
Two days after the GM release about the Volunteer Spirit Award, Roger B. Smith, GM 
Chairman, presented four light guns to the University of Alabama, Huntsville. According to the 
release, “the University will use this unique piece of technology to support national defense and 
space program objectives and enhance its educational and research programs.”930 Through this 
donation, GM encouraged participation in another area of long-term business interest—the 
defense industry. The auto manufacturer donated $35 million to the University of Alabama with 
an additional $20 million worth of equipment and $3 million for research projects.931 GM 
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donated a total of $58 million to encourage defense research at the University of Alabama, 
Huntsville. These initiatives benefit GM by building a corporate relationship for recruitment and 
research that will advance corporate goals. Further, GM’s donations reinforced the growth of the 
military-industrial complex.  
GM also made explicit connections between its support of university education and 
American exceptionalism. In a November 1990 address to the Association of Independent 
Technological Universities, Dr. Robert A. Frosch, vice president of GM Research Laboratories, 
stated, “A crisis in American industry is imminent unless business and academia can reduce the 
fear of learning math and science-based disciplines among nation’s youth, a GM executive today 
told presidents of the nation’s top technical universities.”932 Citing National Science Foundation 
(NSF) research, Dr. Frosch alleged that there would be a “shortfall of 450,000 engineers and 
scientists by 2010.”933 The “shortfall” numbers were taken from a National Science Foundation 
(NSF) report later described as “bad science.” Yet, the figures were widely used by groups 
looking to make legislative changes.934 Fears of a shortage of scientists and engineers have 
propelled a push away from the liberal arts and humanities at the university-level and reinforced 
the importance of federal programs favoring math and science education at the elementary and 
high school levels. The Business Roundtable and similar groups have used the data to push for 
reforms to education including incentive-based pay, industry-supported educational initiatives, 
and increase Race to the Top grants.935 Ultimately, the logic of neoliberal reforms remains 
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dominant with engineering and science routinely tied to increasing economic opportunities. GM 
was committed to refashioning education with economic outcomes as the primary goal.936 
GM’s support for science and engineering education was situated within these larger 
narratives of American decline in engineering and the need for educational reform. By donating 
to engineering programs, GM offered a remedy to the lack of American talent in those fields. 
GM’s press releases for its programs largely used the same arguments as the Business 
Roundtable and other groups; the corporation focused on the economic impact of engineering. In 
a 1991 speech at MIT, Donald L. Runkle, a GM vice president, linked the loss in 
competitiveness in engineering to the “U.S. industry's loss of competitive leadership.”937 Runkle 
explicitly connected the auto industry’s failure to succeed to American education. Further, the 
executive positioned a stronger relationship between business and industry as the solution: 
“We've spent thousands of hours and tens of millions of dollars supporting American 
universities. We are on the same side. But... we all need to listen a little more closely to what the 
real world is saying.”938 Runkle argued that the auto industry should be able to shape American 
education because the success of American corporations was dependent on corporate influence in 
the classroom. While educators and society may have broader views of the value of education, 
the neoliberal philosophy argued that anything that did not benefit the free market was 
unnecessary.  
In addition to making direct connections between education and corporate success, GM 
also emphasized that educational policies should focus on jobs first and foremost. While 
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education can help students to think deeply, be better citizens, or be better members of the 
community, a job-focused perspective emphasizes that jobs are more important than any other 
benefits. In a speech at Northwestern, James R. Wiemels, a GM vice president, made a direct 
connection between GM programs at the university and jobs for Northwestern graduates; he 
specifically mentioned how many Northwestern graduates were hired as interns by GM.939 While 
this programs may have done some good for the students involved, it is ultimately part of a larger 
push to subject public education to privatization.940 The push for privatization undermines the 
American commitment to public education as a basis for civil life and civic engagement.  
 In addition to GM’s support for engineering programs, GM also supported engineering 
education through design competitions. The competitions brought together GM, government 
agencies, and universities. By combining support from government national laboratories and 
GM, the events demonstrated that corporate and government interests were aligned and that 
scientific breakthrough was associated with corporate ingenuity.941 Beginning in 2000, the goal 
of the FutureTruck competition was “to create a ‘greener’ SUV…a low-emissions vehicle (LEV) 
with at least 25% higher fuel economy.”942 From 2000 to 2001, GM provided Chevy Suburbans 
for the competition. FutureTruck was sponsored by the Department of Energy and U.S. auto 
manufacturers. The FutureTruck competition aligned with GM’s need to sell SUVs, while also 
promoting GM as concerned about the SUV’s environmental impact.  
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The SUVs that won were not hybrids or electric, but primarily used ethanol and modified 
gasoline. The best team improved fuel economy by about 10 mpg.943 The press release billed 
“the winners” of the event as “you and me and everyone else who cares about cleaner air and 
fuel conservation.”944 Through this release, GM emphasized that SUVs can be environmentally 
friendly, a theme that resonated with SUV ads. By making such a commitment, GM also implied 
that the industry could resolve fuel efficiency problems, instead of needing intervention in the 
form of CAFE standards. GM’s safety regulator, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, was also a sponsor. Like their sponsorship of MADD, the event also functioned 
as a way for GM to work with its primary regulator, a problem given SUVs’ safety problems. 
Corporations sometimes lobby politicians or regulators by working with charities that they 
favor.945 FutureTruck envisioned a future where SUVs were simply modified to be better, 
reinforcing the industry’s narrative that SUV’s were safe, appealing choices to consumers. The 
industry argued it was difficult to sell consumers on other vehicles, no matter how fuel efficient 
they were. This contest reinforced that the industry’s future was aligned with the SUV.  
 GM’s partnership with the Department of Energy and the national labs continued for 
several more years. In 2009, even as GM was transforming itself into the “new GM,” GM still 
sponsored student design competitions. This time, the design competition was called: EcoCAR: 
The NeXt Challenge.946 University students were challenged to make fuel efficient cars with zero 
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emissions, in response to California’s regulations.947 While GM spent decades lobbying against 
California’s energy regulations, the auto manufacturer also seemingly attempted to respond to 
them. Interestingly, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), another GM regulator, was a 
sponsor of the competition. EcoCAR even utilized the “GM Global Vehicle Development 
Process,” meaning that students would become familiar with how GM developed vehicles in 
preparation for future careers. Teams were given a donated a Saturn VUE to work with.948 Like 
the previous competition, this competition was covered primarily by the trade press. However, it 
served the important role of promoting the industry as “green” to future employees, current 
engineers, and the industry’s primary regulators.  
  While the EV1 received positive press from both the trade press and national 
publications,949 the university programs received less attention; there were only a few mentions 
in the trade press.950 Coverage may have been concentrated at the local level.951 Although these 
programs received different receptions, they were designed for different audiences. The PR 
program for EV1 was targeted to a national audience as befit a technological breakthrough, while 
the university programs had more local appeal. Both programs served as greenwashing for GM. 
Through EV1 PR, GM overstated its commitment to these technologies, as shown by the small 
EV1 rollout and GM’s continued reliance on trucks and SUVs. The EV1 also reinforced the 
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message that GM was a technological innovator and that GM had gone above and beyond to 
meet CAFE requirements and California’s regulations.952 Finally, the EV1 subverted the 
environmental movement by appealing to the environmental movement’s “fascination with 
technological solutions” in the 1990s.953 Environmentalists wanted the EV1 and other 
technological solutions to solve the problem; this helped GM’s PR gain traction and distracted 
from CAFE debates. Similarly, the university programs also reinforced that technological change 
was tied to the free market by explicitly connecting university progress to GM and corporate 
involvement. Yet, GM’s supposed commitment to meeting standards and developing green 
technology was undercut by the company’s lobbying campaign against CAFE.  
GM, GMAC and Habitat for Humanity  
 GMAC, GM’s wholly owned mortgage subsidiary, was involved in a few of GM’s CSR 
efforts, but the most important was Habitat for Humanity, a Christian housing ministry founded 
by Millard Fuller. The non-profit has been a favorite partner of politicians of all stripes from 
Jimmy Carter to Newt Gingrich. One trademark quality of the Habitat for Humanity home is that 
future homeowners are required to put in “sweat equity” in building the home.954 “Sweat equity” 
pairs well with employee volunteerism because employees also put “sweat equity” into their 
communities by building homes. Habitat for Humanity has a variety of corporate partners from 
General Motors to Dow to Lowes.955 For GM, the partnership with Habitat for Humanity was a 
form of strategic philanthropy. It offered GMAC the opportunity to make loans to Habitat 
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chapters while constructing low-income housing in GM communities. Many of these 
communities had agreements with GM that allowed the company to avoid taxation. Thus, GM 
appeared to act in the best interests of the community, while depriving cities and states of much-
needed tax dollars through tax abatements. Overall, GM’s Habitat for Humanity CSR was 
intended to reflect a commitment to the community but was really in GM’s interest.  
GMAC’s 1993 Annual Report stated that Residential Funding Corporation, part of 
GMAC Mortgage Group, was working with Habitat for Humanity as part of Homes First: 
Sharing the Dream.956 The Annual Report offered little information about the details of the 
program, other than its focus on Habitat and low-income borrowers in California. The program 
appeared again in the 1994 Annual Report where GMAC proudly proclaimed that it “stepped up 
its commitment to affordable housing by increasing its involvement with Habitat for Humanity.” 
The report event included a photo of GMAC employees at a home build on the Lakota Sioux 
Indian Reservation.957 Again, the Annual Report lacked details of how GMAC supported 
Habitat, but used the photograph alongside statements describing the company’s commitment to 
low-income borrowers to assert that GMAC was more than a lender, it was a member of the 
community.  
A prepared folder on GMAC’s financial services featured a packet on GMAC RFC that 
focused on its social responsibility practices. The packet was intended for a prospective investor 
and featured testimony from Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO) of 
RFC, and COO of GMAC Mortgage, all of which emphasized GMAC’s social responsibility. 
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For example, the COO of GMAC Mortgage wrote, “No one at GMACM will dispute we’re in 
this business to make a profit. But when you can make a difference in the lives of those less 
fortunate in your community, that’s when the real dividends roll in.”958 This statement 
encapsulates the logic of strategic philanthropy. GMAC’s loan program with Habitat was 
somewhat philanthropic, but also aligned with business goals and profit-making. Through the 
program, GMAC Mortgage made loans to Habitat chapters that other lending institutions bought 
shares in. The loans usually had “below-market interest rates,” meaning that GMAC may have 
been sacrificing some income on these loans while ultimately furthering its business interests.959 
GMAC reported making loans worth $1.7 million in North Carolina, with 13 lending institutions 
participating, and $2.75 million in loans in California, with 33 lending institutions participating. 
GM’s strategic philanthropy paid dividends in multiple ways. It was profitable and built 
connections with the community.  
In 1996, GM began partnering with Habitat to build homes in Matamoros, Mexico. 
Unlike Michigan, this may seem an odd place for GM to flex its CSR muscle, but Matamoros 
had become a hub of production for GM. Just south of the Texas border, GM could pay Mexican 
workers much less than their UAW counterparts in Flint, Michigan: $1 an hour compared to 
$22.960 Many of these workers were employed by GM’s parts subsidiary, Delphi Automotive 
Services. GM was incentivized to produce parts in Mexico because Mexico charged no export 
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tax and because of the savings on labor.961 GM’s press release on the build emphasized that 
social responsibility was related to business opportunities:   
We at General Motors have learned that we cannot separate social responsibility from 
business opportunities... We believe that a 'simple, decent place to live' is a fundamental 
starting point in improving people's lives. Through this partnership, we expect to be able 
to improve living conditions and start the process of 'changing lives one family at a 
time’962 
The Brownsville Herald, the newspaper from the city across the Rio Grande from Matamoros, 
favorably quoted the release.963 According to the Herald, the program would build 50 houses in a 
few Mexican cities near Brownsville. Still, the issue of why GM employees qualified for low-
income housing was not raised. In echoes of the early twentieth century welfare capitalism, GM 
was literally building homes for its workers. Yet, newspaper coverage in GM communities was 
largely uncritical. Even, the Detroit Free Press, which might be concerned with the loss of jobs 
in Michigan, wrote, “General Motors Corp. is continuing to put its money where its mouth is in 
creating better communities for its Mexican workers.”964 The Brownsville Herald, quoted a 
Alejandra Villegas, an employee of a GM subsidiary and Habitat recipient, as saying “The best 
thing about the house is that so many people worked together to build it.”965 Through its 
coverage, the Brownsville Herald reinforced GM’s desire to build community by building 
homes.  
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 Outside of GMAC’s project in Mexico, GM and GMAC were active in other GM 
communities. Pontiac, Michigan, was the site of a Habitat for Humanity project in 2000 that 
brought together GM, GMAC, the UAW, and the City of Pontiac. It was not uncommon for the 
UAW to team up with GM on philanthropic efforts and employee volunteerism. In the aftermath 
of major catastrophes, the UAW and GM often gave joint donations. Rather than offer competing 
philanthropic efforts, this “family” image demonstrated that GM, its subsidiaries, and its workers 
were all part of the community in which they operated and that social responsibility united 
competing factions. Further, the City of Pontiac was involved in the Pontiac project. The city 
government sold a building to Habitat for $1. GM and GMAC financed the construction of the 
home. Workers from GM and GMAC contributed their labor to the home’s construction.966 The 
reiteration of the GM family and its positive presence in Pontiac served to reinforce the capacity 
of the corporation for good, despite the loss of traditional automotive jobs in Michigan and the 
struggles of the City of Pontiac.  
 The problems in Pontiac are indicative of the drawbacks of CSR. Coverage in the Detroit 
Free Press described the Pontiac build as helping a neighborhood that was “demolished by 
neglect.”967 Ironically, that neglect was in part of the fault of GM and the automotive industry. 
GM had regularly used tax abatements that deprived the communities in which it operated of tax 
dollars. In 1980s and 1990s, GM received hundreds of millions in subsidies from federal, state, 
and local governments.968 However, state and local governments suffered most because they lost 
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tax dollars and lost out when GM closed plants. For example, in 1993, GM closed the Willow 
Run Assembly Plant in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The city sued GM for promising to keep the plant 
open to receive tax abatements.969 Ultimately, the city lost because the Michigan state court ruled 
that GM did not really promise to keep the plant open and could not be held accountable for a 
promise that they did not make.  
 GM’s logic of seeking tax abatements and subsidies in the 1990s and 2000s, while also 
committing itself to CSR in GM communities exemplifies the logic of CSR. GM was unwilling 
to put millions into tax dollars in its communities that might have been spent on education or 
social services that could have helped low-income families or given them jobs. Instead, GM 
opted for a private alternative, Habitat for Humanity. Habitat for Humanity is often positioned as 
a solution for “government failure” because it provides a private alternative to public housing.970 
Yet, Habitat for Humanity is not as successful as government housing programs. Its scope is 
limited, and its volunteer-built homes have been criticized for their quality Like the child safety 
CSR programs, there are some benefits, such as homeownership for people who might not have 
had a chance to own a home otherwise.971 However, this CSR also serves an opportunity for 
corporate sponsors to avoid taxation. Viewed in this light, GM is making contributions to a 
Christian housing program that is less comprehensive than a government program that would be 
supported by tax dollars.  
GM, GMAC, and GM’s other subsidiaries participated in a variety of home builds in 
communities where the company operated worldwide from Detroit and Atlanta to Canada and 
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Poland.972 GMAC press releases often included the number of homes built and emphasized the 
extent of the subsidiary’s commitment to Habitat. For example, a 2006 press release stated that 
GMAC had participated in the construction of over 100 homes since 2002.973 With each press 
release, GM emphasized the worldwide community of GM employees and their families and 
described how GMAC and GM employees literally used their labor to construct homes and 
improve livelihoods in their communities. While GMAC’s employee volunteerism and corporate 
philanthropy may have aided people in GM communities, it also served a purpose as a public 
relations vehicle to advance GM and GMAC as a force of good in those communities, despite 
GM’s avoidance of taxation through tax deductible donations to Habitat for Humanity and tax 
abatements. GM has continued to seek tax abatements in recent years, including in Orion 
Township near Pontiac, Michigan.974 Yet, despite promises to stay, the Ypsilanti case shows that 
corporations can leave even after being granted long-term tax abatements. GM is not the only 
company that pushes for tax breaks. Amazon has closed warehouses and left states to seek lower 
taxes or more favorable political climates.975 In a 2018 Gallup poll, 66% of Americans said that 
corporations did not pay enough in taxes.976 GM’s strategy is reflective of the shift from 
accountable corporate citizens through taxation to unaccountable CSR.  
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 This chapter has described how GM used greenwashing to cover for its anti-CAFE 
lobbying and reinforce the neoliberal vision of the relationship between the corporation and the 
community. GM engaged in greenwashing by presenting its technological developments as 
within reach, while its business and marketing practices continued to emphasize vehicles that 
were not fuel efficient. GM also continued to lobby against CAFE with the goal of saving the 
SUV marketplace. This demonstrated that GM was only committed to electric vehicles when 
required to do so by law or as a short-term gimmick. I also discussed how GM partnered with 
Habitat for Humanity in communities around the world while at the same time negotiating tax 
abatements and subsidies by threatening to take jobs elsewhere. Without tax abatements, GM 
would have provided more in tax dollars than it did to local Habitat for Humanity chapters. 
Those millions of dollars could have gone to social services and other programs that would have 
provided long-term solutions for problems facing GM communities.  
 Chapter 4 showed how GM used financial promotions to sell SUVs. However, the surge 
in SUVs also spawned widespread criticism that the vehicles were unsafe and bad for the 
environment. As described in chapter 5, GM countered this message with safetywashing, such as 
a CSR program on child safety. GM’s anti-CAFE lobbying campaign reinforced the message that 
SUVs were safe by claiming that CAFE would force drivers to drive small cars that were unsafe. 
GM and the auto industry reshaped the debate around CAFE in Congress and in the media. In the 
end, the EISA confirmed that CAFE standards could have a negative effect on safety. Corporate 
propaganda had become law. In 2008, GM sought to distance itself from GMAC and SUVs by 
arguing that the corporation was simply a manufacturer that had fallen on hard times as I discuss 
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in the next chapter. However, this argument belies the commitment that GM had made to both 




CHAPTER 7: THE FREE PRESS AND THE AUTO BAILOUT  
Introduction  
By late 2007, the U.S. auto industry had pushed heavily into SUVs. Unfortunately, SUV 
sales began to fall that year because of high gas prices. At the same time, GMAC began to suffer 
heavy losses from GMAC’s subprime mortgage business. In 2007, GM attempted more 0% 
financing sales, but it would not be enough to save the auto manufacturer.977 The losses from 
GMAC’s mortgage holdings and GM’s lackluster sales began to take a toll. Detroit was in 
freefall, with GM and Chrysler likely to go bankrupt. Ford managed to salvage itself, but it 
viewed GM’s and Chrysler’s survival as crucial to the survival of the U.S. auto industry. In 2008, 
GM faced the enormous task of persuading an unwilling public that the government should bail 
out the corporation. This chapter addresses how the Detroit Free Press, GM’s hometown 
newspaper, presented that debate. I argue the Detroit Free Press was compromised by its 
decades-long relationship with GM as an advertiser, meaning that its coverage of the bailout was 
entirely pro-GM, with no attention to consumer issues. Although the bailout largely came with 
no strings attached, I conclude by discussing how the auto industry has recently fought back 
against the paltry regulations implemented after the bailout.  
As I described in both the introduction and Chapter 2 on promotional communication, 
advertising has served as a crucial source of funding for commercial media outlets. 
Unfortunately, it also serves as gateway to influence from advertisers, a key focus of this chapter. 
I have also previously described how GM and its dealers were some of the biggest U.S. 
advertisers during this period. The advertising industry feared that GM’s bankruptcy would 
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negatively impact the industry and ad-supported commercial media. Thus, GM’s survival after 
the bailout was important not only to auto workers, suppliers, and other directly connected to the 
auto industry, but also those connected through other financial ties, like advertising and public 
relations. I previously discussed how auto manufacturers are part of the “auto industrial 
complex,” which has influenced a variety of policies, including safety and environmental 
regulations. This chapter weaves these threads together to discuss how GM wielded its influence 
over the media and government during the bailout.  
In this chapter, I first review the literature related to the relationship between public 
relations, advertising, and journalism. Then, I provide a historical overview of the newspaper 
industry in Detroit. Next, I discuss the joint operating agreement (JOA) between the Detroit Free 
Press and the Detroit News, as well as criticism of the JOA. I then turn to an example of how 
GM influenced news around safety regulations in the 1990s before examining the financial crisis 
and explain how the auto manufacturers and their allies defended the auto bailout. Finally, I 
discuss missed opportunities for reform during the bailout.  
Literature Review  
In the introduction and Chapter 2, I briefly described the constraints of the commercial 
news media. This literature review expands on that discussion through a historical narrative 
about the newspaper industry. The newspaper industry transformed during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries from one defined by independent, local, party-affiliated newspapers 
to national chains. Chains relied heavily on advertising, and the desire for ad dollars drove some 
outlets to rely on “yellow journalism” to sell papers.978 In The Brass Check, Upton Sinclair 
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described how newspapers were willing to overlook advertisers’ misconduct or comment 
favorably on their advertisers.979 Criticism launched against corrupt newspapers led to the 
creation of professional journalism with an emphasis on editorial independence and neutrality. 
Unfortunately, these standards prioritized “achieving factual accuracy and on not… questioning 
the basic infrastructure of an often corrupt and dysfunctional status quo.”980  Professional 
journalism became defined by a propensity to question within the bounds of elite debate and 
neutrality between two sides, regardless of factual accuracy. In addition, professional standards 
increased the reliance on official sources, limiting the range of debate and coverage of issues on 
which official sources agree.981 Professional journalism’s problems intensified as newspapers 
became more dependent on advertising and as media conglomerates grew.  
Media conglomerates are vertically and horizontally integrated. Horizontal integration 
means that conglomerates own companies in different areas of media production, such as 
television and film. Vertical integration means that they own companies at different levels of 
production, such as production and distribution of television shows.982 News outlets are often 
part of conglomerates, which put pressure on their news divisions to be profitable. Mergers in the 
media industries can thus lead to “negative externalities for journalism.”983 Vertically and 
horizontally integrated media conglomerates strive for synergy. For example, Disney released 
Hercules books, CDs, and films at the same time to take advantage of synergy between its 
holdings. The desire to placate corporate owners does not encourage news that is critical of those 
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with economic or political power.984 For example, Janet Wasko found that ABC news declined to 
cover a story about labor issues at Disney’s amusement parks. Disney, as ABC’s corporate 
owner, may have exerted pressure for ABC not to cover the story.985 This corporatization of the 
press “removes the press as a buffer between corporations and the public sphere.”986 Journalism, 
which should advocate on behalf of the public and those in power to account, has become 
disconnected from the public.   
Journalism’s role as a public advocate has been hampered by its relationship with 
advertisers. Corporate influence can come through lucrative relationships from product 
advertising and the placement of issue ads. Although advertising is usually associated with 
products, issue advertising is an important lobbying and PR tactic.987 Issue advertisements 
attempt to influence the public, attempting to change attitudes or motivate the public to act for or 
against policies. Issue advertisements may also be used as an alternative method to reach out to 
legislators and encourage them to lobby their colleagues.988 Like other forms of PR and 
lobbying, corporate spending vastly out-numbers citizens’ groups, about 5 to 1, and unions, 
about 100 to 1.989 In Washington, D.C., 80% of issue ads were sponsored by corporations. Even 
in the New York Times, issue advertisements heavily outnumbered those from unions and 
citizens’ groups. These ads affect how citizens view policy debates and appear alongside 
journalism. In addition, as with corporate owners, advertisers shape news. Publishers frequently 
                                                          
984 Ibid. 
985 Wasko, Understanding Disney.  
986 David S. Allen, Democracy, Inc.: The Press and Law in the Corporate Rationalization of the Public Sphere 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 104. 
987 Richard L. Hall and Richard Anderson, “Issue Advertising and Legislative Advocacy in Health Politics,” in 
Interest Group Politics, ed. Allen J. Cigler and Burdette A. Loomis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012), 221–42. 
988 Ibid. 
989 Ibid., 138. 
248 
 
bias content in favor of advertisers or avoid stories that hurt them.990 A Pew Research Center 
study found that local news was shaped by auto dealers who are major local advertisers in many 
communities, as I discuss below.991 
In addition to the pressures of conglomerates, journalism’s democratic potential has been 
compromised by the crisis in commercial journalism. Although online publishing has lowered 
expenses, revenue from online ads is much lower than revenue from print ads. Newspapers are 
now even more dependent on advertising but make less from online advertising fees.992 Total 
advertising revenue for newspapers has plummeted, despite increases in online ads.993 
Unfortunately, this has affected the overall quality of journalism through the adoption of 
techniques like “native advertising,” where promotion is worked into what appears to be 
legitimate news.994 Newspapers have also been forced to cut reporters and staff. The New York 
Times, for instance, announced plans to reduce the number of copy editors significantly in 
2017.995  Newspapers and their websites must maximize their appeal to advertisers, meaning that 
hard news stories may be overlooked or given less resources in favor of “soft” news, like 
celebrity gossip, that attracts viewers and readers. 
The funding crisis is particularly acute for newspapers, which are the source of most 
original reporting.996 As journalism’s struggles deepened during the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, PR and lobbying have taken advantage of the opportunity. PR is given more credence 
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thanks to the close relationship between public relations professionals and journalists. PR 
professionals cultivate relationships with journalists to get press releases published. These 
releases may be published outright or used as source material supplemented with other reporting. 
Even if the press release is used as supplementary material, it serves as an opportunity for 
corporations to help fill the news hole with PR fluff, as in the case of the Habitat for Humanity 
building project described in an earlier chapter. Because of the decline in revenue online, 
newspapers rely more on press releases and PR materials as article sources, instead of producing 
original reporting. In the past, about 40% of newspaper articles were derived from press releases; 
today, the number is up to about 86% for some papers.997 Professional journalism often reaches 
“balance” by publishing competing press releases. Journalism’s increasing reliance on PR is a 
boon to lobbyists who want to promulgate their narrative to the public.  
Ideally, journalism should serve as the “Fourth Estate” within a democracy, holding those 
in power accountable.998 This is particularly true during critical junctures when the public has an 
opportunity to shape public policy for generations. Acting as the “Fourth Estate” requires 
journalism that makes complex political issues understandable to the public, so that citizens can 
make informed decisions.999 Unfortunately, funding has dried up because newspapers are earning 
less from subscription fees and all forms of advertising. This means there are fewer journalists 
and less funding available for investigative reports. Public relations practitioners now outnumber 
working journalists. Consequently, promotional industries, like advertising and PR, have stepped 
up to fill the editorial void using paid content.1000 As corporate owners balance expenses and 
revenue in online journalism, there is one clear loser: the public. The next section will trace the 
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transformation of the Detroit Free Press as an example of the historical trajectory discussed in 
this section. 
Historical Background 
During the twentieth century, the Detroit Free Press went from a family owned paper to 
part of a newspaper to part of a conglomerate in a two-paper town. Its journey mirrored the 
journeys of many papers across the U.S. that became part of chains and joint operating agencies 
to save on costs. By 1960, the city of Detroit had only two papers: the Detroit Free Press and the 
Detroit News. Thirty years later, those two papers would be united under a joint operating 
agreement which fused the business side of the papers, while striving to keep them editorially 
independent. The Free Press was originally founded in 1831, but in 1940, it would be purchased 
by John S. Knight, who made it part of the Knight Ridder publication family.1001 When the 
Detroit Times folded in 1960, it launched decades of competition between the Free Press and the 
News that would culminate in the unlikely fusion of the two papers.  
 In September 1959, the Free Press was winning the subscription war against the News. 
The Free Press moved to secure former Times subscribers to become the top paper in Detroit. 
Unfortunately, the News had purchased the Times’ assets, including the physical subscription 
lists.1002  Although the News owned the physical subscription lists, most of the carriers were not 
needed. The Free Press took advantage of the opportunity to hire former Times carriers to 
deliver the Free Press to former Times subscribers for free.1003 In addition, both papers offered 
insurance to their subscribers mirroring a gimmick the Times used insurance to lure subscribers. 
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The Free Press also added more sections to mimic former Times offerings.1004 Even as the 
papers fought over Times subscribers, surveys indicated that most subscribers were not bothered 
by the loss of their paper, perhaps a commentary on the sad state of professional journalism in 
Detroit.1005 Ultimately, with control of the Times’ assets, the News lured more Times subscribers, 
and by 1962, the News had higher circulation than the Free Press.1006  
 Labor was important for both newspapers, not only because Detroit was a labor town, but 
also because both newspapers employed thousands of unionized workers ranging from 
Teamsters to Newspaper Guild members. The fates of both papers, as with the city of Detroit, 
was tied to the automotive industry. Coverage of the automotive industry would not be complete 
without coverage of labor issues. A Free Press journalist won a Pulitzer in 1954 for coverage of 
the Chrysler strike and another in 1956 for his coverage of the 1956 UAW negotiations.1007 In 
the 1950s and 1960s, labor relations at both newspapers were particularly fraught because of a 
series of work stoppages. From December 1, 1955 to January 17, 1956, workers struck at the 
Free Press and produced their own paper, “The Detroit Reporter.”1008 The Free Press suffered 
two more strikes in 1964 and 1968, including one lasting more than 134 days.1009 Labor issues 
would continue to plague both newspapers, even after negotiation of a Joint Operating 
Agreement between the Free Press and the News in the 1980s.  
 In 1974, Knight Newspapers merged with Ridder Publications to become Knight 
Ridder.1010 Like the Free Press, the News would soon become part of a chain of daily 
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newspapers. The Free Press and the News battled over customers in one of the largest newspaper 
markets in the country. Advertising fees were kept low, so there were high losses.1011 In 1985, 
the Scripps family sold the News to Gannett after losing millions of dollars a year.1012 Shortly 
after Gannett purchased the News, Knight-Ridder and Gannett began to consider whether a Joint 
Operating Agreement would be beneficial to both papers and their corporate owners.  
The Detroit Joint Operating Agreement  
 A Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) is an agreement between two newspapers to merge 
business operations while maintaining separate editorial offices. The JOA was created in 1933 
due to losses from the Great Depression.1013 Over the next thirty years, newspapers across the 
country entered into JOAs. In 1969, in Citizen Publishing Co. v. the United States, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the JOA between the Tucson Daily Citizen and Arizona Daily Star was 
illegal.1014 At the time, there were more than twenty JOAs, making this antitrust ruling a threat to 
newspaper publishers that were part of JOAs. A key issue in the case was whether chains should 
be part of JOAs. At the time, more than half of JOAs involved chain ownership. In response to 
the Citizen Publishing ruling, newspapers lobbied Congress for a solution: The Newspaper 
Preservation Act (NPA). 
The NPA of 1970 was originally called the Failing Newspaper Bill. The Act allowed 
newspapers to merge their business operations but maintain separate editorial boards for editorial 
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diversity.1015 The law specifically allowed papers to merge if one paper was in danger of failing. 
Congress passed the NPA thanks to intense lobbying by newspaper publishers without 
consideration of how to define a failing newspaper or whether the NPA was the best way to 
promote editorial diversity. In fact, Richard Berlin, the president of Hearst, had written Nixon 
urging him to support the NPA. Both the Hearst and Scripps-Howard chains endorsed Nixon 
because they were part of many JOAs.1016 Because of the growing dominance of newspaper 
chains, some critics argued that JOAs simply meant more profits for large publishers who could 
share monopoly control over a city.1017  
 JOAs were intended to preserve newspaper editorial diversity in a time of rapid 
newspaper closures. Yet, critics have charged that JOAs fail to preserve diversity, ultimately 
serving as a profit-maker for newspaper chains. For example, in Miami, the JOA between the 
Miami Herald and the Miami News ultimately resulted in Cox collecting money from the JOA 
for thirty-three years after the Miami News closed. As Bryan Gruley put it, “In an incredible 
something for nothing deal, Cox was, in effect, getting paid not to publish a newspaper.”1018 Cox 
earned about $165 million from the deal, but, despite a Department of Justice investigation, was 
never held accountable.1019 Cox’s misuse of the JOA demonstrates how, in some cases, promised 
editorial diversity failed to appear when the second newspaper closed, leaving the owner to reap 
the profits from the JOA.  
 The foremost purpose of the JOA is to create editorial diversity where there would be 
none. Some studies have suggested that a JOA succeeds in producing more news than a single 
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paper monopoly but fails to produce the same diversity as two separately owned papers.1020 
Newspapers in a JOA may have some differences in coverage, but those differences may be 
mild, such as one paper supporting President George W. Bush in slightly fewer instances than 
the other.1021 Other editorial differences, such as an emphasis on local news, may also be 
present.1022 Further complicating the issue is that Department of Justice does not have a means 
for investigating editorial diversity,1023 nor has it really considered what the term means, as both 
papers may lockout other viewpoints.  
JOAs preserved some newspapers, but often at a cost to news diversity in the community. 
However, JOAs were incredibly beneficial for publishers because, as with Cox in Miami, they 
gained monopoly control over a city. The Free Press and the News had both been losing money 
for years causing Scripps and Knight-Ridder to secretly consider a JOA since 1980. However, 
they failed to come to an agreement until Gannett bought the News. As Ruth Bader Ginsberg 
noted in her dissent in the later D.C. Court of Appeals case, Gannett only agreed to buy the News 
once it received confirmation that Knight-Ridder would be willing to be part of a JOA.1024 In 
April of 1986, the papers agreed to a 100-year JOA, with Free Press as the morning paper and 
the News as the afternoon paper. The newspapers would roughly share the profits, with a slight 
advantage to the News for the first five years of the agreement.1025 The papers submitted the JOA 
to the Attorney General for review, which began a years-long process of assessing whether the 
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Free Press was failing. The drawn-out review would end with a Supreme Court case affirming 
the JOA and the NPA.  
There were two key issues in the debate over the JOA. The first was whether the Free 
Press was failing, and, if so, whether it would close. The second was whether another newspaper 
would emerge to take the place of the Free Press in the event of closure.1026 After a preliminary 
investigation by Attorney General Edwin Meese’s office, the papers argued their position before 
an administrative law judge. The Detroit newspapers argued that a JOA was necessary for three 
reasons: “(1) the Free Press’s losses were severe and irreversible; (2) the shrinking Detroit 
market could no longer support two major dailies; and (3) the Free Press could not overcome the 
News’s leads in a plethora of circulation and advertising categories.”1027 It was not clear to the 
Department of Justice or the Detroit community that any of these arguments were true. The judge 
ruled that the papers had not proved that the Free Press was in danger of closure and that both 
papers could reverse some losses if they raised subscription prices and advertising rates.1028 
Despite the judge’s determination, Attorney General Meese determined that the JOA could 
proceed.1029 Before the JOA could be finalized, the opponents moved to appeal the decision. 
There were two primary opponents to the JOA in Detroit: the newspaper unions and the 
community.  
From the beginning, the unions opposed the JOA. From the Teamsters to the Newspaper 
Guild, the JOA threatened papers’ unions with the prospect of job losses and loss of union 
protection for some workers. The Newspaper Guild was already struggling in the 1980s due to 
loss of membership. A JOA in Detroit would mean that some members would no longer be part 
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of the union because they would be employed by the Detroit Newspaper Agency (DNA) instead 
of the papers.1030 The DNA would not have to abide by union contracts and would be under the 
partial control of Gannett, known for its anti-union policies. The Newspaper Guild and other 
unions worked desperately to secure contracts that would offer benefits to workers forced into 
retirement because of the merger and protect their members.1031 Unfortunately, the Newspaper 
Guild membership began to waiver on the issue, resulting in a contentious vote for the union to 
continue to fight the JOA, but causing a loss of unity.1032  
In addition to the unions, John Kelly, a Michigan state senator who opposed the JOA, 
formed the Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press with a local publisher, local advertisers, 
and a couple of Free Press and News employees. After Michigan Citizens challenged the JOA, it 
grew quickly to an organization of 500 members.1033 Michigan Citizens argued that the Attorney 
General’s decision had neglected the facts put forth by the administrative law judge: that the 
Free Press had not yet failed, and that Detroit could sustain two newspapers. Michigan Citizens 
got the JOA postponed until the D.C. Court of Appeals could hear the case. The D.C. Court of 
Appeals ruled in favor of the JOA, affirming that Attorney General’s position that it was 
reasonable to assume that the Free Press would fail, despite the Department of Justice’s anti-
trust concerns. Even if the Free Press could recover, the possibility that it might not was enough 
to allow the two papers to merge and share the profits from the Detroit market. Michigan 
Citizens appealed to the Supreme Court, but a 4-4 decision ultimately affirmed the D.C. Court of 
Appeals decision in 1989.1034 
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News and Auto Safety 
 The JOA merged the business operations of the Free Press and the News with the goal of 
increasing editorial diversity and spending on journalism by allowing the companies to share 
advertising and business operations. In 1995, a protracted strike at both papers began when 
management refused to sign a collective bargaining agreement with the news staff. The striking 
workers published the Detroit Sunday Journal from 1995 through the end of the strike in 1999. 
In November 1999, ten years after the Detroit JOA was finalized, the Sunday Journal reported 
that the JOA had failed to produce editorial diversity. The financial problems and journalistic 
decline after the JOA had been accelerated by the strike.1035 Outside of the problems of the JOA, 
Detroit’s news scene was dominated by the auto industry. The health of papers in Detroit had 
long been tied to the health of the auto industry, from award-winning coverage of labor struggles 
to ad dollars from dealers and manufacturers. Other newspapers also maintained Detroit bureaus 
to cover the auto industry. As I observed in Chapter 3, journalist Keith Bradsher was usually 
alone in his safety critiques because most of the Detroit press considered them too one-sided. 
The reaction of other journalists in the Detroit reflects the problems of the commercial media and 
the influence of the auto industry over news coverage.   
For decades, GM’s public relations problems primarily concerned safety issues and the 
press coverage generated from them. In the 1990s, GM began to alter its tactics and more 
forcefully counter bad publicity, even going so far as to threaten ad dollars. The most famous 
story of GM’s willingness to fight safety regulations was the case of side-saddle fuel tanks in 
C/K model trucks manufactured from 1973 to 1987. The problems began before the trucks were 
                                                          
1035 Michael Betzold, “10-Fold: It’s Been a Decade of Decadence for JOA in Detroit,” Detroit Sunday Journal, 
November 7, 1999. 
258 
 
even produced. In 1964, GM designers decided to put truck fuel tanks outside the frame, in order 
to allow the trucks to hold more fuel. Their goal was to make the truck more marketable, despite 
recommendations from engineers that the fuel tank should be placed inside the frame.1036 Initial 
concerns went unheeded, despite further tests in 1973 that indicated outside fuel tanks should be 
moved inside to reduce fuel leakage. In the 1980s, GM considered some possible changes to 
make the fuel tanks safer, but none were implemented.1037  
 The fuel tank issue boiled over in the 1990s. GM faced multiple lawsuits from 
individuals whose family members had been killed in crashes involving C/K model trucks and 
fires. On August 14, 1992, the Center for Auto Safety and Public Citizen asked the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to recall the C/K model trucks.1038 On 
November 17, 1992, a Dateline segment covering the potential safety issue featured a GM 
pickup truck bursting into flames.1039 Less than a month later, the NHTSA opened an 
investigation into the trucks. With the pressure from an NHTSA investigation and multiple court 
cases, GM faced the possibility of a costly recall or costly repairs to the trucks. A recall would 
deal a massive blow to GM’s reputation and sales, particularly because trucks are one of the 
most profitable areas for U.S. auto manufacturers.  
In January 1993, GM began researching the production of the initial Dateline segment. 
GM discovered that Dateline had added elements to the engine to ensure that a fire would result 
from the side impact crash depicted on screen. This information played heavily into GM’s PR 
campaign. GM also criticized NBC for relying on lawyers bent on defaming GM for the story. 
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On February 8, 1993, GM launched its counter campaign against Dateline. The company began 
by filing a defamation suit against NBC, arguing the network1040 had “irresponsibility 
portray[ed] that GM’s 1973-1987 full-size pickup trucks are prone to fires in side impact 
collisions.”1041 Further GM alleged, “the [Dateline] program was part of an orchestrated 
campaign by plaintiff lawyers and others to create a ‘poisoned’ public and litigation climate in 
which an objective engineering evaluation and fair assessment are very difficult.”1042 Thus, GM 
positioned the program as part of a vast conspiracy, language that would later be mimicked in the 
corporate campaign for tort reform.  
 Clarence Ditlow, founder of the Center for Auto Safety and Ralph Nader’s associate, was 
at the center for the battle over GM’s truck safety, just as he was at the center of many battles 
with auto companies in the late twentieth century.1043 With a background in engineering and law, 
Ditlow could confidently testify on issues related to auto safety, making him a threat to the auto 
industry. In a February 9, 1993 press release, GM claimed that Clarence Ditlow was not 
“interested in permitting the American public to hear a dispassionate, scientific, and objective 
consideration of this pickup truck issue.”1044 Yet, GM would never consent to a public debate of 
the issue because it would risk exposure of the flaws in the fuel tank design.  
 Following GM’s accusations that NBC had mislead the public about the demonstration, 
NBC promptly issued an apology on February 9, 1993. In the apology NBC specifically laid out 
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that there had been additional incendiary devices to ensure a fire, that a hole had been made in 
the tank to increase the likelihood of a fire, and that the speeds of the vehicle had been 
misrepresented.1045 NBC also agreed to pay for the cost of GM’s investigation, which was later 
estimated to be $2 million.1046 Scholarly analysis concluded that “GM managed to divert a 
substantial amount of subsequent media coverage from NBC’s claims against them, despite jury 
verdicts and regulatory findings that the company’s trucks posed a significant danger to their 
owners.”1047 To the extent that there was public attention to the truck’s safety issues, it was due 
to the persistence of the Center for Auto Safety and Public Citizen, which were notably omitted 
from GM’s discussion of the timeline of NBC scandal.  
 In Understanding Disney, Janet Wasko describes how ABC shut down a labor story 
about Disney because Disney is ABC’s corporate owner. Similar dynamics were at play in the 
GM-NBC scandal. On February 8, 1993, GM threatened NBC with litigation. However, 
litigation was not the only factor in NBC’s quick concession. GM’s weight as a massive 
advertiser and a corporate partner of NBC’s corporate owner, General Electric, also played a 
role. GM removed its advertising from NBC News programs when it announced that NBC had 
botched the truck demonstration, shifting ad dollars to entertainment and sports instead.1048 As 
one of the biggest advertisers in the U.S. and a $90 million advertiser for NBC, moving their 
advertising likely had weight in the decision. However, there was no investigation of whether 
GM’s decision to move its advertising represented a flaw in commercial journalism model, 
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particularly because of evidence that GM ‘s trucks were dangerous. In the end, NBC’s apology 
aided GM’s PR campaign. The network made it sound like they had fabricated the truck 
problem, rather than it being a long-term GM production problem.  
GM had contemplated cancelling all advertising at NBC, not just advertising for its news 
programs. Advertising Age estimated to value of all GM advertising at NBC as $160 million.1049 
Advertising Age further compared the Dateline NBC coverage to a Volvo ad in which a Volvo 
withstood being crushed by a monster truck. Missing from the Advertising Age comparison was 
the design flaw in GM trucks. Rather than consider the chilling effect on news coverage, 
Advertising Age framed the GM decision as purely a business decision that would improve the 
ability of GM to negotiate an ad deal with NBC for 1993-1994 prime time. Further, GM itself 
did not dissociate the use of ad dollars to secure good coverage or punish bad coverage and even 
confirmed that “GM has moved its ad buys in the past to express its displeasure with editorial 
coverage.”1050 In fact, Dateline and other programs reduced criticism of the Big Three in the 
aftermath of the scandal, perhaps evidence that GM’s tactic was effective.1051 
 Although GM managed to divert some attention from the story about its trucks, the 
NHTSA asked GM to voluntarily recall C/K trucks beginning on April 9, 1993. On October 1, 
1994, Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña reported that GM knew about the defects in the 
fuel tank design since the early 1970s and had kept the design because it placed “sales over 
safety.”1052 However, due to pressure from the Big Three automakers, GM secured a settlement 
with Peña wherein GM would spend $51 million on safety programs, also paying about $500 
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million to litigants who had been injured by the faulty fuel tank design. However, GM never had 
to participate in a public hearing about its design priorities, nor did it have to document what 
safety programs it supported with the money or whether those changed the design problems that 
led to the trucks in the first place. Any such programs were likely safetywashing.  
 The GM-NBC scandal demonstrates some key flaws in commercial journalism and the 
power that advertisers with big ad and PR budgets can wield over programming. GM used its PR 
budget to effectively respond to criticism and avoid real accountability for the design flaws, 
while fomenting doubt about the accidents reported by the federal government. GM and other 
auto manufacturers had decades of experiences responding to safety and environmental 
criticisms, as I described in my previous chapters. The financial crisis offered the auto industry 
the opportunity to define the role of the auto industry in the U.S. economy and convince a wary 
public that the American auto industry was worth saving.  
 The Detroit press had long served as allies to the auto industry. Despite plant closures and 
strikes, Michigan remained stridently supportive of and tied to the auto industry. The auto 
industry remains one of Michigan’s top employers, despite an overall decline in manufacturing 
jobs. President Obama, who supported the later auto bailouts, won Michigan by a wide margin. 
His victory is credited to his stance in support of the bailouts.1053 Because of the JOA, the Detroit 
Free Press, the largest paper in Detroit, was under the control of Gannett. Gannett also owned 
USA Today, which is “one of the top twenty recipients” of GM’s ad dollars.1054 In the years 
before the financial crisis, GM pumped money into advertising, as I observed in Chapter 3. GM’s 
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ad spending more than doubled between 1993 and 2005, rising from $2.6 billion to $5.8 
billion.1055 According to Advertising Age, “ad spending per vehicle nearly doubled from $328 in 
1993 to $632 in 2005. In 2005, GM spent a record 3% of revenue worldwide on advertising, up 
from 1.9% in 1993.”1056 The auto manufacturer’s lavish ad budget was complemented by 
hundreds of PR staff, giving GM ample opportunity to leverage its advertising dollars.  
 As I outlined in Chapter 3, local and regional dealers also purchase advertising, 
supplemented by money from GM. Recently, GM has shifted more control over local and 
regional advertising to dealers, while emphasizing Internet marketing.1057 Newspaper spending 
was an important element of dealer spending before the financial crisis. In 1997, Gannett Media 
Technologies, part of the Gannett Company, made an agreement with a data processing firm to 
digitally connect dealerships with marketing and advertising opportunities.1058 Dealers have long 
used local media to promote their products, although the makeup of dealer advertising has 
changed. In 2006, dealers spent an average of about $450 per vehicle on advertising. About a 
third of that spending went to newspapers, meaning the average dealer spent just over $110,000 
on newspaper advertising, the majority with local and regional papers.1059 In 2014, U.S. dealers 
spent nearly $3 billion on newspaper advertising, while newspaper advertising revenue a year 
earlier was $23.6 billion, meaning that newspapers nationwide garnered about 8% of their ad 
income from automobile dealers.1060 Yet, despite the role of regional and local dealers in funding 
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local news, including newspaper, television, and radio, the relationship between dealer and 
newspaper has received little attention.  
 The problem of the auto industry supporting local media is worse in Detroit. In Michigan, 
over 500,000 jobs are tied to the auto industry.1061 Firms that specialize in auto advertising also 
have offices in Detroit, enabling them to develop relationships with local press and to be 
accessible to the auto manufacturers. For the Detroit news media, the role of the automotive 
industry is complicated by local employment and history. The Detroit Free Press, Detroit News, 
and other local outlets shared a dependency on automobile advertising by manufacturers and 
dealers.1062 They also had developed their media coverage around the industry, featuring a 
dedicated automotive section that primarily focused on the Big 3.  
The Financial Crisis and the Bailouts 
By 2006, two decades of deregulation created a mortgage market on the verge of 
collapse. The U.S. banking industry successfully lobbied Congress and their regulators not to 
intervene based on free market ideology and obfuscation. As the mortgage market became more 
complex, it was easier to dissuade onlookers that anything was wrong because on paper 
everything looked fine. A series of laws played a crucial role in creating this illusion. The 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Alternative 
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 remade savings and loan institutions and enabled the 
rise of subprime lending. The 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act created the 
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mortgage-backed security market. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered how securities were 
taxed and made securities much more viable in the private sector than they had been. In addition, 
under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, private 
mortgage-backed securities were protected just like government securities.1063 Overall, these 
laws worked to create a morass of obfuscation around the practices in mortgage industry, 
practices that GM had become engaged in through GMAC.  
In addition to legislative acts that altered the structure of the mortgage industry, banks 
lobbied regulatory agencies to adjust other rules governing securitization and lending. A 1992 
SEC ruling determined that companies did not have to be classified as investment companies to 
issue securities, greatly relaxing the security market. In addition, a 2004 SEC ruling indirectly 
raised the amount banks could be leveraged by changing accounting methods such that liabilities 
could be more easily hidden. Finally, the Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 determined the 
SEC could not regulate ratings themselves or how ratings institutions determined those ratings. 
Although ratings institutions knew that Collateralized Debt Obligations had a high failure rate, 
they continued to rate them highly because banks threatened to go to another ratings institution if 
they did not get the ratings they wanted.1064 The mortgage industry expanded thanks to 
financialization, and GMAC became entangled in a larger web of financial products.  
The recession began in 2007 and continued in 2008 when U.S. home prices fell, leading 
to a wave of foreclosures.1065 This led to widespread failure of mortgage-backed securities and a 
credit crunch, wherein lenders could not lend to consumers or corporate borrowers.1066 In 
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September 2008, the Bush administration decided that a bailout would be necessary to stabilize 
the banking industry and end the credit crunch, despite widespread disapproval and uncertainty 
about the bailout.1067 On October 3, 2008, the bank bailout was approved,1068 but it did not 
immediately relieve pressure on credit-strapped industries, including the automotive industry. All 
auto manufacturers suffered losses as auto sales plummeted by about one third. GM experienced 
a smaller than average decline of 15%, although its stake in MBS meant that the corporation was 
still in trouble.1069 In November 2008, the Big 3 asked Congress for support, but public support 
for the bailout was low. A month earlier, the auto industry had successfully lobbied for $25 
billion to support alternative energy production, although the industry had initially wanted $50 
billion.1070 In a hearing on November 19, 2008, auto industry executives had to defend their need 
for cash after the alternative energy loans and the bank industry bailout a month before.  
The auto industry needed to marshal their executives, employees, dealer and supplier 
networks, along with supportive members of Congress. In the 4th quarter of 2008, GM spent $3 
billion to lobby Congressional representatives, in addition to spending thousands of dollars on 
national elections.1071 The auto industry also had some allies in the media. In particular, the 
Detroit Free Press’s editorials and general coverage were in favor of the bailout. In addition, 
other newspapers who received auto industry ad dollars, like the Wall Street Journal, were 
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supportive. On November 19, 2008, the day of the auto bailout hearing, the Journal published an 
op-ed from Rick Wagoner, CEO of GM, which was referenced by members of Congress during 
the hearing.1072 However, Wagoner’s appeal did not change the public perception of the auto 
industry. The auto industry’s goal was a $25 billion bailout, primarily for GM and Chrysler. 
Although Ford was in dire straits, the corporation did not need bailout money because it had 
refinanced in 2006.1073  
Because of the bank bailout, the auto industry faced a wary public, nearly half of whom 
opposed the auto bailout.1074 In addition to public scrutiny, the Republican party was staunchly 
free market, and most did not want to intervene. The auto bailout also presented an opportunity 
for conservative legislators to push UAW salaries even lower than their recent bargaining 
agreement. Conservatives aimed match the UAW salaries with those at non-union plants run by 
Toyota and other foreign manufacturers in the U.S. south. This proved fatal to legislative 
compromise on the bill. Toyota, Honda, Kia, and other manufacturers also opposed the bailout 
because the bailout would give U.S. auto manufacturers an advantage. Many Democrats 
supported the auto bailout, particularly those from Michigan and other auto industry states. 
Citizens groups like Public Citizen and the Union of Concerned Scientists were willing to accept 
the auto bailout provided it contained concessions from the industry on environmental issues.  
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The Free Press and the Auto Bailout  
 The first auto bailout hearing was on November 19, 2008. That week, the U.S. auto 
industry was the top news story. Much of the news commentary noted that the hearings did not 
go well because the public was not supportive of a bailout.1075 Indeed, the auto industry failed to 
articulate its value and tried again on December 5, 2008. The industry was not alone in its chilly 
reception. Labor unions were made the villains by many in Congress, but they were not the focus 
of most news stories.1076 In November 2008, the Free Press began defending its home industry. 
The potential bailout was described as a “bridge loan” for industry, the term that industry 
executives preferred instead of bailout.1077 The auto industry described the loan as necessary for 
their survival through to 2009. However, the bailout was not enough for GM and Chrysler to 
avoid bankruptcy the following year. Like its hometown press, Michigan committee members 
favored the auto industry’s narrative about the “bridge loan.” Coverage in the Free Press 
emphasized the auto industry perspective, while de-emphasizing criticism from Public Citizen or 
presenting such criticism as impractical.  
The American public had just bailed out the finance industry, so auto industry executives 
sought distinguish themselves from the financiers. In so doing, they perpetuated the fiction that 
industry had not been changed by financialization. The auto industry and its supporters further 
expanded on this by arguing the financiers were making money without working, while the auto 
industry was not. However, this obscured how the auto industry used finance to support their 
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profit margins and keep their businesses appealing to Wall Street, as I laid out in previous 
chapters. By creating a fictitious wall between the industrial and the financial economy, the auto 
industry not only claimed to show its innocence, it also prevented a wider discussion of 
financialization’s impact on American industry. 
The U.S. auto industry and its midwestern allies positioned the auto bailout as a bailout 
for the “Last manufacturing base that we have in America.”1078 Auto industry executives blamed 
the need for the bailout on the deregulated finance industry and its penchant for complicated 
financial products. The executives claimed to represent the average American who was 
interested in manufacturing, rather than complicated financial products that they did not 
understand.1079 This was ironic given that GM’s executive, Rick Wagoner, had come up through 
GM’s financial divisions, rather than its engineering divisions. As I detail below, the Big 3 
painted a picture of an updated Detroit complete with better vehicle sales. The auto executives 
insisted their captive financing firms had no relationship to auto manufacturing, except providing 
loans and liquidity in the credit markets. The activities and relationship between captive finance 
companies like GMAC was not explored in the hearing or in the coverage by the Free Press. GM 
further de-emphasized its relationship with GMAC thanks to the 2006 sale of 51% of GMAC to 
Cerberus Capital. GM argued that its lack of technical control over GMAC meant that GMAC’s 
behavior was irrelevant, even though GMAC still largely behaved as a captive. 
 GMAC’s growth in the preceding years, which helped sustain GM, was not mentioned in 
any Free Press coverage before or after the Congressional hearings. This is emblematic of the 
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critique that the commercial media fails to include the historical context of public debates, as 
mentioned in the introduction.1080  GMAC was unable to fund GM, its dealers, and its customers 
in part because of its exposure to the mortgage industry. GMAC lost billions of dollars a quarter 
because of its mortgage loans, which in turn affected GM and Cerberus, which also owned a 
majority stake in Chrysler. The simple description of captives as a means for funding dealers and 
customers obscured the decades-long rise of GMAC as a financial powerhouse. Yet, in the Free 
Press, the auto industry was described as “the kind [of business] that gets your fingernails dirty” 
in contrast to the finance industry, which made money by “moving money around a board and 
skimming a percentage.”1081 Of course, the truth was that GM and its dealers had profited by 
taking a percentage. 
The “Americanness” of the Auto Bailout 
A point repeated through the hearings and the coverage of the auto bailout was that the 
auto industry was uniquely American. As Free Press reporter Mitch Albom put it, “America 
isn’t America without an auto industry.”1082 The auto industry positioned the bailout as the best 
way to save millions of jobs and American industry. This vision relied on the public’s vision of 
middle-class (white) America in the mid-twentieth century. CEOs who for decades had fought 
workers on their rights, draped themselves in the flag of the everyday, working American. They 
attempted to tap into the hostility that American’s feel toward snobbish behavior and ritzy jobs 
by proclaiming that the auto industry was for “Main Street,” even if that connection was tenuous, 
and by reminding the public that the auto industry had been a bastion of American greatness. 
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This greatness was predicated on shows of patriotism from the “Arsenal of Democracy” to 0% 
loans after September 11 and on the number of jobs provided by the industry.  
After the November hearing, auto industry executives were roundly criticized for flying 
in private jets to D.C. to ask for money. Yet, with little irony, Michigan representatives and the 
Free Press, borrowing the language of the auto industry, insisted that the bailout was for “Main 
Street.”1083 This language was repeated by John Dingell, a Representative from Michigan, in an 
op-ed in Free Press where he described the disjuncture he saw between the bailout for Wall 
Street and “Main Street.” He wrote, “The nation is debating the merits of yet another bailout of 
Wall Street. Meanwhile the rescue plan for Main Street – an economic stimulus package and a 
loan for the Detroit Three automakers – continues to stall in Congress.”1084 The “main street” 
language was also reflected in a GM issue ad published in the Detroit Free Press in December 
2008, after the second Congressional hearing. In the ad, GM stated, “Fact – What happens to the 
U.S. auto industry matters on Main Street.”1085  As a December 2008 Free Press article put it, 
“They pretended that they were dealing with three auto CEOs and a union boss they didn’t like 
rather than representatives of average Joes and Janes nationwide.”1086 The industry implied that 
the connection between Main Street and the auto industry was the massive amount of jobs that 
would have been affected by the Big 3’s bankruptcy. Despite GM’s practice of whipsawing and 
forcing workers to compete for union jobs, GM was positioned as a hero of “Main Street” and 
American labor.  
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Beyond opining about the “Main Street” nature of the auto industry, executives presented 
numbers that showed that millions of Americans were employed in auto manufacturing and 
related industries, such as repair and maintenance. U.S. auto manufacturers attempted to show 
their failure would have dire consequences for overall employment. As Rick Wagoner, GM’s 
CEO, argued, “The auto industry may be historically anchored in Detroit, but it reaches into 
every state and community in our nation.”1087 Yet, there was still a sense that this global industry 
was uniquely tied to Michigan and Detroit, particularly thanks to the Michigan representatives on 
the panel. As one Free Press writer put it, “Michigan would be ground zero for that economic 
catastrophe, the fiscal equivalent of Hurricane Katrina.”1088 Michigan had lost auto industry jobs 
for decades, as the U.S. auto industry moved jobs to the U.S. south and Mexico. The Free Press 
seemed to forget that Ypsilanti, Michigan, had been forced to compete with Arlington, Texas, for 
a factory and lost millions in tax dollars with the factory closure.  
 If Michigan was the center of the auto industry’s success, then opponents of the industry 
were positioned as “foreign” enemies, out of touch with Michigan and with the American auto 
industry. Southern senators and representatives who opposed the auto bailout, in part due to their 
ties to Toyota and other manufacturers who operated in the south to avoid union laws, were 
routinely identified in the Free Press and targeted with commentary such as “Notice any 
industrial states represented there?”1089 One Free Press writer even went to so far as to state, “It 
just grinds you, doesn’t it? I mean that a handful of senators from former Confederate states 
could so summarily sign a death warrant for the Michigan economy.”1090  It wasn’t that the Big 3 
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were out of touch with the American consumers, but that opposition to the bailout was un-
American. 
 The auto industry positioned manufacturing as uniquely American. One Free Press 
article, published without a byline three days before the hearing, opined, “Industry has been the 
core of the U.S. economy…Is the country really willing to quit on manufacturing, to cede our 
‘make things’ ethic to others and just become the world’s biggest customer?”1091 The auto 
industry was more than just manufacturing, more than a provider of jobs, it was intertwined with 
American values. The language capitalized on the growing sentiment that the U.S. did not 
produce enough and was too dependent on imports from China. It also mimicked the 
Americanness inherent in the Big 3’s advertising. GM had used September 11 to launch its 0% 
financing campaign in the name of patriotic consumption, as I described in Chapter 3. Beyond 
that campaign, GM had advertised its Chevy vehicles as an “American revolution.”  
 The uniquely American aspect of the auto industry was in part derived from its 
association with the “Arsenal of Democracy.” Surprisingly, Michigan’s representatives and the 
Free Press were more likely to make this association than auto industry executives.1092 In 
addition to this historic connection, representatives also mentioned auto industry involvement in 
current military production, which the industry lobbied heavily for.1093 The threat was that 
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foreign manufacturers could not be trusted to properly fulfill defense contracts.1094 Michigan’s 
representatives and the Free Press sought to remind the public that GM did its duty after 9/11 by 
offering 0% financing with “Keep America Rolling.”1095 Thus, the auto industry demonstrated 
value to America in two ways: through sales and through defense contracts. Yet, as I showed in 
Chapter 3, these promotions frequently came with downsides for consumers.  
Greenwashing the Criticism 
 In addition to establishing the American values represented by the auto industry, the 
industry also attempted to reverse course on decades of SUV promotion. As described in the 
previous chapter, the NHTSA first set Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 
1975. These standards require an average fuel economy across cars sold.1096 U.S. manufacturers 
were so successful in fighting CAFE regulations that they managed to get a loophole for SUVs 
and light trucks.1097 By 2008, the U.S. auto industry had spent decades fighting environmental 
regulations while pouring millions into advertising SUVs. Unfortunately, gas prices restricted the 
sale of SUVs. Yet, the image of a recalcitrant industry selling gas-guzzling vehicles was not 
going to persuade Congress or voters that the industry needed a bailout. Thus, the U.S. auto 
industry attempted to dissociate itself from SUV sales and anti-CAFE lobbying.  
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Virtually all automakers emphasized that the American public had misperceptions about 
how fuel efficient and popular their products were. Richard Wagoner’s Wall Street Journal op-ed 
mentioned the Chevy Malibu as an example of a best-selling car. Further, despite GM’s decades-
long reliance on trucks and SUVs, Wagoner argued that GM’s development of the Chevy Volt 
signaled their concern about environmental impact and fuel efficiency.1098 Observers who 
remembered GM’s EV1 electric car, likely did not find his argument compelling. The industry 
CEOs even used the first auto bailout hearing as an opportunity to promote their upcoming 
products. Their testimonies concerning “green” offerings were so much like advertisements that 
Barney Frank (D-MA) cut off the CEO of Ford stating, “Commercials can go later.”1099 Yet, the 
idea of a future with a fuel-efficient and “green” Detroit was not only promoted by the Big 3, but 
by Michigan’s representatives in Congress, who described the hybrids the industry offered and 
the electric vehicle that GM was developing.1100 Likewise, Free Press coverage emphasized that 
the Big 3 had to “to counter the mind-numbing amount of misinformation about Detroit that is 
prevalent in the public psyche.”1101 This “misinformation” included the Big 3’s reliance on SUVs 
and trucks, which they had gleefully supported for the past two decades.  
In response to the challenge for Detroit to prove that it was environmentally friendly, the 
Big 3 devised a PR campaign. Their CEOs had received criticism from Congress for flying to 
DC in private corporate jets for the first hearing. Congress felt that the jets showed how 
disconnected the CEOs were from the average American. GM even announced that it would be 
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returning two leased private jets because of the criticism.1102 For the second auto bailout hearing 
in December 2008, the auto industry CEOs arrived in hybrids developed by their companies.1103 
Yet, the Big 3’s advertisements for their future offerings was not a commitment to fuel efficiency 
or environmental policies, much like their university engineering competitions or experimental 
vehicles. Even as the CEOs begged for the life of their corporations, the auto industry fought 
California’s emissions standards, which would prove to be fatal to the Congressional vote on the 
bailout. 
California passed air pollution laws decades before the Clean Air Act. As a result, the 
federal government gave California a special exemption to pass anti-pollution laws, which can be 
adopted by other states. In 2007, California requested a waiver from the EPA to set its own 
emissions standards, as part of its privileges under the Clean Air Act.1104 The Bush 
Administration blocked the waiver in January 2008.1105 At the same time, the auto industry sued 
California to prevent any state from setting its own fuel efficiency standards. The Big 3 
attempted to greenwash their corporations by driving hybrids to DC, even as they were fighting 
future standards. For reform-minded environmentalists, the bailout presented an opportunity to 
achieve environmental change in the auto industry.1106 The auto industry maintained leverage 
over Congress for decades through jobs, campaign spending, and lobbying, but the bailout 
represented an opportunity for Congress to demand changes from Detroit.  
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 Public Citizen and the Union of Concerned Scientists viewed emissions regulations as an 
important component of any bailout. Public Citizen argued that a bailout must also be contingent 
on improved testing for fuel economy and the passage of a bill to ensure that California would 
continue to be able to set its own standards.1107 As I described in the previous chapter, these 
reflected long-term goals that Public Citizen had fought for. Claybrook specifically called for 40 
mpg CAFE by 2020, challenging Congress to take the industry’s claims that it was committed to 
more fuel-efficient vehicles seriously. Yet, CAFE was mentioned in the November hearing only 
a handful of times. Most of the time, Michigan representatives lambasted the cost of new CAFE 
regulations.1108 This echoed industry claims that CAFE was unnecessary, costly, and unsafe. 
Rick Wagoner even testified that GM would be unable to meet CAFE standards that were passed 
in 2007 by 2015.1109 Thus, from the hearing, one could conclude that the pressing issue was the 
harm from CAFE, not the benefit of fuel efficiency standards.  
 Public Citizen was not given the opportunity to testify in the either auto bailout hearing. 
Joan Claybrook instead offered testimony in a separate hearing after the second auto bailout 
hearing in December 2008.1110 Public Citizen argued that fuel economy changes would lead to a 
more competitive Big 3 that was better insulated from the changing oil prices. In the December 
hearing, She went as far as to suggest that auto manufacturers who achieved CAFE standards 
“should get a quarter-point reduction in the interest rate on these loans.1111 Claybrook further 
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argued that such standards would support “innovation” in the industry, particularly with the 
decline in SUV sales at the time. She was careful to craft policy suggestions that followed the 
logic of financial investment. Rather than focusing on the long-term reasons why emissions 
standards were important, Public Citizen framed it as a return on consumers investment with a 
more competitive industry. At the same time, Public Citizen pointed out at these regulations were 
necessary because self-regulatory bodies, such as the Partnership for a New Generation of 
Vehicles, had not led to any changes in the auto industry. Having greenwashed the public for 
decades, it was time for auto manufacturers to offer some real changes if they wanted to be 
bailed out with public dollars.  
 The Union of Concerned Scientists offered similar testimony to Public Citizen. Despite 
the absence of consumer perspectives in the first hearing, David Friedman, Research Director 
and Senior Engineer at the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), testified during the second 
hearing on the auto bailout in December 2008.1112 Friedman argued that auto manufacturers 
should not only be required to meet fuel efficiency standards, but they should be required to do 
so earlier. Despite Wagoner’s testimony that GM could not meet CAFE standards by 2015, 
documents provided by GM suggested otherwise. In their submission of documents to support 
the bailout, GM had suggested that they could develop fuel efficient vehicles quickly. Friedman 
effectively suggested that the public ask them to stay true to their greenwashing PR campaigns.  
Time and again, GM greenwashed the public and demonstrated they were not willing to 
substantially change their practices, as with the failed production of their first electric vehicle in 
the 1990s. Friedman suggested that meeting CAFE standards would not only be good for the 
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environment but would also save consumers billions on fuel costs. 1113 Friedman also called on 
the U.S. auto manufacturers to drop their lawsuit against California’s emissions standards, which 
they continued even after requesting bailout money. Because other states could implement 
California’s standards, their emissions standards would cover nearly 40% of the public. The 
broader application of California’s standards meant that it was not simply a niche policy, as the 
auto industry argued. UCS was also sensitive to critics’ concerns of timeliness. Friedman 
suggested an immediate short-term bailout could be passed with a longer-term one featuring the 
accountability standards suggested by UCS.1114 Although Friedman presented the UCS proposal 
to Congress, the second bailout hearing was still stacked in the favor of the auto industry.  
 Unfortunately, the bailout oversight measures suggested by Public Citizen and UCS did 
not materialize. The government took a backseat in its oversight of the bailed-out GM. The 
Senate voted down the bailout in December because of the disagreement over the California 
lawsuit and the conflict over union pay.1115 Even if GM and Chrysler had dropped the lawsuit, 
Ford and the foreign auto manufacturers would have still been free to pursue the California 
lawsuit.  In response to the Senate’s failure to pass the bailout, President Bush announced he 
would use TARP dollars to save auto manufacturers on December 24, 2008. Bush had received 
millions of dollars from business interest, including the oil and gas industries and the automotive 
industry including just over $4.5 million from both industries in 2004.1116 The oil and gas 
industry had long been allies of the auto industry, particularly in preventing alternative fuels.  
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Bush used executive power to approve an auto bailout rejected by the Senate and by 
voters.1117 Although GM argued for the bailout based on its role as a manufacturer, GMAC 
became a key bailout recipient. On December 31, 2008, GMAC became a bank holding company 
in order to receive money under TARP.1118 Although GMAC was rarely mentioned during the 
auto bailout discussion and news coverage, GMAC received $5 billion from the Treasury as a 
bank holding company, along with $2 billion from investors. In May 2009, GMAC would 
become the only bank subject to “stress tests” that received an additional bailout, in the amount 
of $7.5 billion. In the end, GMAC received more support from the auto bailout than Chrysler.1119  
 Contrary to the assertation that the auto bailout was not related to finance, GMAC’s 
treatment demonstrates manufacturing could not be separated from finance. GMAC needed a 
bailout because of its toxic mortgage holdings.1120 Unlike GM and Chrysler, GMAC’s potential 
profitability had not been discussed and may have posed more risk to taxpayers than GM and 
Chrysler.1121 In addition, the Obama Administration had not considered the possibility of 
salvaging only GMAC’s auto finance business. The only possibility under the TARP bailout was 
to save all of GMAC, including its numerous toxic mortgage assets. GMAC was treated 
differently from the other banks bailed out and from the auto industry. GMAC was bailed out 
twice, and, unlike GM and Chrysler, GMAC’s shareholders retained their shared of GMAC.1122  
After the bailouts, GMAC was bigger than it was before and more intertwined with the auto 
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industry. No official explanation was offered by the Treasury as to why GMAC was treated 
differently.1123   
 GM had spent decades focused on using GMAC and SUVs for profit. Yet, when it came 
time to argue for a bailout, GM argued that it was not in the financing business, even though its 
financing arm would receive more bailout money than Chrysler.1124 Further, GM attempted to 
greenwash its business practices again by arguing that it was shifting away from SUVs, even 
while lobbying against CAFE in the auto bailout hearings and through the California lawsuit. 
GM used the bailout as an opportunity to use its PR and media connections to promote GM as a 
“green” company that was the victim of the financial industry, just like homeowners throughout 
the U.S. The Detroit media defended its home industry, without considering whether a bailout 
with environmental and financial standards would be better for Michigan and the world.   
Missed Opportunities and Criticism  
 As described above, Public Citizen and UCS argued that the bailout was an opportunity 
to ask for accountability for Detroit. However, because the bailout funds came from the 
executive branch, that opportunity was largely missed. The executive branch bailout provided 
money to support the industry under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which did not 
include policy changes advocated by consumer groups and their allies. This section follows up 
on three debates that came up during or before the bailout. In this section, I show how the auto 
industry has recently fought back against some regulations implemented after the bailout. First, I 
describe the current debate over fuel economy and emissions and show why the compromise in 
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2008 was not enough to address the public interest in regulating emissions. Second, I describe 
the power of auto dealers and two missed opportunities for intervening in the public interest. 
Finally, I describe how the right successfully scapegoated the UAW, forcing them to 
compromise and putting aside discussions of labor rights.  
Even as they received an injection of federal dollars, auto manufacturers were not forced 
to drop their lawsuit against California’s fuel efficiency standards.1125 However, the Obama 
Administration brokered a deal between states and the automakers for an improved national fuel 
efficiency standard of 35 mpg on average by 2020, lower than the 40 mpg that some consumer 
advocates wanted. Consumer advocates from Public Citizen and UCS raised concerns that auto 
manufacturers had engaged in greenwashing for decades, but those concerns went largely 
unheeded. Currently, the auto industry is greenwashing while fighting California’s standards. 
GM’s recent promotion of the Chevy Bolt, a predecessor of the Volt, has paired with continued 
lobbying against California’s fuel standards. Auto industry advocates argue that California 
cannot claim that auto emissions are a factor in global warming, despite overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary.1126 The auto industry further asserts that California’s emissions standards would 
lead to a “patchwork” of laws, even though only California is allowed separate standards that 
other states can adopt.1127 The CAFE increase under President Obama represented a partial 
solution, but did not go as far as it could have. In addition, the industry has continued to fight 
emissions regulations, despite PR claiming that auto manufacturers are committed to electric 
vehicles.  
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 Recently, the auto industry found an ally in the Trump Administration. EPA Director 
Scott Pruitt recently suggested revising the emissions standards, and auto manufacturers praised 
removing standards as “the single most important decision the E.P.A. has made in recent 
history.”1128 The EPA’s decision prompted California to fighting the Trump Administration’s 
emissions standards. The Administration argues, as the auto industry has in the past, that 
emissions are not related to global warming.1129 Repealing California’s wavier would allow the 
auto industry to continue to drag its feet on electric vehicles, as it has for decades since the EV1 
experiment.1130 Auto manufacturers have claimed over and over again that they want to produce 
more fuel-efficient cars. However, repeatedly they have shown that those claims are 
greenwashing as they willing to forego producing electric and compact vehicles in favor of 
SUVs and trucks. Despite the decline in SUV sales in 2007 and 2008, SUVs are still on top of 
the market and are more profitable than compact and electric vehicles.1131 Still, despite the battle 
over selling SUVs, the fight over CAFE and California’s standards comes down to deregulation. 
The California law contains the same flaws as previous CAFE regulations. It allows automakers 
to skirt the most stringent requirements if they sell more SUVs and trucks,1132 meaning that this 
is ultimately about the long-term battle for deregulation waged by industries writ large.  
 The bailout presented an opportunity to address emissions regulations and tie them to 
federal support for the auto industry. Unfortunately, industry was able to conjure up fears that 
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these regulations were not timely or necessary because of plans for fuel efficient vehicles, 
including the now-defunct Chevy Volt. Yet, these plans, like their claims in the past, were 
ultimately greenwashing. They were a public relations attempt to show that the industry was 
finally listening to public interest. The auto industry’s allies, including representatives in 
Congress and the newspaper industry, repeatedly emphasized these industry talking points and 
mentioned the upcoming vehicles as evidence of the Big 3’s change of heart. Unfortunately, the 
Big 3 have done nothing of substance to indicate actual change. 
 The auto industry also turned to a tried-and-true ally: auto dealers. Auto dealers wield 
enormous political power because they are present in nearly every Congressional district. 
Although dealers are politically powerful, some can still fall victim to auto manufacturers. 
During the bankruptcy proceedings for GM and Chrysler, thousands of dealers were casualties. 
Although many agreed that some dealers needed to close to restore profitability, the choice of 
which dealers to close seemed capricious. The chief complaint among both Republicans and 
Democrats was how auto dealers were being treated and how they would be helped.1133 One 
problem identified by Congress was that minority dealers were more likely to close than other 
dealers, but neither the auto industry nor Congress attempted to salvage them.1134 Thus, while 
dealers as a group proved politically powerful during the bailout hearings, not all dealers equally 
benefitted.1135  
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 The Dodd-Frank bill resulted from the political momentum in the years after the bailouts. 
Yet, the bill left the auto loan industry largely untouched because dealers were too politically 
powerful. As I described in Chapter 3, dealer markups are when a dealer charges a higher rate 
than the consumer qualified for and profits off the difference in interest. These markups cost 
consumers billions of dollars annually. Consumers Union argued that the dealer justify 
regulating auto dealers who lend to consumers under the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.1136  A loophole exempting auto dealers was included in the House version of the Dodd-
Frank bill, but not the Senate version.1137 As the bill was put together in conference, Congress 
added a last-minute provision to exempt auto dealers.1138 In the end, auto loan regulation was 
split between the CFPB, which covered lenders, and the FTC, which covered dealers.1139 In 
2013, the CFPB managed to regulate dealer markups through auto finance companies, creating a 
cap on markups that could be charged by dealers. Though not eliminated, the CFPB hoped to 
minimize the impact and discriminatory use of markups.1140  
 The regulations were not around for long. With dealers in every Congressional district, 
auto manufacturers and dealers undid the CFPB regulations. In 2018, the House and Senate 
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passed a Congressional Review Act resolution ending the restrictions.1141 The removal of the rule 
was greeted by industry supporters as a welcome end to illegal regulation. Consumer groups saw 
the repeal of the regulations as legalizing discrimination in auto lending through dealer markups, 
which are disproportionately higher for consumers of color. Unfortunately, the impact of dealer 
markups and even of regulation is sparsely covered by non-trade press and business outlets. 
Because of the clout that local dealers wield as advertisers, journalists struggle to report stories 
that involve local dealers, meaning that these issues go undiscussed.1142 The debate over the auto 
bailout drew a clear line between auto manufacturing and auto finance to the benefit of auto 
dealers. Auto financiers have faced less scrutiny than their counterparts in the mortgage industry, 
even as concerns about the quality of auto loans are on rise.1143 The auto bailout was a missed 
opportunity to interrogate how financialization had changed the auto industry.  
 The final area in which the public lost the opportunity for policy changes was related to 
labor unions. The UAW was forced to shoulder part of the blame for the bailout. Conservative 
leaders, who saw the bailout as an opportunity to decimate the already weakened American labor 
union, scrutinized contract benefits such as healthcare for retirees and wages. The right’s plan to 
blame labor for the bailout worked. Nearly half of the public blamed labor unions for excesses in 
their contracts, although executives received the most blame.1144 Labor unions failed to articulate 
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their value to the public and to explain that “excesses” of the UAW contract were securities that 
all workers should have access to, like healthcare. Union leaders focused on explaining 
concessions that the UAW had already made, rather than discussing the social structures that 
necessitated these benefits.1145 The UAW was forced to make even more concessions as GM and 
Chrysler filed for bankruptcy in the spring.1146 Because a strike would trigger an automatic 
default of the loans, UAW workers lost the ability to strike during their next contract 
negotiation.1147  
 The bailout could have presented an opportunity to protect UAW workers and reaffirm 
the value of the labor movement. Instead, the UAW was forced to side with the industry or risk 
losing all their jobs. Union testimony largely consisted of concessions already made by union 
workers. Despite the already lowered UAW pay scale, the UAW was tarnished by the perception 
that workers were paid the equivalent of $70 an hour. The estimate included benefits that were 
given not only to current workers, but also to retired workers. A straight comparison to workers 
overseas ignored the fact that those workers benefitted from social programs such as national 
health insurance. Representatives expressed that their constituents felt a sense of jealousy or 
“unfairness” toward union workers and that non-union workers and should not be asked to bail 
out workers who made so much more than them.1148 Labor unions failed to articulate their value 
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to American workers during the bailout hearings, although public perception of labor unions has 
since rebounded.1149  
Conclusion  
Advertising opens a gateway for advertisers to influence commercial media, as the 
example of the GM-NBC fuel tank scandal demonstrates. In this chapter, I argue that coverage of 
the auto bailout in the Free Press largely reflected the biases of industry PR and lobbying 
because of the close relationship between the industry and the Detroit press. Although the 
Congressional measure failed, the auto industry ended up with a bailout from President Bush and 
later bankruptcy and bailouts from President Obama. The industry avoided accountability for its 
greenwashing and avoided scrutiny over its financial practices, even though GMAC received 
multiple bailouts under the TARP automotive program. Further, the Free Press coverage 
excluded alternative possibilities for regulation proposed by Public Citizen and UCS. Ultimately, 
the industry remained largely unchanged by regulatory reforms after the bailout and even 
returned to their same greenwashing tactics in a few years. Despite little success convincing the 
public of the value of an auto bailout in 2008, the auto industry’s reputation has since recovered, 
with more than half of Americans approving of their performance.1150 Likewise, unions fared 
badly during the bailout hearings, but their reputation has more than recovered. In Janus v. 
AFSCME, the Supreme Court ruled that unions could not collect fees from non-members 
represented by their collective bargaining agreements. This has weakened the power of unions, 
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which threatens the balance of power between unions and corporations. In this political 




CHAPTER 8:  
GM’S PROMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE COMMERCIAL MEDIA 
Introduction  
 
From 1990 to 2009, GM struggled, grew to dominate the SUV market, and then entered a 
government-funded bailout and bankruptcy. GM used finance and SUVs to profit, despite the 
negative impact on consumers’ finances, safety, and the environment. In 2008, when the housing 
market collapsed, a lack of available credit combined with slow auto sales propelled the already 
floundering U.S. auto manufacturers into mounting debt. GM lost billions. As I described in the 
previous chapter, GM’s PR and lobbying in 2008 eschewed its financial prowess and SUV 
profiteering to present a fuel efficient, forward-looking company. This narrative failed to gain 
enough traction in Congress but did earn the corporation a bailout from the Bush Administration. 
Under Bush and Obama, the government bailed out both the auto and the banking industry. The 
banks received $700 billion dollars under TARP, while the auto industry received about $100 
billion total under a few bailouts.1151 Today, we remember the auto bailout for saving an 
industry, but the far-reaching goals they promised us were not achieved. GM has failed to live up 
to its promotional communication, which has dire consequences for consumer safety and the 
environment.  
GM After the Bailout  
Although the public was skeptical of the auto bailout, today it is remembered as a key 
part of President Obama’s legacy, a successful public policy that jump started a flailing 
                                                          




industry.1152 After the 2008 bailout, GM petitioned the new Obama Administration for additional 
bailout money. Unfortunately, this infusion of capital could not stave off decades of problems. 
Nearly one hundred years after it was founded, GM filed for bankruptcy, rebranding as the “New 
GM.”1153 In 2009, an institutional ad campaign pushed GM’s “reinvention” after the bailout, and 
the first thing to go were excessive GM brands. GM’s years of “badge engineering” had whittled 
down the value of its multitude of brands. Saturn, once the symbol of GM’s shift toward 
Japanese-style cars, lost nearly two-thirds of its sales since 1995. The auto manufacturer 
eliminated Saturn, Hummer, and Pontiac, choosing to maintain the iconic Chevrolet brand, along 
with Cadillac, GMC, and Buick, which is enormously popular in China.1154 GM, once a global 
brand, cut down on its international operations and reformed itself as a smaller company.  
During the bailout debate, GM promised to sell more fuel-efficient and electric vehicles. 
However, the industry looks much the same as it did before the bailout. GM, with about 18% of 
sales, still leads the market. Many of those sales are SUVs, which continue to be profitable and 
popular.1155 GM has produced two electric cars since the bailout: the discontinued Chevy Volt 
and the new Chevy Bolt. As of March 2019, GM made assurances that the Bolt would soon be 
joined by other electric vehicles.1156 However, as Chapter 5 showed, GM has made promises 
about electric vehicles in the past that have yet to be followed up on. By 2035, the world will 
have nearly 2 billion vehicles. Although the number of electric vehicles may be up to 220 million 
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by then, the vast majority will be traditional combustion vehicles.1157 Unfortunately, the 
popularity of SUVs has already increased greenhouse gas emissions around the globe. The path 
to a zero-carbon future requires changing the auto industry.1158  
Critically, after the bailout, GM lost control of GMAC, a source of profits. GMAC’s 
bailouts exist at the nexus of the auto bailouts and the bank bailouts. GMAC was not “too big to 
fail.” The company had invested in subprime mortgages, and those mortgages had led to losses. 
The captive finance company received government support in part because it was infected by the 
malignant practices that crippled that rest of the financial services industry and in part because 
Congress and others believed GMAC was essential to the survival of GM. GMAC became a 
bank holding company, but it was treated differently during the crisis and bailout than the other 
affected financial companies and auto companies.1159 It was even treated differently than 
Chrysler Financial Services which was allowed to fail while GMAC took over loans for 
Chrysler, funded by the government.1160 Unlike GM and Chrysler, GMAC was not restructured, 
nor was it required to show how it would avoid the losses that led to TARP bailouts.1161 In 2010, 
GMAC became Ally Financial, but maintained a close business relationship with GM. That same 
year, GM purchased AmeriCredit, a subprime lender. AmeriCredit became the new GM 
Financial, although GM still maintained dealings with Ally until 2013.1162  
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The Bailout and Reform  
The period after the auto and bank bailouts promised change. The Obama Administration 
immediately began considering new fuel economy rules, which the auto industry was forced to 
accept.1163 Although those rules ostensibly required auto manufacturers to produce vehicles that 
averaged over 50 miles per gallon by 2035, the complicated system of credits for fuel economy 
meant that vehicles would really have to average about 36 miles per gallon.1164 Further, 
California agreed to not set any standards in addition to the Obama rules, a compromise long-
favored by the auto industry, which decried the “patchwork” of laws that would result from 
California’s rules. While the auto industry appeared to acquiesce in the face of a new political 
reality, the rules were not as dire as they appeared.  
Congress also imparted new regulations on the financial services industry. In 2011, 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank importantly created the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, which instituted new regulations to protect consumers’ financial interests. 
The disparate treatment of GMAC continued under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB). As Joseph Stiglitz observed, “under political pressure, auto loans, the second most 
important form of lending, after mortgages – were given an exemption.”1165 The auto industry’s 
dealer allies played an important role in exempting auto loans from regulations. Auto industry 
lobbyists successfully excluded dealer financing, where 80% of auto loans originate, from the 
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CFPB’s jurisdiction.1166 As I explained in Chapter 3, loans from auto dealers are often subject to 
markup rates, which more heavily impact minority borrowers. Loans with dealer markups cost 
consumers billions of dollars annually.1167  
In 2013, the CFPB published a bulletin that advised indirect auto lenders, including both 
banks and non-banks that back auto loans, how to keep their practices in line with the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act.1168 The bulletin makes clear that bank and non-bank lenders should 
exercise more control over markup rates and be aware when dealer markups may be the result of 
discrimination. The CFPB further advises, “eliminating dealer discretion to mark up [sic] buy 
rates and fairly compensating dealers using another mechanism, such as a flat fee per transaction, 
that does not result in discrimination.”1169 Further, the CFPB found evidence that Ally, formerly 
GMAC, had discriminated against borrowers of color between 2011 and 2013. Ally was ordered 
by the Department of Justice to pay $80 million in damages to affected customers.1170 Through 
this bulletin, the CFPB attempted to regulate dealer markups.  
The CFPB’s regulations were poorly received. Republicans attacked the CFPB for 
“unconstitutional” and “out-of-control” behavior.1171 Industry analysts posited that the CFPB’s 
efforts to prevent discrimination would drive up the cost of loans for all consumers.1172 In 2017, 
                                                          
1166 Steven Davidoff Solomon, “Protection Bureau’s Stormy Path to Reform the Auto Finance Industry,” The New 
York Times, December 1, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/business/dealbook/protection-bureaus-
stormy-path-to-reform-the-auto-finance-industry.html. 
1167 Jeff Horwitz, “CFPB Auto Loan Probe Has Banks Fretting,” American Banker 177, no. 90 (June 12, 2012): 1–5. 
1168 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-02, March 21, 2013, 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf; Rachel Witkowski, “The 
Inside Story of the CFPB’s Battle over Auto Lending,” American Banker 180, no. 151 (September 29, 2015): 7. 
1169 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-02. 
1170 Kevin M. McDonald, “Automotive Finance: The Regulatory Cup Spilleth Over,” Business Lawyer 71, no. 2 
(Spring 2017): 713–22. 
1171 “Spat between CFPB, GOP Intensifies with Auto Lending Report,” American Banker 182, no. 12 (January 19, 
2017): 1. 




the Government Accountability Office found that the 2013 bulletin should be subject to 
Congressional review as a new “general statement of policy and a rule under the [Congressional 
Review Act].”1173 The GAO’s decision meant that Congress could review the CFPB rule even 
though it had been made five years earlier. In 2018, Congress repealed the CFPB rule, allowing 
auto dealers to apply markups to loans.1174 Auto dealers can now apply disparate markups to 
people of color and less attention will be given to whether those loans are predatory. 
In addition to the regulatory problems facing auto loans, market observers have also 
questioned the quality of auto loans. The number of subprime auto loans has grown in the past 
few years. Like subprime mortgage loans, subprime auto loans are more likely to default. This 
has caused observers to compare the auto industry in 2017 with the mortgage industry a decade 
earlier.1175 In addition to the growth in subprime loans, the length of auto loans has grown. 
Longer auto loans have become popular because borrowers can pay lower monthly payments. 
However, over the life of the loan, the borrower pays more interest and is at a greater risk of 
default.1176  These concerning trends in the auto industry suggest that the need for further 
examination and possible regulation. However, in the current regulatory atmosphere, that is 
unlikely.  
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The State of Auto Safety  
In the aftermath of the bailouts, federal regulators addressed both fuel economy and 
financial regulations. Both standards have now been rolled back under the Trump 
Administration. In contrast, auto safety was not a focus of regulatory changes after the auto 
bailout. The auto industry has worked for decades to erode auto safety regulations, as I explained 
in Chapter 4. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the NHTSA issued a flurry of regulations. Since the 
late 1980s, however, the auto industry has used its lobbying power to erode the funding and 
authority of the NHTSA. The NHTSA has been captured by the industry and often works with 
auto manufacturers, even when companies are accused of violations, as in the case of the GM 
ignition switch scandal.1177 In 2019, the NHTSA budget was $914 million.1178 Of that, about 
16% went to auto safety. Most of the NHTSA budget is dedicated to highway traffic safety 
grants. The NHTSA’s captured status and its lack of resources means that some newer safety 
issues, such as autonomous vehicle safety, do not have adequate resources.  
In the years since the bailout, the auto industry has promised that autonomous vehicles 
are being developed to ease consumers’ lives, the most advanced of which would drive 
themselves. According to the auto manufacturers, automated cars offer improved safety by 
removing humans from the equation.1179 At the same time, autonomous vehicles would open cars 
to other safety issues, such as hacking and cybersecurity. Despite the benefits of autonomous 
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vehicles, Americans remain skeptical. A 2018 Gallup poll found that 75% of Americans “would 
use a human-operated car even if driverless cars were common” and 52% “would never want to 
use a self-driving car.”1180 Yet, the NHTSA has only issued voluntary guidelines for autonomous 
vehicle safety and does not have the funds to do large scale testing.1181 Instead of government 
standards, industry will likely develop many of the standards for autonomous vehicles. 
Automated Vehicle Safety Consortium (AVSC) is an industry group designed to create 
the voluntary regulatory rules for automated vehicles, thanks to Secretary of Transportation 
Elaine Chao’s decision to cede NHTSA authority.1182 The 2019 NHTSA budget proposal reports 
that the NHTSA plans to “[reduce] regulatory barriers to technology innovation,” meaning that 
the industry will be able to determine what autonomous vehicle regulations should exist and how 
those regulations should be implemented.1183 Unfortunately, self-regulation can put consumers at 
risk. Autonomous vehicles are an opportunity for the auto industry to reap huge profits a from a 
new technology. Auto manufacturers might fail to adequately assess safety considerations 
because they want to get the cars out to the market as quickly as possible, as in the case of the 
more marketable large fuel tanks on GM’s C/K model trucks.  
The Auto Industry and Promotional Communication  
  This dissertation has been a case study of GM’s promotional communication. General 
Motors' promotional communication from 1990 to 2009 illustrates some flaws in the commercial 
                                                          
1180 Megan Brenan, “Driverless Cars Are a Tough Sell to Americans,” Gallup, May 15, 2018, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/234416/driverless-cars-tough-sell-americans.aspx. 
1181 Department of Transportation, “U.S. Department of Transportation Releases ‘Preparing for the Future of 
Transportation: Automated Vehicles 3.0,’” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), October 4, 
2018, https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/us-department-transportation-releases-preparing-future-transportation-
automated. 
1182 Clifford Atiyeh, “Ford, GM, and Toyota Agree We Have No Plan on How to Make Autonomous Cars Safe.” 
1183 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Budget Estimates: Fiscal Year 2019. 
298 
 
media system. Through this period, two themes dominated GM’s promotional communication: 
finance and SUVs. GM sold dangerous, environmentally unsound SUVs and received a bailout 
with few strings attached. Each chapter contributed to my argument by highlighting problems in 
GM's promotional communication. Chapter 1 presented the historical context of GM’s growth. 
Chapter 2 chronicled GM’s promotional communication before 1990. Chapter 3 described how 
GM used financial promotions to sell SUVs, while still profiting from vehicle sales. Chapter 4 
showed how GM used safetywashing while lobbying the NHTSA to prevent regulations of 
SUVs. Chapter 5 showed how GM used greenwashing lobbying against Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) regulations. Finally, Chapter 6 discussed how GM attempted to distance itself 
from two decades of activity to gain a bailout from the government. In the following section, I 
review the argument of each chapter to synthesize my argument before ending with a discussion 
about needed reforms in commercial media.  
 Promotional communication is “commercial propaganda.”1184 Through advertising and 
public relations, corporations attempt to influence the behavior of consumers and citizens. As I 
have shown, commercial propaganda is more than “spin.” GM’s advertising has impacted what 
financial offers consumer seek, which has impacted their loan payments and debt. Likewise, 
GM’s SUV ads often tied into the perception that SUVs were safe, which was also used as a part 
of anti-CAFE lobbying campaign. GM’s PR campaign attempted to present small cars as unsafe, 
fundamentally altering the debate over CAFE by inserting safety considerations as an issue. 
These efforts were complemented by corporate social responsibility campaigns that served as 
safetywashing and greenwashing, presenting GM as more safety and environmentally conscious 
than it was. These efforts shaped how consumers perceive the auto industry and ultimately set 
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back progress on fuel efficiency and safety regulations. The “auto-industrial complex” has 
shaped policymaking and purchasing around automobiles to the detriment of the planet.1185  
 In Chapter 1, I described how the automobile and GM rose to prominence during the 
twentieth century. As an “epoch making” invention, the automobile transformed U.S. society; 
millions of workers are employed by the auto industry and related industries, and millions more 
are dependent on automobiles for everyday life.1186 GM became the largest auto manufacturer in 
the world because of its innovative approach to advertising vehicles. Using annual style changes 
and models to create consumer interest in changing vehicles more frequently, GM also expanded 
credit available to consumers beginning in 1919 with the creation of General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation (GMAC).1187 After World War II, populations moved to the suburbs, propelled by 
the ability to commute in their personal automobiles.1188 Because of competition from foreign 
manufacturers and the oil crises of the 1970s, GM shifted toward “badge engineering,” 
marketing nearly identical vehicles under different names.1189 During this period, financiers 
assumed control of GM and used financial promotions to increase interest in otherwise 
unappealing designs.1190 Financial promotions grew in importance during the 1990s and 2000s as 
GM expanded its production of SUVs and GMAC’s financial offerings.  
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 In Chapter 2, I described GM’s promotional communication strategies before 1990. GM 
utilized institutional advertising to create the image of the “famous family” of GM brands.1191 
Family continued to be an important theme in GM’s advertising, even as GM whittled down its 
brands after the 2009 bailout. A key element of my analysis was GM’s product advertising. GM 
developed the first advertisements that included installment plans, as well as annual styles and 
models. These ads modernized the industry and influenced strategies of “planned obsolescence” 
used in other industries.1192 Beginning in the 1980s, GM modernized financial promotions with 
an emphasis on national interest rate promotions. These promotions became a dominant 
advertising strategy in the 1990s and 2000s, achieving success alongside SUVs.  
 Chapter 2 also addressed GM’s public relations strategies. Prior to World War I, PR 
developed as a reaction to muckraking journalism, mainly as a defensive strategy to protect 
corporations from criticism.1193 After World War I, corporations began to use PR to shape 
“facts” and to protect themselves against the threat of the New Deal. GM’s PR emphasized how 
the free market had enabled the auto manufacturer to produce wonderful technological 
advancements.1194 During World War II, GM became a defense contractor and shifted its PR and 
advertising to emphasize patriotic themes.1195 In the post-war period, criticism from Ralph Nader 
and the environmental movement upset GM’s industry dominance. In Unsafe at Any Speed, 
Nader attacked the auto industry for its lack of concern over consumer safety. Nader focused part 
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of his attack on GM’s stylish but unsafe Corvair.1196 GM’s investigation into Nader backfired, 
and the modern auto safety movement was born. For the first time, GM faced federal safety 
regulations under the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). NHTSA also 
became the primary regulator for the first fuel economy regulations passed in 1975.1197 Safety 
and the environment became the focal points of GM’s PR campaigns in the following decades as 
GM worked to capture the NHTSA and rollback regulations.  
 Chapter 2 also chronicled the relationship between GM and the news media, with an 
emphasis on GM’s labor relations. Most media outlets in the U.S. are commercial and funded 
primarily by advertising. Auto manufacturers, led by GM and its legions of local dealers, are 
some of the biggest advertisers in the world. For decades, press critics have argued that 
advertising can bias coverage in favor of advertisers by either censorship or avoidance of 
issues.1198 Over time, this has meant that corporate PR is more likely to be published, while labor 
coverage has been de-emphasized.1199 The emphasis on corporate perspectives means that 
coverage of “whipsawing” emphasized the drama of communities competing for GM factories, 
rather than the question of why GM put these communities through this process.1200 The 
corporate perspective is also emphasized when discussing auto safety, finance, and other issues. 
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Although consumer news is popular, consumer issues subject major advertisers, like auto 
dealers, to significant scrutiny. This scrutiny has resulted in less coverage of consumer issues.1201 
 Chapter 3 continued with a discussion of how GM co-promoted GMAC auto loans and 
SUVs from 1990 to 2009. As the market leader, GM initiated financial promotions that spread to 
the other U.S. auto manufacturers. With the growing popularity of SUVs, financial promotions 
became even more profitable. The high cost of SUVs meant that they were already more 
profitable than cars; thousands of dollars of discounts still left room for profitability.1202 After 
September 11th, GM began a “Keep America Rolling” 0% financing program to jump-start 
flagging sales.1203 The program was hailed as patriotic, a theme that would be returned to in 2008 
and 2009. GM continued to return to 0% financing programs in the years following. Yet, the 
loans were not as good as they appeared to be. These loans were not available to most 
consumers.1204 Other ads emphasized low monthly payments, which often came with longer 
financing terms, leading to a greater possibility of delinquency. Further, the loan ads primarily 
drove customers to dealerships, where inscrutable auto loans were often packed with other fees 
and charges.1205 Although American financial literacy is low,1206 there have been few inquiries 
                                                          
1201 Steven Waldman, “Consumer News Blues,” Newsweek, May 20, 1991; Maryann Keller, Collision: GM, Toyota, 
Volkswagen, and the Race to Own the 21st Century (New York: Doubleday, 1993); Ronald K. L. Collins, “Cars & 
Censorship: How Advertising Pressure Can Corrupt a Free Press,” Advancing the Consumer Interest 4, no. 2 (1992): 
6–12. 
1202 Bradsher, High and Mighty. 
1203 “More than Zero: Financing Deals Confound Skeptics,” Newsweek, September 16, 2002; Dave Guilford, 
“Looking Back: The 0% Solution,” Automotive News 86, no. 6480 (September 5, 2011). 
1204 John Welbes, “Zero-Percent Auto-Loan Financing Returns,” Saint Paul Pioneer Press, July 3, 2002; “More than 
Zero: Financing Deals Confound Skeptics,” Newsweek. 
1205 William J. Holstein, “Zero Percent: The Fine Print Counts,” New York Times, November 9, 2001; Jon Linkov, 
“How to Get the Best Car Loan,” Consumer Reports, April 18, 2018, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-
financing/get-the-best-car-loan/.  
1206 Udo Reifner and Isabel Herwig, “Consumer Education and Information Rights in Financial Services,” 
Information & Communication Technology Law 12, no. 2 (June 2003): 125–42; Andrew Leyshon, Nigel Thrift, and 
Jonathan Pratt, “Reading Financial Services: Texts, Consumers, and Financial Literacy,” Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space 16 (1998): 29–55. 
303 
 
into the deceptive nature of auto loans. A 2014-2015 FTC inquiry found that many auto loans 
were deceptive, particularly in the fine print. Reforms favored by Public Citizen and other groups 
could improve consumer understanding of auto loan contracts.1207  
 Chapter 4 argued that GM’s PR and lobbying worked in complementary ways to 
influence auto safety regulation. GM used corporate social responsibility programs to emphasize 
individual responsibility in auto safety, such as through partnerships with Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD) and the National SAFE KIDS Campaign. This safetywashing covered 
up GM’s lobbying against NHTSA safety regulations.  In this chapter, I explore how the NHTSA 
has become a “captured” regulatory agency, which has consequences for consumer safety and 
the environment.1208 The NHTSA turned major safety issues, such as vehicle incompatibility, 
over to industry groups, a practice that has continued with current safety issues, such as 
automated driving systems. Public pressure led to some changes, but the changes were not as 
robust as those preferred by consumer groups, as in the case of the NHTSA’s rollover test.1209 
The captured nature of the NTHSA and its effect on consumer safety was apparent in the case of 
the GM ignition switch scandal. Although problems with the ignition in some GM vehicles were 
detected in 2001, vehicles continued to be manufactured with the flawed system until 2014. Even 
after the public learned of the deaths from the ignition switch problem, GM only instituted a 
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voluntary recall.1210 Many consumers will not bring their recalled vehicles in, meaning that 
vehicles with safety issues can remain on the roads for years.  
 In Chapter 5, I addressed GM’s other major PR area: environmental regulations. I argued 
that GM used greenwashing PR to detract from anti-CAFE lobbying. Beginning in the 1970s,1211 
GM and its industry allies, such as the Business Roundtable, financed PR and lobbying 
campaigns to prevent CAFE regulations.1212 The auto manufacturer was successful in avoiding 
CAFE regulations for decades.1213 Through promotional campaigns, GM greenwashed using its 
EV1 vehicle, which was more of a gimmick than the gateway to an electrical vehicle future. GM 
also spent heavily on university education through philanthropy and engineering contests. The 
chapter addressed how GM integrated GMAC into its strategic philanthropy through a 
partnership with Habitat for Humanity. This partnership built relationships in GM communities, 
which were fraught because of labor problems and “whipsawing.” However, support for Habitat 
for Humanity could not undo the tax dollars lost through tax abatements. Corporations continue 
to elicit costly deals form cities, while offering philanthropy as a lesser replacement to social 
services.1214  
 Finally, Chapter 6 brought together the influence of advertising and PR on the 
commercial media. In that chapter, I argued that the Detroit Free Press had been compromised 
by its long-term relationship with GM. The Detroit Free Press was part of a news monopoly 
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under the Joint Operating Agreement in Detroit. The JOA made the Free Press part of the USA 
Today network, which receives a lot of funding from GM.1215 Furthermore, some observers in 
Detroit felt that the JOA had decreased the differences between the Free Press and Detroit News 
coverage.1216 Most articles published on the bailout followed the arguments from GM’s PR and 
GM’s congressional allies. These articles de-emphasized consumer interests, while prioritizing 
necessity of saving the patriotic auto industry. Although the public rejected the auto bailout, 
which failed to pass Congress, President Bush approved a bailout of the auto industry, 
supplemented by bailouts under the Obama Administration.  
 The Commercial Media and the Continuing Influence of GM 
 In Dollarocracy, John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney chronicled how the “money-
and-media election complex” has altered American politics. Corporations and their donations to 
political action committees (PACs) and candidates are one part of the equation. In the 2018 
election cycle, GM spent about $2.4 million on candidates and PACs. GM donates to both 
Republicans and Democrats, although Democrats, including Debbie Stabenow of Michigan and 
Beto O’Rourke of Texas, received the largest donations.1217 In addition, GM spent about $7.7 
million on lobbying in 2018. The auto industrial complex is part of the “money-and-media 
election complex.” The auto industrial complex also operates outside of the election cycle to 
influence public policy through lobbying, PR, and advertising. GM has used commercial media 
to shape public policy for decades. In the 1990s and 2000s, despite intense criticism by public 
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interest groups, GM sold SUVs, avoided CAFE regulations, and prevented safety changes to 
SUVs for years. 
The trends in GM’s promotional communication from 1990 to 2009 continue to impact 
consumer safety and the environment. In 2018, Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao argued that 
the Trump Administration needed to rollback Obama’s fuel economy standards. Secretary Chao 
proposed to “Make Cars Great Again” by “giv[ing] consumers greater access to safer, more 
affordable vehicles, while continuing to protect the environment.”1218 The Trump administration 
continued to propagate the faulty science that more fuel-efficient cars were less safe. This was a 
key point of GM’s anti-CAFE lobbying, and it continues to be a factor in fuel economy 
legislation. Similarly, a trade publication praised the change, stating “Of course, everyone likes 
clean air. Who doesn’t? But we also like inexpensive cars, fewer auto-related deaths and more 
secure and better-paid jobs for autoworkers – all of which will result from the change.”1219 These 
complaints reflected those the auto industry made in the wake of the Obama-era fuel economy 
legislation. As with previous CAFE raises, the auto industry complained that hundreds of 
thousands of jobs would be lost and that car prices would rise by about $1,800.1220 These 
concerns echo those from a decade ago.  
The Trump Administration also granted auto manufacturers’ long-standing request to 
challenge California’s authority to set its own standards. California has sued the EPA, along with 
17 other states, to fight for its right to set fuel economy standards and maintain the Obama-era 
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rules.1221 Even though the Trump administration has deployed the tried and true tactics of the 
industry and met some of their long-term goals, individual auto manufacturers have been 
reluctant to offer their support for the rollback. As in the Chapter 5, this reluctant PR does not 
tell the whole story. Auto manufacturers lobbied to change the standards in 2017.1222 Yet, the 
business press has largely touted the industry’s opposition to Trump’s CAFE freeze, citing the 
industry’s interest in manufacturing electric vehicles. However, as I have showed, PR 
surrounding electric vehicles is not what it appears to be. As an alternative to CAFE, GM has 
offered one global standard for fuel economy.1223 Given that U.S. fuel economy standards have 
dragged behind the world for decades, a global fuel economy standard dictated by U.S. auto 
manufacturers could slow the worldwide response to global warming.  
The auto industry has long claimed that fuel economy goals were too stringent, while 
alleging that they could be met sometime in the future by electric or hydrogen vehicles. 
Recently, GM has promoted an alternative plan, like California’s in the 1990s, that would require 
7% of vehicles sold to produce zero-emissions in 2021. However, there is a catch: “GM's ZEV 
proposal suggests a credits-based system, where automakers would receive credits for every 
zero-emissions vehicle they sell (with partial credit for plug-in hybrid electric cars that can run 
with zero emissions part of the time… Automakers who fail to sell enough ZEVs could buy 
credits from other automakers (presumably, like GM) who were able to exceed their ZEV 
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requirements.”1224 While the auto industry has emphasized that it does want to sell more electric 
vehicles, the industry still remains focused on SUVs. Despite some changes from GM and Ford, 
there is not much to signal actual change in the industry. Ads remain focused on SUVs and 
trucks,1225 with only a few models of electric vehicles available from major U.S. manufacturers. 
Tesla’s increased popularity may be putting some pressure on the major manufacturers to 
address this burgeoning industry.  
In addition to continuing problems in fuel economy and SUV production, the SUV “arms 
race” continues to threaten the lives of drivers, passengers, and pedestrians.1226 Although U.S. 
traffic fatalities in general are lower than they were thirty years ago because of air bags, seat 
belts, and other technologies, they are still much higher than similar countries.1227 Rollovers are 
still more common in SUVs and trucks.1228 In addition, the rise in SUVs has led to more 
pedestrian deaths, with over 6,000 pedestrians killed in 2018. Pedestrian deaths likely result from 
the use of cell phones and the large size of SUVs and trucks, which makes them more deadly.1229 
New technologies also pose new threats. Tesla vehicles with autopilot have already entered the 
market, without much oversight from NHTSA, as described earlier. Unfortunately, some drivers 
have already been injured by the autopilot, and several accidents in Tesla vehicles have been 
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reported.1230 Despite the possible danger of more widespread use of autopilot, the NHTSA has 
largely left this developing market alone. The auto industry’s erosion of auto safety continues to 
endanger the public. 
Unfortunately, consumer reporting, which might help expose the problems of auto safety 
and auto loan discrimination, has declined. The heyday of investigative journalism after the 
Pentagon Papers was also the heyday of consumer journalism. When Nader was writing Unsafe 
at Any Speed and reporting on the problems of the auto industry, consumer reporters around the 
country offered similar reports for their readers. These investigations often came with 
consequences for the newspapers that published them. In the days when newspapers had more 
income, some newspapers could afford to take risks. Other newspapers still needed to capitulate, 
particularly to large advertisers. For example, in 1990, the San José Mercury News lost $1 
million of auto dealer advertising because of an article with advice about purchasing a 
vehicle.1231 Even then, the Mercury News issued an apology and published a favorable follow-up 
article. While consumer reporting has declined, business PR has steadily increased as funding for 
journalism dried up. More press releases are published as news, and outlets are more dependent 
on their advertisers.1232 This is a bad combination for consumer accountability. Yet, some news 
outlets have still been able to hold manufacturers accountable. Local news media discovered the 
problems of with the Firestone tires that were causing Ford SUVs to rollover.1233 If local news 
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media discovered the GM ignition switch scandal earlier, then hundreds of lives could have been 
saved, and GM would not have been able to manufacture more faulty vehicles.  
 In addition to accountability for auto safety, auto finance, and other consumer issues, the 
news media also plays an important role in laying out the terms of public policy debates. As I 
have shown, GM dominated the narratives around CAFE and SUV safety. Through advertising 
and PR, GM stalled fuel economy legislation and sold SUVs on safety. The auto industry 
continues to promote SUVs, while electric vehicles struggle with popularity. The reasons for the 
struggle of the electric vehicle range from the cost of electric vehicles to concern about the lack 
of infrastructure. However, the real reason may be advertising. While auto manufacturers have 
spent millions creating the SUV market, they have not spent even close to the same amount to 
advertise electric vehicles. Further, auto dealers are reluctant to sell electric vehicles because the 
profit margins are lower than SUVs and trucks.1234  
 This study has been situated within the political economy of communication, which 
addresses two kinds of inquiry. First, this field address how the structure of the media system 
influences content and the role of the media system in society.1235 In this case, I have shown how 
the commercial media system has been compromised by auto advertising and PR. Content is 
excluded and at times biased in favor of dealers and auto manufacturers. This leads to the 
exclusion of consumer issues, as well as the warping of policy issues in favor of industry. 
Secondly, the political economy of communication addresses how public policies structure the 
media system.1236 The U.S has focused on the commercial media system in the twentieth century. 
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However, the U.S. media system was not always commercial, nor was there always such 
animosity toward public funding.  
 The political economy of communication views journalism as a public good, meaning 
“journalism is something society requires but that the market cannot generate in sufficient 
quantity or quality.”1237 A viable press is necessary for self-government. Transportation is a 
pressing issue that must be dealt with in order to reverse course on climate change.1238 However, 
the policies that shape our transportation system cannot be addressed if the public does not have 
the knowledge to understand them. Although some scholars have argued that the internet will 
modernize journalism, the internet has not provided a solution to the funding crisis facing 
journalism. To the contrary, most news on the internet was originally reported and researched in 
print outlets. In addition, advertising revenue is smaller online, which leads to less revenue for 
funding journalism.1239 A free press is necessary for protecting the public interest and enabling 
citizens to make informed decisions, but the commercial media has failed to provide adequate 
journalism.  
 A viable free press is required for democracy, but the commercial media has not provided 
a solution. Scholars have offered a few alternative models for funding journalism. Robert W. 
McChesney has suggested that U.S. history offers a glimpse into the historical support for 
publicly funded journalism. In early U.S. history, postal subsidies allowed newspapers to be 
mailed for almost nothing. Other democracies have strong traditions of publicly supported 
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media. McChesney offers a solution developed by economists Dean and Randy Baker. They 
argue that a news voucher would allow Americans to fund publicly supported news through their 
tax returns. The media funded by this voucher should be ad-free and freely published online.1240 
Without the sway of advertisers, journalists would be freer to perform investigative reports that 
might impact auto dealers or auto manufacturers. This would help fill existing gaps in consumer 
coverage, as well as opening nuanced debates over public policy.  
Future Research Questions  
 This dissertation has addressed how GM’s promotional communication supported its 
move toward finance and SUVs from 1990 to 2009. I have demonstrated how advertising and PR 
worked together to reinforce messages about safety and the environment, while also opening the 
door to influencing news coverage, primarily relying on materials from the General Motors 
Heritage Center, as well as the archived Detroit Free Press newspaper. There are few areas of 
inquiry that remain to be explored.  
 First, during this period, GM’s relationship with the UAW was tense due to downsizing 
and whipsawing. However, the UAW frequently partnered with GM on CSR, such as Habitat for 
Humanity builds, and lobbying against CAFE regulations. Future research should investigate the 
why the UAW continued to partner with GM even as the corporation laid off workers and forced 
them to compete for jobs. There may have been internal struggles over the partnership or 
questions about the benefits gained from partnering with GM. Because unions are often aligned 
with democratic politics, lobbying against CAFE might have put the union at odds with other 
allies. The UAW’s complicated relationship with GM’s PR and lobbying deserves more scrutiny.  




 Second, this dissertation focused on the Detroit Free Press, a major publication in 
Detroit. Future research should address the relationship between the Free Press and GM in more 
detail. Interviews with journalists who worked at the press, as well as internal memos, could shed 
light on the long-term relationship between the Free Press and GM. Future research could also 
address the coverage in the Detroit News and local TV stations. The coverage in the News was 
likely similar to the Free Press because of the JOA. However, future research could delve into 
the relationship between the two papers and how that affected reporting, particularly reporting 
related to auto manufacturers and dealers.  
 Third, while this dissertation addressed how GM cultivated relationships with GM 
communities through CSR, there was little examination of Detroit itself. In national narratives, 
Detroit is often pictured as the victim of the decline of manufacturing. Yet, during this period, 
GM constructed the GM Renaissance Center along the Detroit River. The Renaissance Center 
served as a symbol of GM’s investment in the community. Roland Marchand has argued that the 
first department stores were like cathedrals to capitalism.1241 The Renaissance Center similarly 
offers a point of analysis as a symbol of the expectations of the American auto industry. More 
study is needed to determine how GM and the other auto manufacturers were involved in Detroit 
politics and how the Renaissance Center influenced GM’s reputation.  
 Finally, this dissertation was confined to the U.S. context. GM has been a global 
company for decades. Future studies should address how GM navigated globalization during this 
period of turmoil. GM has become highly invested in China, even developing a joint venture 
with a Chinese company.1242 China is an area of growth for the auto industry. However, as the 
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world moves closer to two billion cars, GM’s investment in China is also propelling the planet 
closer to the point of no return for global warming. Future research should address the 
implications of GM’s investment in China on both the environment and on political economy of 
communication. 
Conclusion 
Most studies of the auto industry within the field of communication focus on PR around 
vehicle recalls or symbolism in vehicle ads.1243 Through this study, I have attempted a broad 
inquiry into GM’s promotional communication and how GM promoted financial products and 
SUVs from 1990 to 2009. These two areas remain important for GM because corporate 
profitability is still dependent on SUVs. GM’s promotional communication has enabled the 
corporation to influence consumer purchases and key public policy debates. Unfortunately, the 
popularity of SUVs continues to climb around the world.1244 The addiction spawned by desperate 
U.S. auto manufacturers in the 1990s has put the world on a crash course toward unavoidable 
climate change. Protecting consumer safety, personal finance, and the climate requires 
addressing the influence the auto industry over the commercial media. Alternative models of 
journalism, such as publicly funded journalism, present an opportunity to ignite the public policy 
debate and protect the public interest.  
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